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Abstract 
This thesis of 84,616 words uses the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 to consider the 
Press in Great Britain and Russia. 5 case-study chapters consider respectively 
the reaction to the Bosnian and Hercegovinian revolt of 1875, the Bulgarian 
'Atrocity Campaign' of 1876, the outpouring of public sympathy in Russia for 
the cause of the Serbs in 1876, the involvement of Greece in Eastern crisis, 
and the British 'Jingo' movement. For each case study, the relationship of the 
mass activity to the newspaper and periodical press is considered, as well as 
tracing the interplay between government and Press, and examining whether 
the Press was able to act as an intermediary between people and 
government. As this is a comparative study, these movements are considered 
not only through their own national Press, but through that of the other 
nation. A recurring theme throughout, is the running current of suspicion 
existing between Britain and Russia throughout this period, which is analysed 
in some detail, and shown to have been a highly significant factor in much of 
what was undertaken by both governments and individuals in Britain and 
Russia at this time. 
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Note on definitions and terminology 
Throughout this thesis, the term "Eastern Question" will be used to refer to 
the general perception in eighteenth and nineteenth Century Europe that the 
Ottoman Empire was in a state of terminal decline, and the dilemma thus 
faced by European politicians as to what or who should fill the void it left. The 
term "Eastern Crisis" will be used to refer to the flare-up in the Balkans 
between 1875 and 1878 that occupies the primary attention of this thesis. 
The term 'Britain' will be used through this work, including in translation of 
the Russian 'angJiio' which, despite being literally 'England' was used to refer 
to the political entity represented by Disraeli, Gladstone or any other of 
Victoria's Ministers. This is consistent with the common usage by British 
politicians of the time, as shown by the example of Gladstone who once, 
during a speech in Scotland paused to 'correct' himself for having said 
England, then within two or three lines had lapsed back into saying 'England' 
again.1 Stapleton, following the example of Grainger, also argues that for this 
period the terms 'English' and 'British' are essentially synonymous. 2 Although 
many historians would dissent from this view, it is one which will be adopted 
for the purpose of this thesis. 
The names of Russian publications and titles of articles therein will be given in 
English, accompanied by an appropriate transliteration of the Russian on their 
first appearance, and in isolation thereafter. Quotations will appear in English 
only, except where a reference to the Russian is needed to illustrate a 
linguistic nuance. 
Many place names in the nineteenth Century were rendered differently from 
today. For the Balkan Principalities, the older forms 'Servia,' 'Roumania' etc, 
will be retained only in direct quotations, with the more modern 'Serbia' and 
1 D.W. Bebbington, The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer & Politics, (Oxford, 2004), p.27S. 
2 J. Stapleton, 'Political thought and national identity in Britain, 1850-1950,' in S. Collini, R. 
Whatmore & B. Young (Eds.) History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History, 1750-
1950, (Cambridge, 2000), p.24S. 
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'Romania' used otherwise. 'Constantinople' will be used throughout, rather 
than 'Istanbul.' 
The names of the Romanov Tsars will be translated into their familiar English 
equivalents, 'Nicholas,' 'Alexander' and so forth, rather than the 
transliterated 'Aleksandr,' 'Nikolai.' However, for other personal names, 
transliteration will be used according to the Library of Congress system, so 
'Tolstoi,' 'Dostoevskii,' rather than the more archaic forms- 'Tolstoy' 
'Dostoevsky,' (the exception of course being direct quotations from or 
references to English-language publications which are using the older form.) 
The feminine form of Russian surnames ends in -a. However, for the Russian 
expatriate in London, Olga Novikova, the form 'Novikov' will be used to 
minimise confusion for English speakers, as this is the form used in the vast 
majority of the (principally English) secondary works which refer to her, as 
well as her own writings. 
Imperial Russia in the nineteenth century was still using the Julian calendar, 
placing it roughly twelve days behind Europe. All dates referred to in the main 
body of the text will be according to the Gregorian calendar, but quotations 
from the Russian Press will contain both dates in the footnote, with the 
Russian date appearing in brackets (this is the reverse of how the date 
appeared in publication, where the Russian date was given prominence and 
the Gregorian-style date was given only in brackets for reference. However, 
such an approach seems both inappropriate and likely to cause confusion in a 
comparative piece). 
Some of the articles discussed and referenced here, were printed in British 
journals anonymously. These have been cross-referenced with the Wellesley 
Index to Victorian Periodicals for the probable identity of the author, and this 
information has been added in a footnote where appropriate. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
This study seeks to consider Britain and Russia during the period 1875-1878 and, 
using their actions and reactions around the flare-up of the Eastern Question, 
examine the relationship between the Press, society, and government. The precise 
publications to be considered will be detailed below,l but broadly speaking, the 
focus will be on daily newspapers as well as literary and political journals and 
periodicals. This study will be concerned with how mass social movements were 
represented in the Press, and to what extent it is possible to observe a role being 
played by the Press either in creating these public movements, or in mediating 
between public and government at this time. As the so-called 'Great Eastern Crisis' 
is the focal point, the exact time-scale will be from the spring of 1875 when the 
Hercegovinian revolt first broke out until the summer of 1878, when the various 
European Powers concluded their agreements at the Congress of Berlin. Evidently, 
neither of these events were truly delineated epoch-changers, the Hercegovinian 
revolt was initially little-regarded as just one in a long series of disturbances, and 
the Congress of Berlin had consequences and ramifications over a wide-ranging 
time-period. Medlicott for example argues strongly that the dividing point between 
significant events comes before the Berlin Congress, at the time when the various 
powers agreed to convene, and that the crisis did not truly end until 1881. 2 
However, as he himself notes, the diplomats involved believed at the time that the 
Question had been solved at Berlin, and given that this is largely to be a study of 
public perceptions, the Berlin Congress does indeed provide a suitable watershed 
for concluding the study, for the sake of convenience and practicality.3 
This introduction will begin with a review of the existing state of the many 
historiographical fields with which this study intersects, and establishing the 
contexts in which this work belongs. This will begin with the broader notions of 
'Society' and ideology. Secondly, it will consider 'the Press' in the nineteenth 
1 See below, pS4. 
2 W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern 
Settlement 1878-1880, (London, 1963), pp.ix-xii. 
3 Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p.138. 
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century. Having done this, I will gradually focus in on Russia and Great Britain; 
looking at politics and foreign policy in Britain and at Panslavism in Russia. Finally 
there will be an overview of the tangled history of what became known as the 
Eastern Question, including a specific focus upon the involvement of Britain and 
Russia prior to 1875. Once this background has been established, the following 
chapter will then outline the primary sources to be considered in this thesis, and 
the methodology to be used in examining them, along with an evaluation of the 
principal methodological issues when dealing with this type of source. Finally, a 
broad structure of the thesis as a whole will be given. 
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Literature Review 
The unique nature of this study lies within the fact that it is considering events from 
such a breadth of sources and perspectives. There have been many past studies of 
The Balkan Crisis, of the Eastern Question broadly, of Russian Civil society, of 
Russian governance, of Gladstone and Disraeli. However, these studies have 
generally considered these various elements in isolation from one another. This 
study, by nature of being comparative, will be the first to draw upon them all 
together in a meaningful way, and thereby to show what discoveries in one of these 
areas can illuminate about another. 
Society 
As this is to be a study of the activities of society and the public at this time, it is 
necessary to consider more precisely what is meant by these terms. The differing 
natures of the Russian and British states mean that it is clear that there will not be 
an identical 'society' in the two states. Great Britain has notoriously taken a 
considerable pride in its history of parliaments and in the limitations placed upon 
Royal rule. Indeed, it was described in 1865 by John Bright as 'the mother of 
Parliaments,' a phrase which had already passed into vernacular before the end of 
the nineteenth century.4 This said, it would be wrong to imagine that Britain at this 
time was a democracy as the term would be understood today. The most recent 
piece of relevant legislation before the period covered in this study, was the 
Representation of the People Act (1867), which increased the electorate from 
around 1 million to just over 2 million, namely all urban Male Householders.s 
However, this still accounted for barely half of adult males, with all women being 
excluded from the ballot for at least another 50 years. Russia by contrast, lacked an 
elected legislative body, and the nearest that most citizens, even those of the 
4 H.W. Horwill'The Referendum in Great Britain,' Political Science Quarterly, Vol 26, No.3, (Sep 
1911), p.427; M. Lewis, 'Speech to the Unionists of South Edinburgh,' LSE selected Pamhplets, 1890, 
p.ll. 
sR. Saunders, 'The Politics of Reform and Making of the 2nd Reform Act, 1848-1867,' The Historical 
Journal, VoISO, No.3, (Sep, 2007), pp.S71-S91. For a fuller discussion see his more recent book: R. 
Saunders, Democracy and the vote in British politics: the making of the second Reform Act, 
(Farnham, 2011). 
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educated classes, could get to such a thing, was through the Zemstva. 6 The Zemstva 
were elected district councils, appointed by a broader franchise, but with heavy 
weightings in place to disproportionally emphasise the views of the nobility.7 More 
to the point, it was not able to legislate, merely to organise regional activities, with 
no national congress of the Zemstva ever being held. The Tsar of all Russians was 
very much the initiator of policy and government, whereas the Queen of Great 
Britain, although influential, merely signed her assent to legislation initiated, 
debated and enacted by parliament. Despite these fundamental contrasts at the 
highest level of the state, an attempt will be made now to sketch some of the basic 
commonalities of 'society' as a concept, before focusing in on the specifics of Great 
Britain and Russia at the time. 
Civil Society is something Keane has identified as a concept that was popularised in 
the eighteenth century, but which was fading by the end of the nineteenth 
century.8 This places it as a concept clearly relevant to our time period, but does 
little to help define what is meant by the term: there are as many definitions of Civil 
Society as there are writers about it, and the aim here will be to draw some of these 
diverse writings together, in an attempt to identify some of the key features. For 
Hobbes, although society reflected the common good, it was fundamentally 
artificial, borne out of a love of ease, or a fear of oppression. 9 This, Smelser and 
Warner have argued, was the reason that eighteenth century philosophers such as 
Rousseau were forced to construct their notions of society within a framework of 
'the nation.,lD Melurri argued for the importance of 'invisible networks' in Civil 
Society implying a genuine existence, but a degree of difficulty in perceiving the 
gradual changes made to people's assumptions. ll Significantly, Konrad asserted 
that in Autocratic or Totalitarian regimes, it was necessary to have at best a weak or 
unconfident Civil Society, due to State suspicion of independent activity on the part 
6 Zemstva is the plural of zemstvo. 
7 G. Hosking, Russia: People & Empire 1552-1917, {London, 1997}, p.325. 
8 J. Keane, Civil Society and the State, (London, 1993), p.l. 
9 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (London, 1651), pp.161-163. 
10 N.J. Smelser & R.S. Warner, SOciological Theory: Historical and Formal, (Morristown, 1976), pp.19-
20,27. 
11 Cited in Keane, Civil Society & The State, p.12. 
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of individuals.12 For this reason, I will now examine Russia, to see whether there is a 
similar correlation. 
Recent decades, in particular the 1990s, saw a significant amount of research in 
Late Imperial Russian history, which focused upon the question of 'the middle' in 
the final decades of Empire. The majority of current scholarship seems largely 
convinced that the ultimate demise of the Romanovs was inevitable, and that 'the 
state's rejection of society's attempts to become involved in Russian governance 
doomed it to failure.,13 However, whilst the general principle can be posited, for 
this thesis to be proven, it is necessary to show evidence for, on the one hand, a 
broad range of activities by citizens seeking to become involved in governance, and 
on the other, a failure of the government to allow this. For Engelstein, this was 
expressed in a paradoxical attempt on the part of Alexander II to 'reinforce the 
basis of traditional autocratic rule by controlled application of its opposite 
principles.,14 In this vein, there have, in recent years, been a multiplicity of case 
studies examining those elements thus introduced, and the associated specific 
groups in Russian society who fell between the elites of the Royal family and their 
inner circles on the one hand, and the lowest tier, the workers and the peasantry, 
on the other. 1s Although not necessarily the biggest group of these studies, perhaps 
the most pertinent for this study, given its methodological focus, is the question of 
the press, and therefore this will be discussed separately below.16 Other key 
examples of this fresh work are considerations of the specific roles of students, 
women and teachers, although the list continues through more specific categories 
such as statisticians, to cover a seemingly endless variety of microscopic areas. 17 
12 Cited in Ibid. p.4. 
13 S. Badcock, 'Autocracy in Crisis: Nicholas the Last,' in I. Thatcher (Ed), Late Imperial Russia: 
Problems & Prospects, (Manchester, 2005), p.l0; C. Read, 'In Search of Liberal Tsarism: The 
Historiography of Autocratic Decline,' The Historical Journal, 45, (2002), pp.195-21O. 
14 L. Engelstein, 'The Dream of Civil society in Tsarist Russia: Law, state and religion,' in N. Bermeo & 
P. Nord, Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Euorpe, (Oxford, 2000), 
p.27. 
15 Detailed below. 
16 See below, pp.18-23. 
17 S.K. Morrissey, Heralds of Revolution: Russian Students and the Mythologies of Radicalism (New 
York, 1998); B. Alpern Engel, Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-
Century Russia (Cambridge, 1983); c. Ruane, 'The Vestal Virgins of St. Petersburg: Schoolteachers 
and the 1897 Marriage Ban,' Russian Review, Vo1.50, No2, (1991), pp.163-182. 
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Another significant development in recent years has been the acquiring of a 
regional focus, with case studies being carried out that venture beyond the 
traditional confines of Moscow and St Petersburg. 18 Unsurprisingly, these works 
paint an increasingly diverse picture of Russia, increasing the need for clarity in 
other research about whether the subject is 'Russia' in any meaningful way, or 
merely St. Petersburg. 
Whilst there has been a positive shift in the nature of the material considered, 
there are still many difficulties with the interpretation of the findings. One 
significant reason for this, is the gulf between Russia and the West in terminology. 
Western writers considering Russia often resort to discussing the rather ambiguous 
'middle' in order to avoid the possible misconceptions inherent in the other 
common terms. Lohr advocates the use of 'Civil Society' in relation to Russia, 
arguing the only alternative is 'autocratic citizenship,' something he rejects as being 
oxymoronic. 19 For Gramsci, the omnipresence of the Russian state meant that Civil 
Society could never be more than 'primordial and gelatinous,' lacking a 
superstructure to support the state in its times of weakness. 2o This 'classic' 
statement has been recently argued to be 'both right and wrong' by Engelstein, 
who sees the state as stiflingly powerful, yet asserts the need for the Tsars to 
'contend with public opinion, if only on a limited scale.'21 Others, such as Kassow 
have shown the self-contradictory way in which the state attempted this, for 
example in asking the Universities both to create a new Russia and to preserve the 
traditional society at the same time. 22 Indeed, he has gone further, questioning 
whether there was even 'room for a nation alongside the autocratic state. t23 
Bradley has questioned whether Civil Society is a standard and a universal 
18 L. Hafner, 'liThe Temple of Idleness": Associations and the Public Sphere in Provincial Russia: A 
Case Study of Saratov, 1800-1917,' in S. P. McCaffray & M. Melancon (Eds.)' Russia in the European 
Context 1789-1914: A member of the family, (New York, 2005), pp.141-149; B. Eklof & S. Frank (Eds), 
The World of the Russian Peasant: Post-emancipation Culture and Society (London, 1990). 
19 E. Lohr, 'The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia,' Kritika, 7, (2006), p.173. 
20 A. Gramsci, Selections from The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, (Ed & Trans. Q. Hoare & 
G.N. Smith), (London, 2001), p.494. 
21 Engelstein, 'The Dream,' pp.23-24. 
22 S. D. Kassow, Students, Professors and the State in Tsarist Russia, {Berkley, 1989}, p.387. 
23 I bid, p.l. 
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alternative to state power, or whether it is a purely western construction. 24 A 
significant contributing factor to this uncertainty is the difficulty of providing direct 
translations for the relevant terminology. Of primary concern for those interested 
in the issue of Civil Society in Imperial Russia, is the term obshchestvennost', which 
can be translated simply as 'society' but has stronger political overtones than the 
standard Russian translation for 'society' - obshchestvo. Hosking offers a broad 
range of definitions including variously 'educated society' 'politically aware society' 
and perhaps the greatest stretch 'public opinion.,25 Although the term 
obshchestvennost' was initially coined in the late eighteenth century, it was not 
popularised until the mid-nineteenth century when, Shepherd and Kelly argue, it 
was used to emphasise a break with earlier traditions of society and to assert a 
more radical outlook. 26 For Hosking it was more explicitly a zemstvo term, for a self-
appointed 'alternative establishment.,27 
The key question at this juncture, is what exactly the nature of obshchestvennost' 
was. Tsarist Russia both historically and legally divided its citizens into Sos/ovio, 
classifications which were both stronger, and far more long-lived, than the class 
structures of Europe at large, perhaps more resembling an Indian caste system. 28 In 
an autocratic society, in which superficial attempts at Western-style legality 
inevitably lacked the institutions necessary to implement them, this means of 
legally defining the status of various groups of the populace was crucial. 29 Gleason 
has argued that distinctions between the various social classes were the nearest 
thing Russia had to a social contract, and that this was therefore something the 
state strove actively to preserve. 3D In this context, the question of 
obshchestvennost' becomes particularly significant, especially if we regard it as 
24 J. Bradley, 'Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia', The 
American Historical Review, 107, (200), pp.1094-95. 
25 Hosking, Russia: People & Empire, p.325. 
26 C. Kelly & D. Shepherd, Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940, (Oxford, 
1998). 
27 Hosking, Russia: People & Empire, p.325. 
28 G.L. Freeze, 'The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History,' The American Historical 
Review, 91, (1986), p.1l-36. 
29 R. Wortman, 'Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: New Considerations of the Court Reform of 
1864,' Kritika, 6, (2005), p.149. 
30 A. Gleason, Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s, (New York, 1980), p.13. 
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being somehow distinct from a conscious class, and instead 'an informal yet 
authoritative presence of educated Russians determined to work for the common 
good, for progress. J31 For, whilst nineteenth Century Russia was largely a peasant 
state, with minimal standards of literacy,32 it has been argued that many of the 
Russian people developed conceptions of class consciousness, long before the 
emergence of clearly defined social classes themselves. 33 In fact, Monas goes so far 
as to argue that the primary reason for the lack of a self-conscious bourgeoisie in 
Russia was that the term was regarded as being too radical by the elites, yet too 
crude by the intelligentsia.34 Owen challenges this view, although he does support 
the notion that a bourgeois consciousness was lacking in Russia, by asserting 
instead that what was lacking were the necessary elements to form a coherent 
class, namely a shared set of ideas or beliefs, the means of communicating and 
sharing these ideas, and a means of acting on them. 35 The 'middle' in Imperial 
Russia then becomes simply a catch-all term for any who failed to fit into the 
existing sos/oviaJ a kind of incoherent succession to a set of traditional definitions 
rapidly declining in relevance. This, Wagner argues, poses a significant problem for 
what he perceives as traditional historiography, namely the notion that the middle 
classes always support liberalism and ultimately parliamentary democracy.36 In 
Russia it becomes necessary to seek a far narrower social grouping, something 
which is defined by activity and is significant because it at least aspired to create 
the common liberties that Russia lacked.37 As Engelstein puts it, although the 
attempts to create elements of civil society spawned both 'desire' and 'frustration,' 
31 E. W. Clowes, S. D. Kassow, J. L. West (Eds.)' Between Tsar and People: educated society and the 
quest for public identity in late imperial Russia, (Princeton, 1991), p.3. 
32 The earliest Russia-wide statistics are from 1897, at which point in time 21% of the population was 
listed as literate. Brooks asserts the rapid rise in literacy in the last half-century of the empire, and 
the fact that literacy was highest amongst the young. Given that in our period 21% of new recruits 
into the army could read and write, the national figure at this time would seem likely to be far lower. 
J. Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature 1861-1917 (Princeton, 
1985), pp.3-4. 
33 T.C. Owen, 'Impediments to a Bourgeois Consciousness in Russia,' in Clowes, Kassow, West, 
Between Tsar and People, p.88. 
34 S. Monas, 'Twilight Middle Class of nineteenth Century Russia', in Clowes, Kassow, West, Between 
Tsar and People, p.28. 
35 Owen, 'Impediments to a Bourgeois Consciousness,' p.76. 
36 W. G. Wagner, 'Ideology, Identity, and the Emergence of a Middle Class', in Clowes, Kassow, West, 
Between Tsar and People, pp.149-150. 
37 J. Bradley, 'Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture', in Clowes, Kassow & West, Between Tsar and 
People, p.148. 
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it is the desire that is key, 'a case of wishful thinking embodying the wish.,38 This 
then, is the obshchesvennost' and in Russia, this must be the point of examination 
when seeking to establish the existence and nature of Civil Society. Perhaps the 
best summary of these various tenets to be sought in Russia when looking for a civil 
society is a series of extra-state activities that are 'ordered, nonclandestine and 
collective.,39 
Society in Victorian Britain was of course a very different matter, the local and 
social independent activities which must be sought so carefully in Russia were clear 
for anyone to see with groups meeting freely and regularly in schools, chapels or 
pubs.40 Joyce sees the Victorian period as the time when 'social' activities outgrew 
their traditional parameters, and although he considers Civil Society to have been 
born in the eighteenth century, it only reached its fullest form in the nineteenth.41 
For Thompson, the crucial change in the nineteenth century as regards the political 
activity of society, was the tactic adopted by Earl Grey in framing the Great Reform 
act, namely to 'associate the middle with the higher orders of society.,42 This, he 
argues, moved the government from having all sections of society united in 
disgruntlement to having the vast majority of middle class heads of household 
enfranchised and thus associated with the system rather than outside it.43 This is 
perhaps reflected in the concern of many of the middle classes in the Victorian 
period to 'improve' the lower orders, and indeed their surprise at the ability of 
working people to conduct themselves respectably, for example at the Great 
Exhibition of 1851.44 However, Thompson argues that this does not mean that the 
Victorians should be seen as simply 'cleaning up a rough and raw society,' rather 
they were 'fashioning the elements of a new society in step with the appearance of 
38 Engelstein, 'The Dream,' p.24. 
39 Bermeo & Nord, Civil Society, pxiv. 
40 J.M. Golby & A.W. Purdue, The Civilisation of the Crowd: Popular Culture in England, 1750-1900 
(Revised Ed.) (Stroud, 1999), p.120. 
41 P. Joyce, Democratic Subjects: The self & the social in Nineteenth Century England, (Cambridge, 
1994), p.1S. 
42 F.M.L. Thompson, The rise of respectable society: a social history of Victorian Britain 1830-1900, 
(London, 1988), p.16. 
43 Ibid, pp.14, 19. 
44 Golby & Purdue, The Civilisation of the Crowd, pp.116, 137-8. 
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its material and human components.,45 Thus it is important to recognise that when 
considering Civil Society in Victorian Britain, we are dealing with groups who had an 
evolving sense of their own identity. 
Although Joyce feels that 'class' has lost its primacy as a category of historical 
explanation, for this period, it still seems both an informative and a useful 
shorthand for identifying the 'middling' sections of the population who were 
outside of the highest aristocratic circles, yet provided the literate electoral opinion 
of which the government needed to be mindful. 46 Furthermore, the multiplicity of 
studies of everyday life in the nineteenth century which have appeared in recent 
decades invariably delineate their area of study by class, or in some other fashion 
make class a key element.47 Inevitably, given the sources used to consider opinion, 
this study will shed greater light on a middle-class than a working-class perspective 
of the Crisis. 
Although they are not the primary focus of this thesis, no consideration of social 
elements within Late Imperial Russia would be complete without an appreciation of 
the nature of 'The People.' This is the form generally used to translate the Russian 
'Narod/ although other forms such as 'common folk' are also to be found, and has a 
meaning loosely equivalent to the German 'volk.AB Whilst in a literal sense, the 
term could be used simply to refer to the masses of the Russian population, the 
rural peasantry, in reality it was generally used far more emotively and evocatively 
than this. The educated and literary classes of Russia seem to have felt entirely 
confident about assigning views, ideals and opinions to 'The People,' variously a 
kind of noble purity uncorrupted by the influence of the West which was so 
inevitable in the metropolitan areas, or a backward savagery bypassed by the 
recent steps of progress. Furthermore, although Russia was a state whose borders 
45 Thompson, The rise of respectable society, p.29. 
46 Joyce, Democratic Subjects, p.2. 
47 There are, of course, numerous examples of this e.g. J. T. Smith, A Victorian class conflict? 
Schoolteaching and the parson, priest and minister, 1837-1902, (Brighton, 2009); P. Ingham, The 
Language of Gender and Class: Transformation in the Victorian novel, (London, 1996); H. McLeod, 
Piety and Poverty: workingclass religion in Berlin, London, and New York, 1870-1914, (New York, 
1996). 
48 N. Stone, S. Podboltov, M Yasar, 'Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of 
Empires,' in A. Miller & A.J. Rieber (eds.), Imperial Rule, (Budapest, 2004), p.32. 
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were defined by military rather than ethnic factors, it was generally believed that 
nationality lay with (the people.,49 The actions and views which the Press, and 
indeed historians since, have claimed for (the People' at this time will be of 
considerable significance for this study, although not for what they tells us about 
(the People,' per se, but more for what they tell us about those who thus discerned 
these views and attitudes. 
The Press 
The nineteenth century has been cited as the period when newspapers not only 
grew in number but, according to Jones, became (embedded in the culture.'so 
Therefore, the historiography of the press is a crucial topic for anyone concerned 
with popular events of that period and in particular for a study using the press as a 
window onto the period. However, Jones' comments were made only in reference 
to the role of newspapers in England, and therefore their status in Russian society 
needs separate examination. Before considering the historiography of the Press in 
the two nations separately, it is necessary to first consider the works of the German 
theorist Jurgen Habermas, who has been highly influentia I on theories of the Press 
and its role as an intermediary between Public and Private. Habermas's The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere first appeared in German in 1962, 
only being translated into English in 1989.51 In it, he traces from the Middle Ages 
the changing relationship between public and private, focusing not upon (Civil 
Society,' but upon the more ambiguous (Public Sphere,' and the related concept 
"Public Opinion.,s2 
Although providing considerations of Germany and France, Habermas focused 
primarily upon Britain as he traced the development of the Press from being simply 
a means of keeping contact between an increasingly broad coffee-house discussion 
culture, through a mercantile position as purveyors of News as a commodity, to an 
49 Miller & Rieber, Imperial Rule, p.2; Stone, Podbolt & Yasar, 'Russians and Turks,' in Miller and 
Rieber, Imperial Rule, p.32. 
50 A. Jones, Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power & the Public in Nineteenth Century England, 
(Cambridge, 1996), pxi. 
51 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Trans T. Burger, (Cambridge, 
1989). 
52 Ibid., pp.5-30. 
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ideological role as the partisans of a particular political cause. 53 The last stage 
pertinent to this study, he diagnosed from the mid-1830s, as being the time when 
the Press returned to being Iprimarily a business.,s4 Habermas has not been without 
his critics, and Hampton in particular accuses him of Islippage' in his definitions, 
failing to state conclusively whether the Ipublic sphere' is a Ihistorical entity' or a 
Inormative idea.'ss 
There is a clear sense in Habermas's work that the growth of the Press led to a 
decline in public criticism, and he defines most modern forms of society as having in 
common the increased labstinence from literary and political debate.,s6 However, 
he is very assertive about the direction of cause and effect here, in a manner that 
sits uneasily with Jones' observation of the continued puzzle, in Britain at least, 
during the nineteenth century as to whether the press reflected or created public 
opinion.s7 Indeed, although Hampton has observed a marked shift in educated 
opinion in nineteenth century Britain from the view that readers rationally 
evaluated material to the idea that they passively accepted it, this seems to be 
more strongly linked to the so-called INew Journalism' of Stead and others in the 
1880s and beyond.s8 
The fullest consideration of the role of the press in nineteenth century Russia is 
Louise McReynolds' The News under Russia's Old Regime.s9 The methodological 
approach adopted by McReynolds will be considered below in discussing the 
methodology of this study. As regards her work more generally, she relies heavily 
on Habermas, and particularly the notion of a Ibourgeois public sphere.,6o In the 
view of McReynolds, the public sphere was a more obtainable goal than the more 
ill-defined ICivil Society' or democracy. She highlights the views of the American 
media magnate Walter Lippman, who felt that the connection between economy 
53 Ibid., pp.21, 42-3, 59-60. 
54 Ibid, p184. 
55 M. Hampton, 'Liberalism, the Press and the Construction of the Public Sphere: Theories of the 
Press in Britain, 1830-1914,' Victorian Periodicals Review, Vol37, Nol, (Spring, 2004), p.74. 
56 Habermas, Public sphere, p163. 
57 Jones, Powers of the Press, pp.87 -88. 
58 Hampton, 'Liberalism' pp.73, 77-79. 
59 L. McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime, (Princeton, 1991). 
60 J Habermas, The Structural transformation of the Public Sphere: an enquiry into a category of 
Bourgeois society: trans. Thomas Burger, (Cambridge, Mass, 1989). 
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and politics forged by the press linked the growth of the 'fourth estate' inexorably 
to the rise of democracy.61 There are of course numerous objections to Lippman's 
theories, for example observations such as those of Parsons and White, who have 
highlighted the use of the press (amongst various forms of mass media) by 
totalitarian regimes as instruments of propaganda and control. 62 For McReynolds 
however, the flaws in Lippman's arguments are dealt with by Habermas' focus upon 
the pre-commercial rather than simply the commercial Press. 63 
Although some of her theoretical structure may be called into question, 
McReynolds' work remains invaluable to the scholar of the Russian press in this 
period, as it offers the most detailed accounts available of the key events in the 
development of the most significant elements of the mass-circulation press and the 
individuals behind it. Other key texts in the existing historiography of the Russian 
Press include various articles compiled by Deborah Martinsen on journals, Joan 
Neuberger's work on the St. Petersburg popular press, or so-called boulevard 
newspapers, and Daniel Brower's work on the penny press.64 Due to the broad 
nature of the press, and the specific focus of these works, there is often little 
interaction between them, although a degree of overlap does start to become 
apparent when the Press is considered more indirectly, yet still in considerable 
detail, in works such as Daniel Balmuth's volume on censorship, and Jeffrey Brooks 
on the growth of Russian literacy.65 Brooks' primary concern is with the liubok 
literature that was popular amongst the urban lower classes in the latter part of the 
century, but he reveals the educated attitudes to the growth in mass literacy, 
primarily characterised by 'disdain and dismay' at the standard of the material 
being read. 66 This is a commonality with much of the literature for Britain at the 
61 McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime, p.ll. 
62 T. Parsons, and W. White, 'The Mass Media and the Structure of American Society' Journal of 
Social Issues 16, (1960), p.67-77. 
63 McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime, p12. 
64 D.A. Martinsen (Ed.), Literary Journals in Imperial Russia (Cambridge, 1997); J. Neuberger, 'Stories 
of the Street: Hooliganism in the St. Petersburg Popular Press', Slavic Review, 48, (1989), 177-194; 
D.R. Brower, The Russian City between tradition and modernity 1850-1900, (Oxford, 1990). 
65 D. Balmuth, Censorship in Russia. 1865-1905, (Washington D.C., 1979); Brooks, When Russia 
Learned to Read. 
66 Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read, p.295. 
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time.
67 
Despite the obvious links between ideological groups and the press, little 
has been produced in the way of detailed studies of how they interacted, despite 
assertions such as those of Suslov who argued that in an autocracy, a truly free 
press was vital as an expresser of alternative opinions, without which an autocrat 
would become so isolated as to be rendered practically impotent: in the words of 
the Slavophiles {the people offer opinions, the tsar - decisions.,68 
The literature for the British Press of ou r period is rather more substantial than for 
the Russian, perhaps a reflection of the greater number of legal papers. Koss notes 
the significance of the abolition between 1854 and 1855 of the advertising and 
stamp duties that had kept prices high and thus limited the growth of the daily 
Press. 69 No less significant a factor than stamp duties for the Press in Nineteenth 
Century Britain, were the Paper Duties, against which Gladstone campaigned so 
vigorously in 1861-2. Shannon notes how this campaign against {the greatest of the 
{{taxes on knowledge'" cost Gladstone a series of unprecedented political defeats 
before ultimately becoming law.70 This reduction in commercial obstacles, 
combined with the increased demand for overseas news caused by the outbreak of 
the Crimean War in 1853, led to nearly five hundred new papers being established 
in the next decade, almost as many as in the entire century up to that point.71 
Indeed, this proliferation of independent titles, combined with the influence held 
by some of the larger papers, has led Chamberlain to assert that this was the period 
in which {public opinion' and {press opinion' were at their closest.72 As far as the 
influence of the press goes, Koss in his highly comprehensive The Rise and Fall of 
the Political Press in Britain shows confidently that it was The Times of London 
which came closest to being the paper of record insofar as politicians and educated 
readers were concerned. Indeed he cites Abraham Lincoln as saying of the paper ({I 
67 Hampton, 'Liberalism,' p.84; Jones, Powers of the Press, p.7. 
68 M. Suslov, 'Slavophilism is True Liberalism: The Political Utopias of S.F. Sharapov 1855-1911,' 
Russian History, 38, (2011), p.287. 
69 5 Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: Voll. The Nineteenth Century, (London, 
1984,) pp.68-69. 
70 Shannon, Gladstone, God and Politics, pp.136-140. 
71 Jones, Powers of the Press, p.23. 
72 M. E. Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914, (London, 1988), p.14. 
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don't know anything which has more power except the Mississipi."n Historians 
seem generally agreed that the 1870s was a period of particular good health for the 
British Press, and Lee characterises it as a decade of optimism. 74 This optimism 
should not necessarily be taken at face-value, however. Brown argues that although 
the late-Victorian Press took great pride in its supposed independence, it was in 
reality heavily dependent upon both Politicians and its readership.7s In his view, the 
Press existed in a complex web of patronage, exchanging coverage for information 
with leading political figures, at the same time as bending to the perceived public 
mood regarding what should be written. However, he also notes that this never 
appeared to shake the British Press's belief in its own incorruptibility, nor the 
confidence which others placed in it. 76 
Whatever their own desires, be they commercially or politically motivated a 
newspaper editor's ability to publish on a given topic was always constrained by the 
law. For Russia, the limitation clearly came most strongly from the behaviour of the 
censor. In his early years as Tsar, Alexander II carried out extensive reforms to the 
all-pervasive state censor that had grown under his father to the point where the 
number of censors exceeded the number of books being published.77 However, in 
the 1860s, there was a sharp reaction against this, as responsibility for censorship 
was shifted to the notoriously reactionary Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in 1865, a 
series of 'temporary regulations' were issued that ultimately lasted for 38 years. 78 
In 1868, the censor was given the power to forbid retail sale of newspapers (the 
selling of individual copies rather than regular deliveries to subscribers) and in 1873 
a decision was taken to 'prohibit discussions in the press of any social or political 
issues.'79 Whilst this does not present a particularly encouraging portrait of the 
journalistic landscape, McCombs and Shaw have argued that the Press was still to a 
73 Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press, p.129. 
74 A.J. Lee, The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855-1914, (London, 1976), p62. 
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certain extent able to set the agenda of what was discussed even if they were more 
limited regarding the line they took on it. 8o Brown has argued that any Press which 
reported or summarised a selection of news, rather than simply printing verbatim 
what it was told to by its political masters was, in fact, in a position of significant 
influence.81 Indeed, although questions of audience and censorship (which will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter 2) may mean having to qualify any conclusions we 
may be able to draw from it, the fact remains that all the available data indicates an 
increasingly diverse press at this time, and one which was able to exercise a 
reasonable degree of freedom from simply proclaiming state doctrines. 82 In fact, 
much of the Soviet scholarship on the Russian Imperial press, despite setti ng out to 
discredit the journalists as being unduly influenced, or even controlled, by 
bourgeois capital, shows admirably that it was not.83 
Whilst the British Press did not have to deal with a militant censor, there were still 
legal considerations for the Victorian Press in terms of what they could publish. 
Perhaps the most significant moment in this respect had come at the end of the 
Eighteenth Century with Fox's Act or, more properly, The Libel Act (1792). This had 
taken decisions regarding libel suits out of the hands of judges, and had placed 
them instead under the charge of juries. Harling has shown how in the early 
decades of the Nineteenth Century, Libel had still been used as an instrument of 
repression by Tory administrations, but had ultimately been abandoned as simply 
ineffective in light of the new legislation.84 Whilst this did not, of course, mean an 
end to libel as a concept, it did accord the Victorian Press a certain degree of 
protection from the legal exercise of political vindictiveness. 
80 M.E. McCombs & D.L. Shaw, The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media,' The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol.36, No2, (Summer, 1972,) p.176 
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Politics and Foreign Policy in Victorian Britain 
Although this is partially a study of the involvement of Russia in the Balkans, it is 
also a study of Victorian Britain. 8s Much has been written about the political events 
and intrigues of this period, as well as about the specific merits of differing 
traditions of foreign policy in Great Britain. Chamberlain, amongst others, has 
asserted the essential continuity of British Foreign policy for much of the 
nineteenth century, asserting that all the major players in British Foreign Policy 
from 1812 to the death of Palmerston laid claim to the legacy of Pitt the Younger, 
making it difficult to know where best to begin a consideration of the themes and 
values which informed their policies. 86 This difficulty is compounded by 
Chamberlain's assertion that {everyone assumed that everyone else knew the 
underlying principles [according to which Foreign Policy was conducted], and thus 
they were rarely stated explicitly or written down.87 However, others have offered a 
different summary of Foreign Policy in the nineteenth century. Wilson noted the 
lack of {consensus as to what British foreign policy should be,' and this apparent 
uncertainty can be seen leading to very different practical attitudes being adopted 
by the intermittent Conservative governments of the mid-nineteenth century from 
their Liberal predecessors and successors.88 This apparent disagreement is perhaps 
best explained by Brettle, who describes how the {Conservative' ideology upheld by 
Castlereagh and his followers, strove to keep Foreign Policy {above parties and 
factions,' to such an extent that this became in itself a factional policy.89 In essence, 
it is argued, the Conservatives felt that British foreign policy could best achieve 
respect abroad through consistency, and that this was in turn best accomplished by 
transcending factional interests. Examples of this are cited by Hicks who describes 
the mid-century Conservatives as frequently attempting {to mend fences that 
85 The actual primary research conducted will also be almost universally "English," but within the 
already given caveats, the Press of London is probably no worse a representation of "Britain" than it 
is of the entirety of "England." 
86 Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? p.12. 
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Palmerston had torn down.,9o He notes particularly the efforts made by 
Malmesbury and Derby to remove the 'suspicion' and {alienation' that had 
characterised relations with Austria, but which they felt were a lien to the traditions 
of British Foreign Policy.91 Beyond the simple desire to maintain cord ial relations, 
Chamberlain has herself betrayed the inadequacy of notions of continuity by noting 
the fundamental disagreement regarding the settlement of 1815. 92 Conservatives 
regarded this as a positive event in history, and as time went by they were able to 
point increasingly to the decades of comparative peace it had brought Europe.93 
The alternative to the Conservative view, was the Whig or 'Canningite' position 
most fully developed by Palmerston, that the first goal of Foreign Policy was 
{eternal vigilance in the protection of the hard-won liberties of the British people.,94 
Chamberlain notes the way in which Palmerston exploited a populist desire to feel 
important and influential, repeatedly telling the British people that Britain was able 
to be a power-broker in Europe.95 However, she attributes this to a remarkably 
modern understanding of political realities and the need for the support of the 
electorate over and above the king, rather than to political cynicism. 96 Whatever 
Palmerston's motives, it is certain that he pursued an active Foreign Policy, which to 
his opponents was the worst kind of meddling.97 For his supporters, Parry contends 
the crucial factor was the nuanced yet significant difference between 'non 
interference' and 'non-intervention.,98 Too much of the history of nineteenth 
century British Foreign Policy, he argues, has been written without sufficient regard 
for the commonly held-perception amongst the British that Great Britain was not 
only the greatest nation ever seen, but one made great by Providence, along with 
certain expectations quid pro quO.99 Thus, the notion of inactivity was an affront to 
90 G. Hicks, Peace, War & Party Politics, p.13. 
91 Ibid, pp.7S-79. 
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British patriotism at large as well as to the particular moralism of the Liberal Party. 
Whilst this view may seem to put excessive emphasis on public involvement with 
Foreign Policy, something highlighted by Mulligan who argues that 'public opinion' 
only ever acted in reaction to Foreign Policy, rather than pre-emptively, this is not 
necessarily SO.100 In fact, as Howe has noted, a moralistic approach to foreign policy 
had considerable breadth of appeal amongst those on the Liberal side of politics, 
from Internationalists like Cobden all the way to more Whiggish tendencies. 101 
Perhaps then, the strongest commonality than can be traced through the practice 
of British foreign policy in the nineteenth century, is a determination to uphold 
British prestige and honour. As has already been noted, the Conservative tradition 
saw Britain as being respected for the unstinting, unchanging nature of its activities 
abroad, whilst the Liberals remained equally focused on the need to 'project a 
confident and influential presence on the European stage.,102 
The decade or so immediately before the period of our study saw a series of major 
shifts in the foundations of British Foreign Policy. For Mulligan, the most significant 
came in 1870-71 with the creation of a united Germany.103 The reason for this he 
asserts is that Prussia's victory over France vindicated the cause of power-politics, 
over Cobdenite internationalism. 104 Perhaps more significant however, is Lieven's 
assertion of the constant concern of both British and Russian Foreign Policy makers 
of a power trying to dominate Europe from the 'Carolingian Core.,10S The rise of 
Bismarck's Germany made this a possibility in a fashion that had not been a serious 
consideration since the time of Napoleon. Indeed, Parry finds this such a game-
changer for the international scene, that he holds it primarily responsible for the 
'spectacular' implosion of Gladstone's first Liberal government. lOG The key point, he 
100 W. Mulligan, 'Gladstone and the Primacy of Foreign Policy' in Mulligan & Simms, The Primacy of 
Foreign Policy,p.183. 
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argues, was that whereas before German unification international assertion and 
domestic retrenchment had been perfectly harmonious themes for government 
policy, it was now necessary to make a choice between preserving a small budget 
or investing in defence in order to rival Germany.107 The impact that this had on the 
Liberal cabinet need not concern us here, but the impact on the pragmatics of 
British Foreign Policy should be clear. 
Another factor was the death of Palmerston (1865), the man who had dominated 
British politics for so long. Steele notes how Palmerston dominated the Foreign 
Office when he was Prime Minister, an example of a broader phenomenon noted 
by Chamberlain, whereby the British public, she asserts, maintained a keen 
awareness of who they perceived to be the driving force in Foreign Policy, whether 
it be a Prime Minister like Pitt the Younger, Gladstone or Disraeli, or a Foreign 
Secretary like Castlereagh or Canning.10B Hicks notes that Disraeli was unique 
amongst this list as a figure who meddled in Foreign Policy whilst holding the office 
neither of Prime Minister nor of Foreign Secretary, but of Chancellor. The most 
significant example he gives is in late 1858, when Disraeli sent his own envoy 
directly to Napoleon III seeking certain naval reassurances in exchange for British 
neutrality in an imminent Italian conflict. 10g A third significant change affecting 
British Politics around this time was the decline of the coalitions and minority 
governments that had dominated the mid-century. The parliamentary system which 
had been blurred by resentments and clashes of personality began to crystalise into 
something resembling a coherent two-party system in the 1860s. The nature of the 
Liberal movement with the various Whig and Radical factions makes it somewhat 
difficult to define their exact status, with Matthew on the one hand asserting that 
'even in Gladstone's day, the Liberals were not a party' whilst Parry feels able to 
talk meaningfully about the Liberals as a single grouping as early as the 1830s. 110 
What is certain, is that all of the Conservative-led administrations from the fall of 
107 Ibid, pp.277-281. 
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Peel in 1846 to the end of the 1860s were minorities and several commentators 
have noted the limitations placed upon them by their inability to rely upon an 
absolute majority in the House of Commons. ill For Hicks, the securing of the first 
majority in decades was the reason that Disraeli was Icanonised' in history by the 
party that had regarded him as a 'necessary evil' in his own life. 1l2 
The wealth of material written both about and by William Ewart Gladstone and 
Benjamin Disraeli is staggering, with Gladstone's diaries running to fourteen 
volumes, and Disraeli's society novels filling a shelf on their own. l13 Although this 
may, to an extent, be curtailed by a focus upon the late 1870s and the Eastern 
Question, the strong personalities of both men and their reputations both in their 
lifetimes and since make it impossible to adequately consider either of their 
activities at this time in isolation from the historiography of their careers more 
broadly. For both men, there are detailed and authoritative biographical accounts, 
Shannon and Blake being the most comprehensive accounts for Gladstone and 
Disraeli respectively, although Blake's work on Disraeli is now noticeably dated.1l4 
Parry proclaims confidently that '20th Century professional historians have 
demolished the pious partisan idealism with which Gladstone & Disraeli were 
regarded by their late Victorian supporters, and replaced it with a sophisticated 
scepticism.,lls This however seems questionable, particularly in regard to Disraeli. 
Whilst Blake offers what is in many respects a very rounded depiction of Disraeli, 
blending personal, literary and political activities in a manner that is perhaps more 
convincing than some more traditional approaches to biography which treat 
political life as a hermetically sealed entity, he fails almost entirely to take account 
of his Jewishness. Wohl decries the mere three sentences in eight hundred pages 
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devoted to anti-Semitism.116 However, given Blake's assertion that 'it is not so much 
the Jewish as the Italian streak in Disraeli that predominated,' it seems unlikely that 
further discussion by Blake would have filled the historiographical void Wohl 
laments.117 Wohl himself highlighted the anti-Semitism Disraeli faced as Prime 
Minister, noting it to be more sustained and more virulent than that which had 
dogged him at hustings throughout his life. 118 There has been a recent move 
towards reassessing the impact of Disraeli's background and personality upon his 
life, beginning with Smith's Brief Life, as well as Endelman and Kushner's recent 
volume on Disraeli's Jewishness and Kuhn's polemic on the more hedonistic 
interplay of his private and political life. 119 For Gladstone, recent writers have 
emphasised anew the deep religious basis for so much of what he did, most notably 
Shannon's Gladstone: God and Politics. 120 
The strong divisions in feeling regarding the two men continue to the existing 
literature on the Eastern Crisis. Millman, whose account of the period is widely 
regarded as one of 'the best diplomatic' histories, strongly censures Gladstone in 
this crisis as a wielder of 'irresponsible' rhetoric. 121 By contrast, Shannon's account 
of the crisis, focusing on the "Bulgarian Atrocities" campaign, depicts him as some 
kind of latter-day messiah who 'became a popular leader against his will.'122 This 
view is substantiated with accounts of early 'articulation' for the agitation coming 
from figures such as Bishop Fraser, Henry Liddon & Edward Freeman, none of 
whom were at this time connected with Gladstone. 123 Saab's view of the crisis is 
also profoundly sympathetic to Gladstone, as betrayed by her title 'Reluctant 
116 A.S. Wohl, 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi: Disraeli as Alien,' Journal of British Studies, Vo134, NoS, (Jul, 1995), 
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Icon. ,124 He is depicted as having tremendous oratorical appeal (something attested 
to by many at the time) and as providing the {reasons & justifications' for a pre-
existing public outburst. 125 However, whereas Shannon depicts the gradual 
evolution of Gladstone's interest in the agitation as he awaited both {significant 
manifestation of moral sentiment on a popular level' and {clear and responsible 
evidence' of the true facts of the crisis, Saab seems determined to go further. 126 For 
her, Gladstone is portrayed as impassively resisting various demands for his 
involvement, all couched in political platitudes, before finally succumbing to a 
personal request from the chair of the Hackney Workmen's Committee, as if 
overwhelmed by the faith of the simple folk.127 Totally lacking from her account is 
any reference to the impact of Gladstone's Bulgarian activities on the Liberal Party 
itself, an aspect of the crisis viewed as highly significant by Swartz, who feels that 
Gladstone exploited the Bulgarian crisis to reconstruct the Liberal party and secure 
his own return to the leadership of the party and government in 1880. 128 It seems a 
significant limitation of the existing literature that many of the accounts of the 
crisis, whilst giving plentiful attention and varying assessments of Gladstone's 
activities, are curiously silent about any inner motives held by Disraeli. This is of 
course understandable for those concerned primarily with mass movements rather 
than high politics, nonetheless, this study will seek to integrate more of the 
personal insights given in biographies about Disraeli into the narrative of his 
activities during the crisis. A helpful corrective to the established trend, is Kovic's 
recent work, Disraeli and The Eastern Question, which seeks to trace Disraeli's 
thinking on eastern matters from his youth, travels, and novel-writing, right up to 
his death.129 
Although not widely available, the work of Cunningham on this period deserves a 
mention due to its general significance. His articles {Jingoism in 1877-78' and {The 
language of patriotism 1750-1914' are well-known, but both draw from and offer 
124 A. P. Saab, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, 1856-1878, (Cambridge, 
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development of specific sections of his far broader work, an unpublished DPhil 
Thesis British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question 1877-1878. 130 Despite dating 
back to 1969, many of the topics explored and considered by Cunn ingham in this 
work have not received popular consideration more recently, thus making the text 
invaluable for this study. These works will be properly considered in chapter seven 
of this study, which deals more fully with the phenomenon of Jingoism. 
Panslavism 
Any full understanding of nineteenth Century Russian foreign policy, or to a lesser 
extent internal activity would be impossible without an appreciation of the forces at 
work within the movement known as 'Panslavism.' If the nineteenth Century was 
the era of Nationalism, a movement of considerable significance for this study, it 
was also a distinctly fertile time for Pan-national movements, and whilst Pan-
Germanism is often accorded the most attention, producing as it did the unified 
Germany in the 1870s, and influencing the course of European politics for decades 
after, Pan-Slavism is, in its way, no less deserving of the scholar's attention. In 
Russia at least, Pan-Slavism seems to have grown out of the Slavophile movement, 
a belief that, at its most basic, held that Russia was the last refuge of all that was 
pure, and that Europe by contrast was 'the other from which Russia must be 
saved.,131 The Slavophiles were one half of a long-standing intellectual debate 
within Russia, the other half of which was the 'Westernisers.' The practice of 
Westernisation began in Russia with the reign of Peter I 'the great,' 1682-1725. 
Hughes asserts that he was not a Westerniser and that he rather exhorted his 
countrymen that "it is good to build anew, but the old which is good should not be 
thrown away.,132 Whatever his intentions may have been, though, it was in Peter's 
footsteps that the future Westernisers believed they trod. Regarding Russia 
somewhat contemptuously as backward and corrupt, Peter and his ideological 
130 H. Cunningham, 'Jingoism 1877-78,' Victorian Studies, 14,4, (Jun 1971), pp.429-453; H. 
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successors argued that Russia needed to become more like the West in order to 
thrive. It was the second quarter of the nineteenth Century when the debate 
reached its most vocal and contested, as Russia came down from the euphoric high 
it had enjoyed as self-perceived saviour of Europe from the Bonapartist menace, 
and was brought back to reality with a failed Palace coup for modernisation and 
liberalism, and instead experienced the reactionary reign of Nicholas I. In 1836 a 
retired guards' officer named Chadaev published an article in which he declared 
that Russia had fallen between Europe and Asia and 'borrowed nothing fruitful 
from either.,133 Although Chadaev paid for his outburst by being incarcerated in an 
asylum, he had provoked perhaps the most significant ideological debate to happen 
during the reign of Nicholas I, and as such the Siavophile-Westerniser polemic has 
attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, most significantly Walicki's The 
Slavophile Controversy, which focuses upon the ideology, and the theoretical 
premises of the movement.134 For a more personal approach to Slavophiles Peter 
Christoff has produced a four-volume series on some of the key figures in the 
Slavophile movement, the first volume of which is particularly helpful in outlining 
the broader social contours into which his subject fits.135 Suslov has recently 
highlighted the historiographical debate as to whether Slavophilism was intrinsically 
liberal or illiberal: despite highlighting the work of Engelstein, who painted the 
movement as illiberal due to its nationalist, isolationist and anti-semitic trends, 
Suslov has offered as a counter-point the activities of individuals such as Sharapov 
and the other 'neo-Slavophiles' who added systems of self-government and 
principles of law to their ideology, in a way which he argues links strongly to 
Habermas's ideas of the public sphere, as well as giving 'us insight into the 
development, or rather underdevelopment, of the public sphere in Russia.,136 
133 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, pp.270-271. 
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However, in order to track the progression of ideas from the Siavophile-Westerniser 
debate to the more pertinent question of Pan-Slavism, it is necessary to look 
elsewhere, most significantly to Michael Boro-Petrovich's The Emergence of Russian 
Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870.137 Although Boro-Petrovich's now rather aged work stops 
a few years short of the period that will be of concern to this study, it still offers 
perhaps the best introduction to the topic. Perhaps the first and most crucial thing 
that Boro-Petrovich offers those seeking to understand Pan-Slavism is a definition, 
namely (the historic tendency of the Slavic peoples to manifest in some tangible 
way, whether cultural or political, their consciousness of ethnic kinship.,138 
Evidently, this was a highly diverse concept which ranged over many lands and 
centuries, thus necessitating a rather narrower focus here, which shall be the Great 
Russian political face of Pan-Slavism. Some have argued that Russian Pan-Slavism 
could be traced back a very long way, with O'Brien claiming to find (incipient' traces 
as early as the late seventeenth Century.139 However, this seems to be stretching 
the point, and there is perhaps more to be said for the notion that Pan-Slavism (in 
the Russian form at least) was (forged in the flames of burning MOSCOW,' this rude 
awakening to the hostility of France leading as Tolstoi has noted to a revival of 
spoken Russian amongst the aristocracy, and a general reappraisal of attitudes. 140 If 
it is possible to talk of a founder of Russian Pan-Slavism, then Walicki is probably 
correct in assigning this title to Mikhail Pogodin, the Russian historian who argued 
strongly for the Normanist theory of Russian origins, and who contributed 
significantly to the official nationality policy, famously summed up by Uvarov, as 
(Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.,141 The Pan-slav cause was then taken up in the 
1850s by Konstantin Aksakov and A.S. Khomyakov. With the Crimean conflict 
already looming on the horizon for those inclined to see it, these men led a cry to 
137 M. Boro-Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism 1856-1870, (New York, 1956). 
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initiate a IHoly War' against Turkey for the liberation of all Slavs and all people of 
Orthodox faith.142 Aksakov was to die shortly after this, but it was his brother, Ivan, 
who was to become the most significant figure of Russian Panslavism. I.S. Aksakov 
first rose to prominence in 1858, when he took over the editorship of RU5skaia 
Beseda, which was thereby to become the first organ of the Panslavist popular 
press. This stood in stark contrast to the very academic forums to which Panslav 
discussions had previously been confined. It also seems probable that this, 
combined with the establishment in 1861 of the periodical Den' (Day), also a 
Panslav organ run by Aksakov, was responsible for more moderate publications, 
such as the semi-official Sankt Peterburgskaia Vedomosti starting up their own 
Slavonic sections. 143 In the first decades after The Crimean War, much of the 
Panslavism that was advocated in Russia was of a rather vague nature, and it was 
only in the 1860s that the work of V.A. Cherkasskii was able to beat a clearer path 
of thought and, more crucially, make Panslavism and the Eastern Question 
synonymous in many people's minds. l44 
Beyond the vague sense of common identity that many cited and few defined, the 
strongest case for Slavonic unity was two-fold, namely linguistic and religious. The 
proximity of the Slavonic languages to each other led many to assert that the Slavs 
were united by a common language. However, whilst this position certainly had a 
greater coherence than if it were applied to, say, the Romance peoples, it was still 
incomplete without this supposed common-language being identified. Proto-
Slavonic had never been committed to writing, and the Pan-slavs were over a 
century too early to resort to Siovianski or Slovio. 145 Perhaps the best claim to be a 
universal Slavonic language was held by Old Church Slavonic, the language used by 
the Orthodox Church throughout much of Eastern Europe. However, the use of an 
ecclesiastical language for day-to-day purposes was deeply problematic, due to its 
narrow, religious vocabulary, and cripplingly complex grammatical structure. 146 The 
142 Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, p.496. 
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only remaining choice then, at least in the minds of Russian Pan -slavists, was the 
Russian language itself, and this led to a concerted effort on the part of many to 
belittle the various Slavonic vernaculars as simply contaminations or denigrations of 
Russian. This leads us back to the already noted tension prevalent in the nineteenth 
Century between pan-national movements such as Pan-Slavism, and the more 
localised nationalistic movements that were to form the nation-states of the 20th 
Century. Whilst the Russian Pan-slavs were trying to diminish the characteristics of 
other Slavonic languages, figures such as Vuk Karadzic in Serbia were carrying out 
significant linguistic reforms designed to energise literary Serbian, such as the 
creation of new Cyrillic letters designed to represent sounds unique to Serbian. 147 
Whilst tensions between ideologies are hardly uncommon, this difficulty between 
the Russian Pan-Slavs and their supposed brothers, Slavonic intelligentsia trying to 
arouse a sense of patriotic identity, caused serious damage to the various claims of 
fraternity that were being advanced. 
Aside from language, another supposed commonality of the Slavonic peoples was 
that of religion. More specifically, the Russian Pan-Slavs saw Moscow as the 'third 
Rome,' the true home of Christianity after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. 148 
However, this view, whilst perhaps useful for arguing a case against Muslim Turks, 
had proved decidedly problematic when dealing within Europe, with other Slavs. 
With the whole of Europe at this time being notionally Christian, it became ever 
clearer that the supposed bond of the Slavs was specifically that of the Eastern, 
Orthodox rite of Christianity. This however had little resonance with many of those 
Slavs who had long lived under Hapsburg rule, and followed the teachings of the 
Catholic Church. Poles, Czechs and Croats, for example, were all largely under the 
sway of the Church of Rome, and were thus religiously disinclined to switch their 
allegiance to Moscow. Furthermore, although most of the predominantly Orthodox 
nations were Slavs, this generalisation failed to take account of others, such as the 
Romanians, and most significantly of all, the Greeks, who were not only Orthodox, 
147 S. K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The history behind the Name, (London, 2002), p.3S. 
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but who laid claim to the Patriarch of Constantinople, ostensibly the highest, or at 
least the most prestigious, office in Orthodox Christianity. 
With these tensions lingering, the Pan-Slavs still needed some kind of method 
through which to operate, and aside from the actions of individuals, perhaps the 
most useful case for the historian to consider, is the activities of the various 
Slavonic organisations. The foremost of these was the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent 
committee, established in 1858, apparently with (full approval' from Prince 
Gorchakov.149 The Moscow Slavonic committees have been considered in great 
depth by S.A. Nikitin. lso However, the high level of geographical fragmentation 
amongst the Slavonic committees makes it very difficult to transpose his findings 
onto any of the other groupings. For example, the St Petersburg arm of the Slavonic 
committee, Russia's other capital and a city well-connected to Moscow both in 
terms of information and transport, remained entirely ad-hoc until 1877, the height 
of the crisis which this study will be considering. 
Being the largest of the Slavonic peoples and indeed one of very few able to lay 
claim to a sovereign state, Russian Panslavs (as has already been seen with regard 
to language) often behaved in a rather paternalistic fashion, aiming at best to aid 
their less fortunate brethren, and often simply to patronise them. Furthermore, the 
application of Panslavism in practice was rarely devoid of self-interested 
pragmatism. Even before Panslavism proper, in 1711, Peter the Great had first 
posited the idea of inciting Orthodox Christians in the Balkans to rise up against 
their Muslim overlords, both as a means of distracting and reducing the 
effectiveness of the Turkish forces, and as a way of increasing Russian influence in 
the region. ISI The significance has already been noted of the idea of Moscow as 
(the third Rome' and the final new home of (true religion'. This statement received 
its first and most explicit statement in 1510 in a letter to Grand Duke Vasili III of 
Moscow, father of Ivan IV, stating (two Romes have fallen. The third stands. And 
there will not be a fourth. No-one will replace your Christian Tsardom.,ls2 Whilst 
149 Boro-Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism, p.132. 
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Russia was not a theocracy, it has been widely argued that Russia did keep religious 
concerns in mind, especially when dealing with Turkey, forming what Schonle has 
termed fa geopolitical argument rooted in religious hostility.,153 It is always difficult 
to determine exactly how much government policy is genuinely influenced by 
religious conviction. Nonetheless, it does seem that Russian Tsars retained a belief 
in the divine right of Kings, long after Locke and Rousseau had made such ideas 
unfashionable in the west. 154 
The Eastern Question 
The Balkan Background 
Much of what has occurred in the Balkans in recent decades has shown the 
presence of long, if often selective, collective memories. The conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was often conducted with reference to fourteenth-
century battles and Empires, and twelfth century coronations. Whilst these are 
obviously beyond the scope of this current work, it does highlight the difficulty of 
compartmentalising the conflicts of this region. 
Broadly speaking, the Balkan Peninsula following the arrival of the Slav peoples in 
the early seventh century witnessed a fluid host of kingdoms, principalities and 
empires, as various peoples, often sharing a name with a modern-day ethnic group, 
attempted to assert their authority over the neighbouring regions. In the course of 
the next seven hundred years or so Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats (amongst others) 
enjoyed periods of success ruling territories historically claimed by the Greeks or 
which provided the core of their latter-day nation-states. In the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, however, these Slavonic Princelings were gradually 
eliminated by the ascendancy of the Ottoman Empire, which was reaching the 
height of its power. For 500 years or so, practical notions of independent statehood 
for the Balkan Slavs were extinguished. 
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Despite this, however, the Ottoman system of rule, the so-called 'millet,' allowed 
many of the subject peoples to keep their religion and to retain at least their 
language as a peasant vernacular; indeed Shaw has argued that the millets provided 
the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire with 'the requisite conditions for 
developing their own culture.,155 There is a growing body of work on the exact 
nature of the millet system, and its proper place within Quranic law. A system 
which allowed the infidels to contribute to the Imperial treasury, and 
simultaneously provided them with an exemption from military service which 
helped to ensure the security of the harvest, was of course highly significant. 
However, it remains unclear as to whether this should more properly be seen as a 
benevolent and far-sighted, legitimate approach, or an 'expediency' of dubious 
legality, providing servitude where death was the prescribed punishment. 156 Whilst 
the Empire remained strong, this linguistic concession provided little difficulty. 
However, as the power of the Sultans stagnated and began to wane, this act of 
convenience on the part of the Ottomans returned to haunt them, as there 
emerged figures from within these nationalities keen to seek a fresh lease of 
independence. 
Much of the impetus for the creation of these new independent territories came 
from the Napoleonic era. Although the map of Europe was far from static at the 
best of times, the French Revolutionary wars destroyed many of the apparent 
geographical certainties of the time. Although keen not to overplay the significance 
of the French Army and the declarations of rights that it carried with it, Okey sums 
up neatly the fact that 'Napoleon had brilliantly set the national question before 
the minds of his contemporaries.,157 Military victories over Austria in 1805 and 1808 
had given France access to Balkan territories, and Napoelon's establishment in 1808 
of the 'Illyrian provinces,' comprising Dalmatia, Istria, much of modern-day 
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Slovenia, and the western half of Croatia, provided perhaps the first separate 
south-Slav state in centuries. ISS Obviously, a state which failed in an attempt to 
standardise the local south-Slav vernacular and was ruled over by a French Marshall 
did not provide instant fuel for the cause of Slav nationalism. lS9 However, the 
creation of the IIlyrian provinces, like the remarkable success of the broadly 
contemporary first Serbian revolt led by 'Black' George Petrovic, a pig-farmer, 
despite its ultimate failure, did 'give new impetus both to the memory of medieval 
Serbia and to the tradition of defiance and defeat.,16o 
Ironically, and perhaps unfortunately for the south-Slav advocates of national 
liberty, the nineteenth century world in which many of them began to make their 
bid for independence was a massively transformed place from the medieval world 
in which their ancestors had laid claim to Empires. The former Barbarian kingdoms 
of the Western Roman Empire had largely emerged as the so-called 'Great Powers' 
of the nineteenth Century: Britain, France and Austria, joined by Russia from the 
East, and Germany (replacing Prussia) in the latter half of the century. In a manner 
that would have been unthinkable at the point when the Balkan Slavs last enjoyed 
political independence, any question of establishing new states within Europe now 
fell very much within the spheres of interest of all of these powers, something 
which the Ottoman Slavs were aware of, but not always able to adequately act 
according to. The example of Karadjordjevic's rebels during the first Serbian revolt 
of 1804-13 is a good one; they began by approaching Tsar Alexander, Emperor 
Ferdinand, and Napoleon, reasoning that 'only another emperor could deal with the 
ruler of an empire.,161 However, despite a brief war between Russia and Turkey, the 
peace treaty failed to mention the Serbs, and when Napoleon invaded Russia the 
Serbs ceased to receive even encouragements, a turn of events regarded as typical 
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of Russo-Serb relations by Judah who asserts that 'The Serbs have always been 
conscious that there is no real love lost between the two countries.,162 
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 largely restored the geographical status quo from 
before the wars, leaving the south Slavs to brood over their brief flirtations with 
autonomy and independence. When not distracted by a major war with each other, 
the European powers showed differing degrees of interest in various regions of 
Europe. Russia was by far the most involved in Balkan affairs, playing at least some 
role in all of the significant periods of diplomatic activity in that area during the 
nineteenth Century. Great Britain by contrast tended to be less involved, although 
significant exceptions were made such as the war of Greek Independence {1821-
1832} and the Crimean War {1853-6}. Although not a conflict waged in the Balkans, 
its causes were inextricably entangled with Balkan events. 
Russo- Turkish Relations Before Crimea 
To consider very broadly the development of relations between Russia and Turkey 
will be essential in illuminating the context of events. They first clashed over the 
Khanate of the Crimea, a nominal Turkish vassal state that found itself being 
increasingly drawn into the Muscovite sphere of influence. These initial tensions 
crystallised into a more clearly defined Russo-Turkish problem in the late 
seventeenth Century, with the signing of the treaty of Bakhchisarai in 1681. 163 The 
treaty was linguistically rather condescending towards the Russians, yet as O'Brien 
has noted, it was in fact of crucial importance for Russia, as it provides a case-study 
of the rapid Russian expansion into European space. 164 Furthermore, it made 
provision for Muscovite Tsars establishing separate treaties with the Porte, and for 
the recognition of at least some Russian territorial claims. 165 This issue of tone of 
language within Ottoman treaties with Christian Powers is an interesting one, as it 
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may be the case that Ottoman insistence upon linguistic superiority masked the 
relative power-shift away from Turkey and towards Europe during the early-
modern period. 166 Russia continued to expand against Turkey in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth Century, as Peter the Great captured Azov, 
before suffering defeat on the Pruth in 1711. 167 The key date prior to the dawn of 
the nineteenth Century, however, was 1774, when a series of Russo-Turkish 
conflicts, initiated by Potemkin's seizure of the Crimea, was brought to a conclusion 
by the now notorious treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji ( K u ~ u k k Kaynarca in Turkish). 
Although some, such as Figes have tried to downplay the significance of Kuchuk 
Kainardji in the late nineteenth century, given that it was explicitly nullified by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856, this is to wilfully ignore the tremendous impact the treaty 
made upon Russian perceptions of the Balkans, which is why it has been justly 
described as 'one of history's great shifts in power relations. /16B The crucial point of 
Kuchuk Kainadrji, was that it contained a Turkish promise to 'protect constantly the 
Christians' religion and churches' and rather more nebulously, allowed 'Ministers of 
the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations' if this 
was not done.169 The treaty was from its outset a major source of contention in 
terms of how it was to be interpreted, with the Turks perceiving the Russian right to 
be purely and simply that of 'making representations', whilst many Russian 
politicians interpreted it as allowing them to intervene directly in Turkish internal 
affairs if they perceived Ottoman Christians to be at risk.170 The multi-lingual nature 
of the treaty did little to help clarify the situation, and Davison notes that the 
Russian government felt the need to issue an 'official' French translation, in which 
all contentious words had been resolved in Russia's favour. l71 This did little to 
convince the Turks, who continued to deny the validity of the clause, right down to 
the Crimean War. However, whatever the initial intention, the fact seems clear 
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that, by the mid-nineteenth Century, the language used by almost all European 
diplomats seemed to implicitly acknowledge some expectation of Russian 
intervention within Turkey in times of crisis. l72 
Whilst few would doubt that Russia perceived itself as being entitled to interfere 
within Turkey, a more pertinent question is whether her desires stretched any 
further in that direction. For many, the actions of Tsar Ivan III 'The Great' in the 
fifteenth century made strong symbolic claims to the heritage of Christian 
Byzantium, adopting for Russia the double-headed eagle, and marrying the niece of 
the last Byzantine emperor. This symbolic behaviour carried on throughout the 
centuries, for example in the naming of Catherine the Great's grandson 
'Constantine.' However, whether this was ever seriously expected to translate into 
anything more substantial is a matter of considerable debate. Jelavich sees 
evidence that there was a genuine expectation amongst Russian elites, citing a 
conversation between Catherine II and Joseph II of Austria about a revived 
Byzantine Empire under the aforementioned Constantine. l73 In the time of the 
Great Eastern Crisis, writers such as Dostoevskii felt able to write with confidence 
that 'Constantinople must one day be ours,' and one of the final acts of the Imperial 
government was to sign the secret Constantinople agreement in the spring of 1915, 
pledging continued war support for the allies in return for Constantinople and the 
northern shore of Anatolia. l74 For others, such as Polunov, these claims fail to 
present the political realities that inevitably tempered the aspirations of people in 
Russia, and as an example they cite Nicholas I's unambiguous warning to 
Nesselrode 'we do not want Constantinople ... that would be the most dangerous 
conquest we could make.,l7s However, Lieven attempts to move beyond this 
disagreement, treating the Russian obsession with Constantinople as simply a 
consequence of Russian geography. Russian expansion brought her an ever greater 
number of landlocked seas, and the Black Sea was useless without the Bosphorus 
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and the Dardanelles.176 This argument is borne out by the repeated attempts by 
Russia to constrain the Turkish navy, one of the most extreme of which came in 
1769, when a detachment of 16 ships was sent all the way from the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean to harass the Turks.l77 
Anglo-Turkish Relations before Crimea 
British contact with the Turks was less frequent and, generally speaking, less tense. 
Britain was a long way from Turkish domains, and Britain only began to have 
serious designs on Ottoman territories comparatively late in the lifetime of the 
Empire. Even then, it was often concern about Russian or French intentions that 
proved the primary motivating factor. However, whilst much of the existing 
historiography has tended to focus on these realpolitik concerns, Robbins and 
Fisher have recently noted that in the nineteenth century, it was 'impossible not to 
conceive of the United Kingdom as a Christian country,' and have asserted that this 
played a significant role in Foreign Policy, especially when dea ling with non-
Christian powers.178 However, whilst religious factors undoubtedly influenced 
remarks such as Gladstone's comment that Turkey's flaw was 'Mahometanism 
compounded with the peculiar character of a race,' it seems that most of the 
religiously motivated statements regarding Ottoman Turkey were from those who 
wished to see lithe cross [once more] elevated at St. Sophia./ i79 Indeed, the 
conviction that a conquering army entering Constantinople would have as its first 
priority the holding of a mass calls to mind the enthusiasm of Great War British 
officers for a meal in Berlin, accompanied by Captain Blackadder's comment that 'I 
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hope the cafes are well-stocked, everyone seems determined to eat out the 
moment they arrive !,180 
Chamberlain identifies the first British involvement in the Eastern Question as being 
the Ochakov incident in 1791. Although British pressure regarding this fortress on 
the Black Sea had little success, she regards it as significant for being the first 
instance of British intervention in a Russo-Turkish dispute, motivated by concerns 
for trade routes. 181 Despite this brief disagreement at the diplomatic level, the first 
serious intervention by British politicians in the internal affairs of Ottoman Turkey 
was when Napoleon Bonaparte led his army to Egypt in 1799. Although the 
expedition was ordered by Talleyrand, the purpose was made clear a short while 
before the expedition in a comment made by Napoleon: "The time is not far 
distant, when we shall feel that, in order to destroy England once a nd for all we 
must occupy Egypt." 182 In many respects, this provides a quintessential example of 
the type of event likely to engage British attention. Although the conflict 
superficially involved simply the two protagonists, Turkey and France, it was felt in 
Whitehall that a Napoleonic success, would have allowed France to threaten British 
communication with India at a time when commercial enterprise under the East 
India Company was being rapidly replaced by administrative Imperialism under the 
Wellesley brothers. This was sufficient to convince the British to intervene on the 
Turkish side of the conflict and, despite Napoeloen's initial victories on land, 
Nelson's triumph at the battle of the Nile left the French stranded and ensured the 
ultimate defeat of the expedition.183 Napoleon was, of course, one of the French 
who returned unscathed from the Egyptian campaign, and Chamberlain argues that 
it was his words at Tilsit in 1807 that first prompted fears of a Russian threat to 
India, one of the most significant factors in sustaining British interest and concern in 
the Near East throughout the nineteenth century.l84 Doubtless encouraged by the 
ease with which their masters had been defeated in the field by the French, various 
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Ottoman provincial Pashas began to make life difficult for their masters in the 
coming decades, none more so than Egypt's Mehmet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim. 
Mehmet Ali had initially been sent as part of the Ottoman re-occupation after the 
French withdrawal, but swiftly established himself as pre-eminent in Egypt. In 
Charmley's view, he made himself master of Egypt 'by a mixture of intrigue, 
ruthlessness and sheer ability.' l85The appeal of Mehmet Ali to the west was that he 
seemed to offer a positive answer for the age old question of whether the 'timeless 
Orient' could be modernised successfully.186 However, his true impact on both the 
Ottoman Empire and on Britain was not to make itself felt for several years yet. 
The next major event for British involvement with the Turks came in 1820, with the 
outbreak of the Greek revolt. Whilst the Sultan was distracted with another unruly 
vassal, this time the Albanian Ali Pasha, Greek revolutionaries decided to take 
advantage.187 Led by a former aide-de-camp of Alexander I named Alexandros 
Ypsilantis, the 'Philiki Etaireia' society staged a brief uprising in the Danubian 
Provinces.188 Despite the strategic and religious reasons in favour of intervention, 
Alexander I decided that his greater loyalty lay with the Holy Alliance, created in 
1815 for the promotion of Christian values, but more frequently used as a bulwark 
against revolution and secularism, and thus did not act in support of the Greeks. 189 
Britain likewise declared that it would not intervene, and the Sultan was therefore 
ultimately forced to call upon Egypt for assistance, and troops under the command 
of Ibrahim Pasha, (son of Mehmet Ali) landed in 1825.190 The Egyptian troops 
achieved considerable success, undermining the military gains that the Greeks had 
made in the previous five years, and were doubtless largely responsible for the joint 
Russo-British declaration, in April 1826, of an intention to work together for the 
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establishment of a Greek tributary.191 This in turn led to the creation of a joint 
Anglo-Russo-French naval force which successfully confronted and destroyed an 
Egypto-Turkish force at Navarino the following year. 192 Once all three Powers were 
committed to the Greek cause, the outcome was fairly certain, and Beaton argues 
that the most crucial aspect of Greek success was the achievement by Greeks in the 
eighteenth century of attaching the rhetoric of restoration rather than innovation 
to the issue of Greek independence.193 Whilst Chamberlain's assertions that the 
revolt was broadly misunderstood in the west as {Homer and Pericles' rising against 
the Turks seems perhaps a little strong, Beaton does have a strong point about the 
ideological unlikelihood of Nicholas I, Charles X of France and the Duke of 
Wellington sitting down together to sign into being a new state at the expense of 
an established and legitimate state. 194 The fact that the new Greece was 
established by a treaty of the European Powers, rather than by a bilateral Greco-
Turkish agreement was lost neither on the new Greek government, nor on more 
recent historians. Despite their short-term success, the minimal size of the new 
state and the expansionist aims of those given it were to ensure the continuation of 
British intervention for much of the following decades. 195 Although Navarino had 
effectively marked the end of one conflict, it was only the beginning of another; 
Mehmet Ali had lost his fleet in the battle but {consoled himself with the prospect 
of the governorships of Syria and Crete which the Sultan had promised as his 
reward' for silencing the Greeks.196 Although the Sultan was accurate in his 
assessment that Mehmet Ali's help had not actually brought about victory against 
Greece, he turned out to be extremely ill-advised in refusing the governorships, 
which Mehmet Ali decided to take anyway. Between 1831-32, Ibrahim's forces 
swiftly occupied Acre, and announced the annexation of Syria. Many feared that Ali 
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Pasha's desires stretched even further, and the British agent at Alexandria reported 
that he suspected the ultimate goal was to install Ibrahim as Sultan with Mehmet 
Ali confirmed as Viceroy in Egypt. 197 Despite offering vague reassurances to the 
Sultan, the British government, occupied with a Reform Act at home, failed to 
provide any concrete support, leading in 1833 to the Sultan's fateful decision to 
seek help from Russia and 'as a drowning man clutches at a serpent/ sign the 
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. 198 This treaty of mutual protection was viewed by 
Palmerston as both the first step to Turkey becoming a Russian protectorate, and 
the 'greatest mistake' a British cabinet had ever made in Foreign Policy.199 This has 
generally been seen as being the major impetus behind much of subsequent British 
involvement in Turkish affairs, and calls into question Parry's assertion that 'it is 
misleading to reduce the story of British attitudes to Europe to notions of 
"Russophobia" or "Francophobia.",200 Whilst his warning against over-simplification 
must stand, so too must the basic notion of Russophobia as a guiding principle for 
Britain in the nineteenth century. Gleason has asserted the fundamental 
compatibility of British and Russian aims, but believes that the sheer scale of 
Russian expansion in the nineteenth century made their (honest) claims 
unbelievable in Whitehall. 201 
Despite these specific flare-ups, it is important to re-stress the significance of 
economic factors in British consideration. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Britain had the largest share of Ottoman trade, and three quarters of all British 
exports to the Middle East (including EgyptL went through Anatolia. 202 According to 
Bailey, Turkey was identified early in the century as an ideal market due to its low 
tariffs, and the outperforming of Russian merchants by their British counterparts 
was a significant factor in causing the two governments to seek political leverage 
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over the situation. 203 Thus, any major political or territorial change in the region 
would have had direct and tangible effects on British merchants. 
The Crimean War 
The root cause of the Crimea conflict stemmed, at least in part, from the suspicion 
and misunderstandings which punctuated international diplomacy in the 
nineteenth Century. Warner has concluded that 'after a series of acts which the 
Russians thought were legitimate defensive moves, and which the Turks, French, 
and British thought were blatant examples of aggression, Turkey, France and Britain 
declared war on Russia on 28 March 1854.,204 The initial point of conflict in the 
chains of events that led to the Crimean war came in the early 1850s, when Louis-
Napoleon of France sought recognition from the Sultan as protector of the Holy 
Places, and specifically the keys to the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.20s The 
fact that this was accepted by Sultan Abdulmajid I caused a fierce reaction in Russia 
and set in motion a complex diplomatic wrangle concerning who could have keys, 
use doors, hold services, and even fix the roof. 206 Seeing these French claims as a 
violation of the terms of Kujuk Kainardji, Jelavich asserts that the Russian 
government was forced by honour 'to regard the defence of treaty rights as a 
duty.,207 However, despite this noble sentiment she espouses, it would be naive to 
suggest that Nicholas I's concern was not at least partially with the prospect of 
Republican France transforming itself into both Imperial France and into the 
dominant European Power at the Porte. 208 Jelavich once again tries to assert 
Russia's moderation, noting that Menshikov was dispatched to the Porte seeking 
only a re-iteration of those rights which Russia already claimed (Le. that of 
intervention in the affairs of Ottoman Christians.)209 However, others have noted 
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that the Tsar's choice of diplomat left a great deal to be desired if he was genuinely 
intent on holding negotiations and resolving the Holy Places dispute, not simply 
provoking a war. 210 Goldfrank provides a meticulously detailed study of the 
diplomatic to-ings and fro-ings leading up to the outbreak of the Crimean conflict, 
and is ultimately unable to move far from the simple assertion that the blame must 
lie with Nicholas I, in a fashion that seems improbable as late as the mid-nineteenth 
century, when so much of international relations was taken out of the hands of 
Royals and delegated to professional diplomats.211 Britain, it must be remembered, 
always maintained a healthy degree of suspicion towards all foreigners, and given 
that the dispute over the Holy Places coincided with the decision by the French 
ruler to proclaim himself 'Napoleon III' (thus claiming to be both the heir of 
Bonaparte and the legitimate continuation of an Imperial dynasty headed by the 
four year-old King of Rome after Waterloo,) Nicholas set himself a not insignificant 
task when he decided to push Britain into the arms of the French and in opposition 
to himself.212 Goldfrank asserts that Nicholas had repeated opportunities to back 
down, claim victory, or even simply avoid being on the receiving end of a multi-
power military coalition, but that he repeatedly lacked realism and was ultimately 
'too angry to cut his losses.,213 It was not even a matter of losing prestige, simply a 
need to accept reality and be prepared to compromise. 
Russian decisions to cross the Danube deeper into Turkish territory, and to sink 
much of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, ensured the arrival of Anglo-French forces in 
the Black Sea. Wary of being outflanked by Austria, Nicholas withdrew his forces to 
the Crimea. However, it was Naval Power that counted and the prospect of leaving 
the Black Sea under sole Russian control ensured that the war would not end when 
Russian troops left Turkish soil. Nicholas of course continued to assert that 'Russia is 
fighting for Christian truth and the defence of its co-religionist brothers,' and this is 
the very right, however dubiously held to begin with, that she unequivocally lost. 214 
Following a dismal military showing by the Russians, and a campaign that could not 
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even be turned around by allied blunders such as the Charge of the Light Brigade, or 
the siege of Sevastapol, Russia found itself on the receiving end of the Treaty of 
Paris. 21s The Treaty provides a fascinating insight into the mentality of the Russian 
diplomatic Corps in the nineteenth Century. Broadly speaking it was a massive 
defeat and a loss of prestige for the Tsar, with protection of Turkish Christians being 
moved definitively from Russia to the European Powers as a whole (although the 
tension between this 'protection' and Ottoman sovereignty remained unresolved). 
Furthermore, the Black Sea was demilitarised in its entirety, another major blow to 
Russia, although at least preferable to the alternative, which would have been 
opening the straits to international warships, and allowing the Royal Navy to extend 
British influence there.216 That all this was a major blow to Russia is beyond doubt. 
However, even in this new treaty, there was ambiguity as to how exactly Turkey 
would treat her Christian subjects, and this ambiguity was brought once again 
under the spotlight in 1875, with the outbreak of the Hercegovinian revolt. 
Crucially, despite the explicit repudiation of the Kuchuk-Kainardji provisions in the 
treaty of Paris, Russia still acted as if they provided her framework for action in the 
1870s. It was still Russia that saw herself as the 'natural' protector of the Slavs, and 
there seemed to have been no lessons learned from the debacle that was Crimea. 
The Great Eastern Crisis 1875-1878 
There has been a considerable volume of scholarship relating to this topic, and 
although much of it is now decidedly dated, the sheer detail which was included 
ensures that much of it remains useful today. The majority of the works written 
between the wars focused on the diplomatic aspect of events, perhaps labouring 
under the misapprehension identified by Chamberlain that diplomacy was an 
activity that if sufficiently well studied could be mastered in order to prevent a 
future war. 217 The chief example of this is B.H. Sumner's epic Russia and the Balkans 
1870-1880, which delivers a blow-by-blow account of almost all of the conferences, 
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discussions and intrigues between the Great Power politicians of the time. 218 Sadly, 
Sumner's work is very limited in its broader utility by his two central assumptions, 
namely that there were no events of significance outside the military or diplomatic 
sphere, and that it is unnecessary to translate any quotation first made in French. 
The first of these limitations is shared by Stojanovic's slightly briefer account, which 
is nonetheless a good guide to the general contours of events. 219 After these two 
giants of the 1930s, the historiography did not receive much in the way of fresh 
attention until the 1960s and 1970s when there was a sudden proliferation of 
works from authors such as Jelavich and MacKenzie.22o MacKenzie's work offers 
detailed consideration of the St. Petersburg and Belgrade press of the time, as well 
as on the internal political wrangling in Serbia on a level that has yet to be 
duplicated. However, he fails to adequately locate his work within the context of 
the nineteenth century more generally and, being concerned primarily with Serbs, 
mentions the Bulgarian aspect of the uprising only insofar as it distracted attention 
or support from Serbia.221 Jelavich continued working on the area into the final 
years of the 20th Century, but generally speaking, the collapse of Soviet Power in 
Eastern Europe distracted scholarly attention onto more immediately relevant 
areas of study. Her last significant work, Russia's Balkan Entanglements is 
particularly valuable for the broad contextualisation it provides of the 1875-78 
Crisis within the broader context of Russian involvement in the Balkans, although 
this gain in breadth means a loss of depth and she adds little on this occasio n to the 
scholarship of the crisis itself.222 Works considering the crisis from a more explicitly 
British perspective have already been discussed above in the examination of the 
historiography of Victorian Britain. Recent years have seen a limited revival of 
attention to this period, including the informative yet error-strewn works of Jelena 
Milokovic-Ojuric, and the Russian-language work of Viktoriia Khevrolina on Russian 
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politics in this period as well as a recent biographical work on Ignatiev, and a 
consideration by Kovic of the role of Disraeli in the Eastern Question. 223 
Additionally, various new broader histories, for example of the various countries 
involved in events, have also been forthcoming, and these have helped to return 
the spotlight to the perspectives of the many groups involved in the crisis. 224 
However, as these are mostly survey works, there is (to date) little in the way of 
truly new revelations coming from this direction. The last, but by no means least, 
valuable source of scholarly research on this topic can be found in some of the 
previously detailed volumes concerned with Panslavism. 
In the last few years, some new works have emerged on the Eastern Crisis, 
including Kovic's Disraeli and the Eastern Question, mentioned above, and Hakan 
Yavuz's War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of 
Berlin, which appeared just as this thesis was being completed, too recently to be 
incorporated into this work. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
This thesis is composed of a series of case-studies, each one considering a separate 
'popular movement.' These movements are: the campaign for aid to the Bosnian 
and Hercegovinian rebels and their families, the 'Bulgarian Atrocity' campaign, the 
Russian popular movement in support of the Serbs against Turkey, the campaign for 
greater Greek involvement in the Crisis, and the British 'Jingo' movement. Although 
most of these movements have been examined elsewhere, they have rarely been 
treated fully as an integral part of a wider issue. Popular action provides an ideal 
medium through which to consider the public and society. For each case study, two 
questions will be asked: was there indeed a popular movement? And if so why it 
was that this issue seemed to have succeeded or failed to have captured the 
popular imagination? Once these two questions have been dealt with the portrayal 
of the movement in the Press of the time will be considered, as well as any 
significant impact which it made upon those few social and political elites whose 
views can be readily accessed. From this evidence base the thesis will explore the 
ways in which the Press acted, or did not act, as an intermediary between these 
elites and the mass movements, as well as between the events in the Balkans and 
their readership. 
The 'how' of this study is only of limited use without the 'what?' This study will seek 
to trace the interaction of society and press, press and government. It will seek to 
draw comparisons between the way that a 'modern liberal democracy' such as 
Great Britain and a bureaucratic autocracy such as Russia were able to use the 
media and the popular mood to their own ends. In contrast, it will also consider the 
extent to which either state was able to pursue a course of action unhindered by 
considerations of wider public sentiment as mediated through the Press. Although 
this will mostly be achieved in macrocosm, on the British side of events, there is a 
fascinating opportunity to examine the very personal battleground of William 
Gladstone who recorded copious amounts on this topic and was both an 
instrument of mass propaganda and a politician and statesman of the highest order 
in Victorian England. 
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The Press 
The primary research of this thesis focuses upon an examination of the literary 
press of this period. For Russia, the daily newspaper The Voice (Golos) will be 
examined, along with a series of periodicals, most specifically The Messenger of 
Europe (Viestnik Evropy) , The Orthodox Observer (Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie) and 
Notes of the Fatherland {Otechestvennie Zapiski.l For the British side, the primary 
focus will be upon The Times of London but drawing on a broad selection of 
publications, as and where appropriate. Principal examples include The Edinburgh 
ReviewJ The Quarterly ReviewJ The Contemporary ReviewJ and Nineteenth Century. 2 
It is important to be clear about the sample of the press used. Firstly, when 
examining the press, it is necessary to bear in mind Rieber's considerations of the 
methodological difficulties involved, chief amongst which is the need to be selective 
in order to stand a chance of dealing with the sheer volume of source material 
available.3 Indeed, in his study of Constantinople, a city of particular interest to this 
study, Mansel notes the overwhelming volume of documentary sources which 
confront a scholar tackling just the media sources of that locale. 4 It is also important 
to be clear about what a press study can and cannot tell us. Reading a paper can 
only provide, with any degree of certainty, the opinions of the writer and the editor 
of that publication. Although the readership of the educated, Liberal press may, 
under certain circumstances, be roughly equated with 'educated society' it is never 
the same thing as 'the public.' 
The Messenger of Europe was a relatively young publication, having been founded 
in 1866 by M.M. Stasiulevich, a former history professor of St Petersburg University. 
Initially a dry, serious and scholarly publication, within a few years it had expanded 
to include literature and politics, and become in certain eyes 'the quintessential 
1 Otechestvennie Zapiski is sometimes translated as The National Annals, see V. Terras, A History of 
Russian Literature (London, 1991), p. 289. 
2 Now known as Nineteenth Century and Beyond. 
3 A.J. Rieber, 'review of L. McReynolds, The Russian Press under the Old Regime,' in Slavic Review: 
52, (1992), p. 278. 
4 P. Mansel, Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924, (London, 1995), p.135 ft. 
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Russian thick journal of the second half of the nineteenth century.'s It was edited by 
the liberal literary historian Aleksandr Pipin, who gave it a broadly 'liberal' 
intelligentsia tone.6 Certainly, its circulation figures made it the most popular 
publication of its kind of the period.7 The Notes of the FatherlandJ by contrast, was 
a much older publication. It had been established in the first half of the century by 
A.A. Kraevskii, a self-styled 'literary tycoon,' and arguably the founder of Russia's 
commercial press, together with V.F. Odoevskii (the author of Russian Nights), in 
the first half of the century.8 From these 'liberal' beginnings, the journal had been 
sold to the radical poet Nekrasov, in 1866, who, despite the marked shift in tone he 
effected in the newspaper, managed to bribe the censors sufficiently well to be 
listed in 1869 by the censor Lebedev as a 'progressive liberal' publication. 9 
There are a number of reasons why these particular publications are valuable case 
studies, the first of which is their ethos. Jones has noted the dangers of being too 
dogmatic about the supposed 'political stance' of a paper, noting that such a 
position would be composed not simply of the editor's viewpoint, but also of 
individual sentiments expressed by journalists, and even the choice of advertising. 1o 
The Voice is described by A.J. Rieber as having 'faced the major socio-economic 
issues of its day by gambling that facticity by itself would carry a progressive 
political message.,ll In slightly simpler terms, The Voice appeared neither to toe the 
line in the way that papers such as the Saint Petersburg News (Sankt Peterburgskaia 
Vedemosti) were wont to do, nor to abandon itself entirely to a cause in the 
manner of such extreme papers as the Panslavist Russian World (Russkii Mir.) The 
reports of the censors illustrate this, showing The Voice receiving occasional raps on 
5 A. Pogorelskin, 'The Messenger of Europe', in D.A. Martinsen, (ed.), Literary Journals in Imperial 
Russia (Cambridge, 1997), p. 129. 
6 N. Knight, 'Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation', Kritika, 7,4, (2006), p.7S3. 
7 D. Balmuth, Censorship in Russia,(Washington D.C., 1969), p.63. 
8 K Dianina, 'Passage to Europe: Dostoevskii in the St. Petersburg Arcade', Slavic Review: 62, 2, 
(2003), p.2S1; L. McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime: the Development of a Mass-
Circulation Press (Princeton, 1991), p.30; N. Cornwell, 'A History of Russian Literature by Victor 
Terras', Modern Language Review, 89, (1994), p. 269. 
9 Terras, History of Russian literature, p.289; Balmuth, Censorship in Russia, p.6S. 
10 A. Jones, Powers of the Press: newspapers, power and the public in nineteenth century England, 
(Aldershot, 1996), p.140. 
11 Rieber, 'Louise McReynolds,' p. 819. 
ss 
the knuckles, but largely avoiding any extreme censure. 12 The most notable 
exception to this came at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, when 
Kraevskii poured scorn on the 'rumours' of war on the very day that the Tsar issued 
a formal declaration of hostilities. 
The second reason for choosing these publications is their audience. The precise 
'who' of the audience is, alas, unknown given that there is essentially no survey 
data available for the period in question. 13 Although we cannot state with any 
confidence who exactly might have read the daily press, or indeed the thick 
journals, economic data can be used to give some clues - a man would seem 
unlikely to spend all he earned in a week on newspapers. Furthermore, it is known 
that The Voice had subscriptions of around twenty-two thousand by the mid 
1870s.14 Its comments therefore reached a significant proportion of St. Petersburg 
educated society. Furthermore, The Voice was described by Dostoevskii as 'the 
mouthpiece of public opinion' which, although a subjective judgement, came from 
a strong opponent of the paper's editor, suggesting that it is likely to contain more 
truth than flattery.15 The Times by 1877 had a circulation of almost two hundred 
and fifty thousand copies, up fifty thousand from the start of the decade. 16 This 
suggests that not only were its articles and arguments widely read, but that they 
were reaching fresh audiences, rather than relying on habit for sales, another 
indication of the paper's significance. A measure perhaps of both the significance 
and the limitations of The Times, can be seen in a dispute occurring between 
Disraeli and Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, regarding a Times 
editorial urging Bosnian autonomy: the very fact that Andrassy was both aware of, 
and angered by, a piece in The Times must give some indication of its reach, but this 
12 In the period 1863-1877, the paper received 11 warnings, 3 temporary suspensions, and was 
deprived of retail rights 11 times. For a fuller discussion, see Balmuth, Censorship in Russia, p. 64, 
N.M. Lisovskii, 'Materialy dlia kharakteristiki polozheniia russkoi pechati', Vsemirnyi Viestnik 8. 
{1908}, p. 50., and V.Rozenburg & V. lakushkin, Russkaia pechat' i tsenzura v proshlom i 
nastoiashchem {Moscow, 1905}, pp. 231-232, both cited in Balmuth. 
13 McReynolds, The News under Russia's old regime, p.9. 
14 A.J. Rieber, 'Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous', Russian Review, 53, 3, {1994}, 
p.333. 
15 V.G. Bazanov & G.M. Fridlender, Dostoevskii i ego vremia (Leningrad, 1971), pp.17-30; Dianina, 
'Passage to Europe' p.256. 
16 S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, (London, 1981), p.203. 
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must be counter-balanced by Disraeli's angered response to the situation that 'they 
[Le. Andrassy] think they [Le. The Times] indicate the English public! They indicate 
the policy of stockjobbers and idiots!,17 
A further point about The Times must be taken from the work of Cunningham, who 
has considered the domestic aspect of this period in considerable detail. Drawing 
upon the official History of the Times, he notes that with Delane, the editor of The 
Times ill throughout much of the crisis, his influence upon his paper was much 
reduced.18 Firstly, this is significant due to Delane's belief that it was the obligation 
of his paper always to present the voice of 'governing opinion.,19 More significant 
however is what followed in his wake: he was replaced in the autumn of 1877 by a 
stand-in-editor, before a permanent replacement arrived in 1878. The overall effect 
of this, Cunningham argues is that The Times 'meandered' through the crisis, unable 
to impose a strong editorial will on the paper.20 This should not be seen as a 
drawback for the purposes of this study. Indeed, it suggests, if anything, that The 
Times might be more reflective of changes in public mood, as it was less closely 
bound to an editorial line. 
It seems somewhat reckless to make the considerable leap that McReynolds and 
Brower have made, of simply trying to guess who the audience of the papers and 
journals are by reading back from their content. 21 This study will adopt the more 
cautious approach of being content with the knowledge that these publications 
were widely read as attested to by their circulation figures, and that the readership 
was broadly the educated classes, as demonstrated by their cost. 
Broadly, then, it can be seen that there is a rough equivalency between the Press 
sources for Britain and Russia: for each country there is a single Daily Newspaper, 
and a selection of journals. All of the publications considered were noted for 
17 M. Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, (Oxford, 2011), p.91. 
18 H.S. Cunningham, British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question, (DPhil, University of Sussex, 
1969), p.17. 
19 D. Brown, 'Morally Transforming the World or spinning a line? Politicians and the newspaper press 
in mid Nineteenth-century Britain,' Historical research, 83, 220, (May 2010), 329. 
20 Cunningham, British Public Opinion, pp.17-18. 
21 Daniel R. Brower, The Russian City between Tradition and Modernity 1850-1900 (Berkeley, 1990); 
McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime, p. 9. 
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holding relatively moderate views most of the time, although that certainly did not 
mean that they were entirely free of controversy, nor of political disputes between 
them. The most obvious example of this can be seen in Nineteenth Century, a 
journal set up as a result of a dispute with the editors of the Contemporary Review, 
itself established as a counter to the Fortnightly Review. 22 
Having established which papers will be considered, it is important then to make 
clear the way in which they will be looked at. I shall confine myself to a 
consideration of the content of the papers, namely the topics of discussion and 
what was said in those discussions. This methodology follows McReynolds in largely 
leaving out issues of economics and censorship, and indeed goes further, by leaving 
out any new study of the lives and careers of the individuals who shaped the 
papers. 23 
As is inevitably the case with any comparative piece, this work will be affected by 
the variation in the amounts of evidence and source material available for the two 
sides of the study. Firstly, the differing nature of the two societies under 
consideration has impacted the amount of information that has been left to 
posterity. Furthermore, the manner in which this information has been stored or 
distributed will impact significantly upon the ultimate landscape which can be 
reconstructed. Broadly speaking, the British side of the study will at times be faced 
with an embarrassment of riches, whilst the Russian side remains shrouded in 
mystery. 
It is also important to keep in mind the true significance or otherwise of source 
material. Where only a single newspaper article exists upon a given topic, there is 
an inevitable temptation to read too much into its contents, and to extrapolate 
from a small and inconsequential piece a broad world-view where no such thing 
existed. On the other hand, an absence of significant amounts of reportage on a 
particular topic, event, or issue is, in itself, significant, as it shows the inability or 
22 S. Lee, 'Knowles, Sir James Thomas (1831-1908),' rev. H.C.G. Matthew, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, (Oxford, 2004: online edn, Sept 2010) 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34353. accessed 19 July 2011]. 
23 G. Marker, 'L. McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime', Russian Review, 52, (1993), 
p.l11. 
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unwillingness of the editorial decision makers to formulate an explicit statement on 
that topic. This should not be ignored, but nor should we stray too far in claiming to 
know the reasons behind these decisions and omissions. 
Within the broader category of {the Press,' journals provide certain particular 
challenges of their own. Whereas articles in The Times or The Voice would be 
published within a day of the information being received by the editor, and 
generally within a week or two of the actual event taking place in the Balkans, the 
process of producing journal articles was far slower. Many journal articles would 
often be informed by the newspaper reports and thus could not be written ahead 
of the daily coverage. Journals would be published monthly, or even quarterly, 
meaning that sometimes the very quickest an event could be responded to would 
be three or four months after it had happened, by which time the situation would 
be much changed. For this reason, it is necessary to be particularly wary when 
commenting upon the absence of articles on a given topic in the journals, as all 
sorts of unknowable factors may have prevented an opinion reaching the page in a 
timely manner. This said, it is still possible to draw comparisons and to suggest, for 
example, that a journal which published six articles on Bulgaria and only one on 
Serbia was showing a greater interest in Bulgaria. 
Literature 
Although the Press is the primary medium through which this study will engage 
with expressed opinions and actions during the Eastern Crisis, consideration will 
also be made of the engagement with major events made by contemporary 
literature. This of course provides its own series of methodological challenges and 
issues. 
Whilst the literary studies can provide some interesting insights into certain 
thoughts and ideas in circulation at the time, or even provide a full debate as in the 
case of the contrasting views of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, they do not, in any 
meaningful way, provide a picture of popular views. As with the Press, figures of 
circulations and readership may perhaps suggest an interest in the broad topics 
under discussion, but they certainly do not indicate agreement with the arguments 
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being put forward. Indeed, even such questions of interest must be treated 
carefully, as the very fact of Tolstoi or Dostoevskii's authorship would, as much as 
the title of The TimesJ be sufficient to sell a certain number of copies, regardless of 
whether the topic being considered was of particular interest. 
It is also important to consider the breadth of the literary genre. Whereas journals 
and newspaper articles have a reasonably narrow function, the literary sources 
which will be considered here are far more varied in nature. For the consideration 
of Russian literature, the main texts which will be examined will be Dostoevskii's 
WriterJs DiarYJ and Tolstoi's Anna Karenina, (most particularly, the final section). 
Fyodor Dostoevskii, who had been exiled to Siberia in 1850 for his involvement in 
the Petrashevtsy conspiracy, had returned in 1854, and immediately upon the 
outbreak of the Crimean War had begun sending 'jingoistic' poems to the Tsar and 
other senior figures at the court. 24 By the mid-1870s, despite often being forced to 
write in order to pay gambling debts and retain the rights to his own works, his star 
had risen further, and Pobedonostsev, whom Dostoevskii first met in 1871, ensured 
that the Imperial Family read his WriterJs Diary. 25 The WriterJs Diary was a genre-
defying work, which has been described by scholars as 'Dostoevsky's boldest 
experiment with literary form' and which contained variously short-stories, abstract 
philosophy, and a consideration of the Russian Society for the Protection of 
Animals. 26 First launched in 1873 and stretching to fifteen undated articles, the 
DiarYJ which in form perhaps most closely resembles a modern 'blog,' was revived 
in 1876 with a stricter and more explicit chronology, and after a few months in the 
old vein, began to shift towards the Eastern Question. In the second section of his 
June Diary, Dostoevskii launched into a full-scale discussion of the Eastern Question 
with the observation 'Again a tussle with Europe ... again in Europe they are looking 
mistrustfully at Russia.,27 
24 Dostoevsky, F., The House o/the Dead, (London, 2003), p.7; Brooks, J., 'How Tolstoevskii pleased 
Readers, and Rewrote a Russian Myth,' Slavic Review, Vo164. No3. (Autumn 2005), p.548. For more 
on the term 'Jingoism,' and its anachronistic use, such as here, see chapter 5 p.178. 
25 R.F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev: his life and thought, (Indiana, 1968), p.98. 
26 F. Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz, v.l, (Evanstown, 2000). 
27 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, voLl, p.515. 
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Tolstoi's Anna Karenina is of course one of the best known works of Russian 
literature. The vast majority of the book appeared in seven parts in the journal The 
Russian Messenger between 1875 and 1877. However, the final section of the novel 
was deemed by Katkov, the journal's editor, to be so vehemently anti-Panslav that 
he refused to publish it for fear of the censors.28 The chapters in question feature a 
depiction of Russian volunteers bound for the Balkans to fight alongside the Serbs, 
along with a discussion of the pro-Slavonic 'movement' of 1876 by some of the 
principal characters of the novel. This section, which will be considered in detail in 
chapter 5, never had a serialised publication as the earlier parts of the novel had, 
but instead appeared for the first time in the full novel publication, which was 
published in the late spring of 1877. In some subsequent editions, such as Natan 
Zarkhi's edition of 1967, which ends with the death of the eponymous heroine, they 
have been omitted altogether.29 
The styles of these two texts are distinctly contrasting: aside from the difference in 
when they were written, it is important to remember that Tolstoi provided a one-
off snapshot in his novel, whereas Dostoevskii's work, being a monthly (or often bi-
monthly) publication, allowed for a more graduated portrayal of the writer's 
opinions. It was also, as a piece of non-fiction, able to engage with Anna Karenina in 
a fashion that the novel was ill-able to counter. This is, perhaps, particularly ironic 
given Curtis's assertion that not only did Tolstoi's literary style evolve significantly 
as a result of the author's reading habits, but that Anna Karenina was the 
'transitional point' in Tolstoi's work and the moment at which it became fully 
'Dostoevskian' in its use of metaphor and contrast. 3D The significance of Anna 
Karenina as a window onto the Eastern Question in Russia at that time was 
recognised by Dostoevskii, who dubbed the novel 'a fact of special importance' in 
the history of Russia.31 Furthermore, Dostoevskii draws his readers' attention to the 
fact that he had, in the opening of his Diary, expressed a desire to avoid literary 
criticism. What though, he asks his readers, can he do when his own 'feelings' on a 
28 Brooks, Tolstoevskii, p.543. 
29 Brooks, Tolstoevskii, p.545. 
30 J. M. Curtis, 'Metaphor is to Dostoevskii as metonymy is to Tolstoi,' Slavic Review, Vol61. Nol 
(Spring, 2002), p.lll. 
31 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, VoI2., p.1067. 
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topical matter happen to relate to a piece of literature732 As Morson has observed, 
much of Dostoevskii's literature is fuelled by paradox and it is perhaps the case that 
he felt the need to highlight the same here. 33 
Structure of this work 
This thesis is structured around a series of more specific and focused case-studies. 
As this is to be a study of public interest and action, each chapter will focus around 
a particular event of public interest, or indeed non-interest. The opening case-study 
will consider the 'forgotten' revolt of firstly Hercegovina, and then of Bosnia, 
beginning in the spring of 1875. It will examine the way in which these events were 
reported, and consider why it was that this period received so little popular 
attention, yet continued to bubble along, paving the way for the more spectacular 
events which were to occur later. 
The second case-study will focus on the aspect of the crisis perhaps most familiar to 
British historians, that of Gladstone and the 'Bulgarian Horrors.' Both the events 
and the complex manner of the reporting of this event will be considered in order 
to attempt an understanding of how one event, sadly far from unique, was able to 
energise the 'Grand Old Man,' produce one of the most widely-read pamphlets of 
the nineteenth century, lead him to the momentous step of writing long-hand 
entries in his diary, and eventually provide the momentum that led to the 
successful Midlothian campaign of 1880 and his second term as Prime Minister. 
The third case-study will focus most closely upon Russian perspectives on the crisis, 
and consider the impact of the Serbian War and then the Russo-Turkish war upon 
Russian society. Examination will be made of the popular myths which have grown 
up surrounding events of this time, particularly the notion of the entire Russian 
nation up in arms. An attempt is made to define what exactly the Russian people 
thought of events, utilising both their own contemporary accounts, and the manner 
in which they were reported by the British Press at the time. The significant impact 
32 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, Vo12., p.1063. 
33 G. S. Morson, 'Paradoxical Dostoevsky,' The Slavic and East European Journal, Vo144, No3, 
(Autumn 1999), p.471. 
62 
of the campaign upon the Russian literary world will also be considered, along with 
the reciprocal impact of literary engagements with the crisis upon popular 
perceptions of events. 
The fourth case-study will focus on the role played by the Greeks in the crisis. As 
the Balkan minority which most closely allowed its policy to be guided by Great 
Power (and particularly British) advice and insistence, Greece warrants particular 
consideration. Despite their relative inactivity, the Greeks received considerable 
attention, much of it positive, at least in the British press. The reasons for this will 
be analysed, including a consideration of the personal role of Gladstone, and a 
contrast with the Russian press at the time, which maintained a relative degree of 
silence regarding Greece and essentially limited comment on Greece to its role as 
an aid of the Slavs. 
The final case-study will consider some of the darker aspects of this period on the 
home front, looking particularly at the period before the Congress of Berlin in which 
the British and Russian governments came close to war with each other over the 
fate of Constantinople and the Ottoman empire more generally. This section will 
contain an examination of the broad sweep of Russophobia within Great Britain in 
the nineteenth century, as well as Anglophobia within Russia as a necessary 
background to these events. Following this, a particular focus will be given to 
'Jingoism,' the aggressive pro-war counter agitation of 1878, as well as to the 
related opposition to Gladstone's atrocities campaign. All the Jingo activities 
opposed Gladstone, but not every event opposed to Gladstone should properly be 
considered part of Jingoism. This section will also provide an insight into the conflict 
between ideological moralism and practical pragmatism in both the public and the 
government's understanding of events. 
Finally, a concluding chapter will recapitulate the various findings which have been 
uncovered in the case-studies and consider how the discoveries in the different 
chapters relate to each other, primarily by means of linking them back to some of 
the larger questions raised by this thesis. This will be followed by a reflection of 
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possible future uses of the discoveries made here, or directions for subsequent 
study. 
Boundaries of this work 
This is principally a study of the Press. It will also make significant use of printed 
diaries and some correspondence in order to shed a contrasting light on the events 
being discussed in the Press. Furthermore, there will be reference to some 
government documents as a proof of the actions which the Press variously did or 
did not attest to. It is not, however, a diplomatic history of the crisis, a task which 
has already been accomplished on a number of occasions and thus will not provide 
a blow-by-blow account of the diplomatic exchanges, intrigues, deals and 
conferences. For this reason, an existing familiarity with the broad chronology of 
the crisis and its significant political landmarks is assumed, and will not be 
recapitulated. Nor is it a biographical history of the principal characters involved in 
the crisis. Thus, the question of whether the press subjected Benjamin Disraeli to a 
tide of anti-Semitic abuse is relevant as it concerns the press and the public, but the 
question of whether Lady Derby was betraying secrets to the Russian ambassador is 
not.34 As with any study of this nature, a significant limitation is linguistic: there will 
therefore be no real consideration of the Turkish perspective upon events, except 
where these have been re-stated by others in English, nor will any use be made of 
the Press or other Documents originating in German. 
An important factor to keep in mind, easily forgotten by those accustomed to the 
Press of the twenty-first century, is that newspapers published in St. Petersburg or 
London in the nineteenth century were very much publications of that city, rather 
than of the nation as a whole, and that regional papers were much more 
prominent. Indeed, Lee has stated that in Britain in 1870, there were no national 
papers, but that The Times was the closest thing.35 
To sum up, the principal questions of this thesis are as follows: 
34 For Disraeli and anti-semitism, see below, pp.188-190; For Lady Derby, see R. Millman, Britain and 
the Eastern Question 1875-1878, (Oxford, 1979), p.10. 
3S A.J. Lee, The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855-1914, (London, 1976), p.34. 
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• To what extent can popular feeling or activity be shown to have existed on a 
specific issue? 
• What factors led to this popular activity? 
• How was each type of activity dealt with by the Press? 
• Did the Press seem primarily to be leading or following the crowds? 
• How did the government relate to these public movements via the medium 
of the Press? 
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Chapter 3 - The Forgotten Revolt: Hercegovina and Bosnia 
In 1874, the peasant farmers of Turkish Hercegovina suffered a crop failure, which 
left them unable to pay the harsh tax demands imposed on them at the turn of 
1875. After an appeal to the authorities produced only threats of violence, a large 
number of them fled across the border into Montenegro on February 20 th . After a 
few quiet months, many of the villagers returned, having been promised an 
amnesty by the Turkish authorities. However, in the village of Nevesinje they were 
attacked by local Muslims, an action which was acquiesced in by the authorities. 
The population of Nevesinje armed in self-defence and demanded substantial 
reforms. Dervish Pasha the local governor refused to negotiate whilst they were 
armed, and after a further round of violence by the Muslim populace in early July, 
large numbers of the men of the province fled, armed, into the mountains, now in 
open revolt against the local administration. 
Over the coming months, crude and violent attempts by the authorities to crush 
this rebellion served only to fuel it, and the expanding blaze ultimately threatened 
to engulf much of Europe in war. By the end of 1878, two major European Powers, 
Russia and Turkey, had fought a war, and a third, Great Britain, had almost joined 
them. Three countries, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, had gained independence, 
and sizeable popular movements had arisen in both Britain and Russia in response 
to the events which inflamed the Balkan Peninsula. 
Yet, despite all of this, both at the time and since, the initial events in Hercegovina 
and then in neighbouring Bosnia have remained a dark spot. No significant popular 
movement arose to champion their cause, little has been written about them, and 
the details of what happened are forgotten by all but the most specialist interest. 
This chapter will revisit the Bosnian revolt, consider the way in which it was 
regarded (and, indeed, reported) at the time, and seek to establish just why it is 
that these events have been forgotten. It will also consider the way in which the 
slowly-growing Press coverage and small but devoted agitation at this time laid the 
foundations for the much larger public movements of the following years. 
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Background to the Revolt 
Although the chronology of the above narrative is broadly agreed upon, it is worth 
considering in more detail the exact causes of the uprising. It is worth noting that 
some, such as Millman, have argued that despite a multiplicity of theories by 
various scholars, the true cause of the revolt remains beyond the grasp of the 
modern historian.1 However, whilst this may be true, it still behoves scholars to 
examine some of the theories which have been advanced: Harris has argued that, 
despite the contemporary belief of the international consuls that it was taxation 
that provided the spark, misery is insufficient to start a revolt. 2 Rather, he argues, it 
is necessary also to have some kind of animosity existing between the rebels and 
the authorities, memories of a better past, and a precedent of revolt. 3 
The precedent of revolt is an easy case to argue, and as will be discussed below, the 
frequency of revolts against Turkish rule were probably a significant factor in the 
lack of attention initially given by the press to this crisis. A previous major 
insurrection had occurred in 1868, as well as frequent other minor revolts dotted 
around European Turkey over the previous quarter century. The notion of hatred 
existing between the Christian Rayah and the Turkish authorities is also amply 
testified to by the events of the crisis. Finally, the question exists as to whether the 
peasants had any memories of a better alternative to Turkish rule. Obviously no 
individual in Hercegovina in 1875 had been alive centuries earlier when the Slavic 
Princes were last independent. However, the folklore in the region was well-known 
for providing stories of powerful medieval empires latterly subjugated by the Turk. 
An interesting question would be, to what extent these peasants perceived 
themselves as Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosnians, or Hercegovinans. Malcolm notes 
that the Medieval Kingdom equivalent to the latter-day Hercegovina was that of 
Hum, linked to Bosnia by marriage between their ruling family and Bosnia's Ban 
Kulin, but separated by the Orthodox Christianity, unlike Bosnia's Catholicism.4 This 
1 R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-78, (Oxford, 1979), p.13. 
2 D. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year, (Stanford, 1936), 
p.17. 
3 Ibid. 
4 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A short history, (London, 1994), pp.14-1S. 
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level of historical awareness was doubtless beyond the average Bosnian or 
Hercegovinian peasant in the 1870s, but the strength of religious identity in the 
Balkans should not be underestimated, as shown by Judah in his observation that 
'In an age before nationalism Serbs would just as often identify themselves as 
Orthodox and Croats as Catholic; and in cases where their ethnic origins may have 
been neither Serb nor Croat but rather Vlach it was this religious identity which 
eventually made them Serbs and Croats.'s Of course for the intelligentsia of the 
great European capitals, 1875 was not part of an 'age before nationalism/ but 
whether the same can be said for rural Bosnia is another matter. This issue 
becomes still more complicated when it is borne in mind that, although the 
medium-term causes of the revolt largely involved the Orthodox population, there 
was in June of 1875, a brief outbreak of unrest by Catholic villagers in the Gabela 
and Hrasno districts, a group more traditionally identified with the neighbouring 
Croat population. Sumner attributes this Catholic rising to the murder of a local 
priest, although this does not fit particularly well with some contemporary accounts 
which see the death of Prior Kavaula as marking the end of organised Catholic 
activity against the authorities.6 
The Opening Stages 
There is both much, and at the same time very little, to say regarding the fashion in 
which the early stages of the revolt were covered by the Press. For a considerable 
period of time, events in the Balkans were almost entirely ignored by the press 
outside of the area, which on the one hand provides us with little to analyse, but on 
the other speaks volumes for the significance attached to these events by outsiders. 
The initial migration of the villagers into Montenegro failed to register with the 
European press, likewise the initial return and violence in June. Whilst it is of course 
possible that the Press remained universally oblivious to events, it seems more 
5 T. Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (2nd ed.) (Yale, 2000), p.43. 
6 B.H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, (Oxford, 1937), p.139. Kavaula's murder was 
noted by a Times correspondent as having ISO intimidated' the local monks that when the area's 
Catholic Bishop was forced by the Turkish authorities to undertake a mission of pacification, he 
found the local population already well on the way to meeting this viewpoint: The Times, 'The 
Insuranction [sic] in Herzegovina,' 15/12/1875, p.4, CoI.E. 
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likely that the nearest correspondents simply deemed these events of sufficiently 
little import that they did not report on them to their superiors, or that if they did, 
their dispatches were not deemed worthy of the column inches they would have 
required. This is of course fully understandable; the inefficient, despotic, and even 
barbaric nature of Turkish rule throughout its European provinces was something of 
an accepted maxim in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Some months into 
the crisis, when the press began to make more rounded evaluations of the 
situation, an editorial in The Voice asserted that Turkey was nothing more than a 
"sick man" and that this rebellion was merely the tip of the iceberg, with almost 
universal discontent simmering beneath. 7 Around the same time, in London, the 
ongoing success of the rebellion was being attributed to the fact that the Turks 
were too lazy and inept to do anything about it. 8 Even more than this, the Turkish 
authorities consistently denied or dismissed reports of rebellious activities against 
them, either claiming that reports of violence were total fabrication, or at least 
asserting that the revolt was a mere trifle and would be suppressed within days. In 
mid-July The Voice described a report from the London Standard, which attested to 
'many attempts to reduce awareness' of the revolt. 9 Likewise, the very first words 
that The Times had to say on the matter of the revolt contained a disclaimer that 
the reports coming from the region were 'very much exaggerated.,lo 
As the revolt continued, accounts of Turkish denials were published with increasing 
degrees of ridicule and incredulity, the correspondent for The Voice describing the 
whole affair as a 'remarkable curiosity' for the way in which it was ignored by the 
Turkish government.ll The Times was initially more matter-of-fact, simply stating 
that the Constantinople press was reporting many successes, but an underlying 
scepticism as to the veracity of official reports escalated to the point that, by the 
turn of the year, a Times correspondent was so moved as to say 'I doubt if anything 
so ridiculously and uselessly mendacious has been perpetrated, even in China, as 
7 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (28/8) 9/9/1875, p.l, CoI.B. 
S The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 21/8/1875, p.6, CoI.A. 
9 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (12) 24/7/1875, p.3, CoLD. 
10 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 14/7/1875, p.5, CoI.E. 
11 The Voice, 'Foreign news,' (26/7) 7/8/1875, p.4, CoI.B. 
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Shefket Pasha's reports of his military operations.,12 In light of all this, then, it does 
not seem particularly remarkable that reports of the initial flight of the villagers, or 
of their violent reception upon their return home, were sufficiently subdued and 
suppressed to have seemed largely insignificant to those British or Russian 
reporters who might have encountered them. To an extent, questions were raised a 
few months later as to whether this initial dismissal was somewhat disingenuous, 
and the Notes of the Fatherland painted a colourful picture of the 'Turkofile press' 
of Europe trying to convince its readers that 'the uprising was a mere trifle.,13 
However, it seems more probable that this was simply the result of genuine 
obliviousness, rather than anything more sinister. 
The point at which silence could no longer be maintained, was when an entire 
province went into armed revolt. The initial reporting of this was cagey, but seems 
to have begun around the same time across the daily Press. The Voice reported a 
few days after the event, in a reprint of a London Standard article, that on the 
eighth of July there had been an uprising near the village of 'Drachovo,' a 
settlement near the Austrian border. 14 This report also attested to waves of unrest 
spreading outwards into Bosnia and Albania. Is The same day, The Times reported 
violence 'around Metkewitch,' although it did so only briefly, and with little 
importance attached to it at this stage. 16 Over the following weeks, there were 
intermittent accounts of skirmishes in the area, and reports that the Hercegovinan 
commissioners were requesting troops be sent by the Porte to deal with the 
matter. 17 The Times even made a preliminary attempt to explain the causes of the 
uprising, noting that the principal grievance was against 'tax-gatherers.,18 Thus it 
can be seen clearly that however silent the press may have been on the medium-
term causes and on the lead up to the revolt, once open violence broke out on a 
large-scale, they were aware of it, reporting it, and in a position to continue 
12 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 6/8/1875, p.5, CoLA; 'Herzegovina,' 27/12/1875, p.4, CoLe. 
13 Notes of the Fatherland, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1875, p.122. 
14 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (2) 14/7/1875, p.3, CoLE. 
15 Ibid. 
16 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 14/7/1875, p.5, CoLE. 
17 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (11) 23/7/1875, p.3, CoI.B; The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 20/7/1875, 
p.5, CoLB. 
18 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 19/7/1875, p.5, CoI.G. 
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providing updates upon it. All of this is significant, as it undermines any claim that 
the Hercegovinan revolt had somehow simply slipped under the radar. The 
stagnation of coverage in the popular press, and the significant focus upon the 
diplomatic wrangling of the Powers at the expense of covering the activities of the 
peasants were all the result of definite actions, and thus may be seen as part of 
editorial policy, despite the fact that it remains uncertain to what degree this was 
an attempt to curtail public interest in the revolt, and to what extent the papers 
were simply responding to a general lack of public interest. 
The period in which the revolt received the most attention, at least in The Voice, 
was the early autumn. Although often lacking in detail there were numerous 
reports around this time of troop movements, the mood of the rebel camp, or the 
activities of some of the more charismatic and distinctive insurgent leaders. 19 Only 
intermittently did the commentary run beyond this to offering anything 
approaching a considered opinion on events, mostly towards the end of this period 
such as in mid-October, when a Voice correspondent opined that whatever the 
cause, 'the uprising must be worse' than the grievances it set out to tackle. 20 As late 
autumn wore on, however, the rebels gradually faded from the pages. Logistics 
were sometimes blamed, such as the report of early November which simply 
attested that it was 'too cold' for any news from the mountains, but largely their 
disappearance went unexplained. 21 The picture coming from The Times is similar. In 
September, they carried an account of a general meeting of the insurgents, from a 
correspondent who had made repeat visits to their camp.22 Likewise, they found 
ample space to report the activities of Ljubobratic. Meaning 'brotherly love,' this 
ironic moniker was the nom de guerre of one Mico Ballardic, a colourful figure who 
was often depicted trying to put himself at the head of the rebellion, despite having 
the firm loyalty of only a small band of brigands more intent on looting and pillaging 
than on fighting a reasoned campaign against the Turks. 23 After briefly disappearing 
19 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' e.g. (3) 15/9/1875; (16) 28/9/1875; (23/9) 5/10/1875; (2) 14/10/1875. 
20 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (21/10) 2/11/1875, p.1, CoLB. 
21 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/11/1875, p4, CoLA. 
II The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 13/9/1875, p.5, CoLB. 
23 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 14/9/1875, p.6, CoLA; 'Herzegovina,' 16/10/1875, p.10, CoLA; 'The 
Insuranction [sic] in Herzegovina,' 15/12/1875, p.4, CoLE. 
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from view when he fell from his horse in the autumn and broke his arm, 
Ljubobratic's involvement in the uprising was finally brought to an end the 
following spring, when he strayed onto Austrian territory, and was picked up by the 
authorities who had him locked up where he could do less harm. The loss to the 
insurrection was questionable, but to the media it was palpable. 24 
Generally speaking though, by the middle of the autumn of 1875, Press interest in 
the rebels was beginning to wane. The Great Powers of Europe were gradually 
stirring and becoming ever-more active in seeking a solution (or at least 
suppression) for the conflict, and at the end of November, Britain suddenly became 
pre-occupied with the purchase of the Suez canal shares, an act deemed 'both bold 
and original, in keeping with the qualities popularly ascribed to Mr. Disraeli, from 
whom the country expected some departure from the commonplace.,25 Although 
still part of the Eastern Question as a whole, the precise issue of the Suez purchase 
is generally beyond the remit of this present study 
The Arrival of the Powers 
One of the most striking things about the coverage of the Hercegovinan 
insurrection, as has already been noted, is the manner in which the acts and 
intentions of the Great Powers of Europe were repeatedly given more column 
inches than the events of the actual insurgents themselves. Whether or not, as 
Millman has argued, it was the Su Itan's decision to agree to an international 
consultation which kept the revolt alive, it certainly seems that it was the 
preparation for just such international involvement which kept the Press's attention 
active.26 However, whilst the truth of this is evident to anyone who has glanced 
over the papers of that period, it is not the case that this was so from the outset. It 
was towards the end of August 1875 that The Voice first began to address the 
question of the broader international situation, with an article which noted with 
surprise that the Powers seemed to be more favourable to the Turks than they 
24 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 8/11/1875, p.5, CoI.G; 'Herzegovina, 15/3/1876, p.5, Col.e. 
2S 'The Great Canal at Suez: its Political Engineering and Financial History,' Quarterly Review, 142, 
284, (Oct 1876), pp.429-430. 
26 Millman, Britain and the Eastern question, p.19. 
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were towards the rebels. 27 This comment is particularly surprising, given the fact 
that they had just a day or so earlier described how the Northern Powers were to 
supervise negotiations towards reform.28 
From here on in, there was a steady accumulation, with an editorial a week later 
asserting that the revolt was symptomatic of the more general condition of the 'sick 
man' and that it would not long remain isolated. 29 The Times, by contrast, was 
some way ahead of its Russian counterpart, and from the beginning of August had 
been following carefully the conversations between Belgrade and Vienna, as Prince 
Milan first began to find himself torn between bellicose advisers and ministers on 
the one hand, and a neighbouring government determined to prevent an escalation 
on the other. Indeed, his warning to Vienna that he was having difficulties 
restraining the population was announced in The Times on the same day as the 
revelation that the Austrian government would not allow any further collections to 
be made for the insurgents.3o As far as The Times was concerned, in August 1875, 
Austria was indeed the only concerned Power. In light of the various assertions that 
many rebels and supporters were repeatedly crossing and re-crossing the Austrian 
border with supplies or simply to join the fight, this is relatively unsurprising. 31 It 
was stated explicitly in an article on the twelfth which pondered the reason for the 
relative inactivity in Russia. Turkey, it argued, was bound to collapse eventually, so 
why worry about the details?32 This thesis was gradually expanded upon by The 
Times during the autumn, with great significance being attached to every action (or 
inaction) by the Russians. 
When the consular commission set out for Hercegovina at the end of August, the 
Russian consul was declared to be 'too ill' to attend, something which was noted as 
heavily damaging for the mission, as even if it were true, it was likely to be seen by 
the rebels as conscious encouragement.33 The unilateral activities of the Russian 
27 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (22/8) 3/9/1875, p.3, CoLA. 
28 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/8/1875, p.4, CoLB. 
29 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' 28/8/1875. 
30 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 5/8/1875, p.5, CoLB. 
31 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 6/8/1875, p.5, CoLA. 
32 The Times, 'The Herzegovina and Turkestan,' 12/8/1875, p.l0, CoLA. 
33 The Times, 'The Herzegovina Insurrection,' 28/8/1875, p.3, CoLB. 
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consuls in the region earlier in the crisis had already attracted considerable 
comment, and this did little to reinforce the picture of multi-Power cooperation.34 
Furthermore, it was Russian failure to cooperate with Austria that was blamed for 
the reform proposals presented to the Porte by the Dreikaiserbund, that is the 
Conservative alliance of Russia, Austria and Germany, being severely watered-
down, to the point where they were unlikely to satisfy the rebels. 35 This resolute 
inactivity was still being noted at the end of September when a correspondent 
declared that Russia still regarded the rebellion as inopportune, and thus a 
nuisance, but that they were firmly resolved to ensure that whatever the ultimate 
solution, it was not a turn of events that most benefitted Austria. 36 The logical 
conclusion to this line of argument appeared at the end of September, when The 
Times announced boldly that the Russian press was beginning to 'withdraw the 
veil': Russia, they argued, was waiting for Turkey to collapse of its own accord, and 
had no intention of stirring up trouble before that time. Austria, by contrast, had 
incited this whole rebellion to shift the course of events onto a path more to her 
suiting. 37 
The actions and motivations of the Vienna government are, of course, beyond the 
scope of this present study. However, the motives attributed to them by the British 
and the Russian press are not, and thus this accusation warrants some further 
consideration. A first question is what form exactly this lifting of 'the veil' took. A 
few days before the Times article, The Voice had remarked upon the futility of 
escaping the Turkish yoke only to fall under the rule of Austria. 38 However, in 
translation, The Times had somewhat watered-down the assertions being made by 
The Voice, attributing to them a reluctance to 'spend money and men. J39 In fact, 
The Voice had put the matter rather more vividly; putting the words in the mouths 
of the insurgent south Slavs themselves, they condemned not the wasting of 
34 Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, p.16. 
35 The Times, 'The Herzegovina Insurrection,' 31/8/1875, p.3, CoI.B. 
36 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 18/9/1875, p.8, CoLA. 
37 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 23/9/1875, p.8, CoI.B. 
38 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/9/1875, p.3, CoLD. 
39 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 23/9/1875, p.8, CoI.B. 
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money, but the spilling of blood in a futile cause. 40 Whilst it is tempting to attempt 
to read into this mis-translation some kind of politically motivated attempt to 
downplay and de motivate the Russian cause, it is equally possible that it was a 
simple transcription error, and thus nothing can truly be inferred from it. 
This was far from being the end of what The Voice had to say on the matter. A few 
days later, they issued a substantial editorial, considering the various conflicting 
interests of the Powers, and the attendant difficulty in resolving the Eastern 
Question. Austria, it asserted, could not preside over autonomous Slav states, and 
'Muslim culture obviously can never identify with Christian.,41 Whilst the remark 
about the unsustainable nature of 'Muslim' government is hardly surprising, and of 
the flavour of the times, the other comment, rounding off the sentiments 
presented in the previous piece, is a significant one. Up to this point, much of the 
diplomatic initiative had been at least in the name of the three 'Northern Powers' 
or Dreikaiserbund.42 The tensions in this alliance, particularly between Russia and 
Austria, had already been noted in The TimesJ as discussed above, but the fact that 
they were now being openly voiced in the Russian Press marks a significant change. 
It might seem logical, then, to expect that this hardening of words would coincide 
with a changing of attitudes by the Russian government. The Times certainly 
portrayed the activities of Russian Press and Government as if they were part of 
one large, carefully orchestrated plan.43 However, this does not seem to have been 
the case: firstly, the change in position was not nearly as cut-and-dried as it might 
at first seem. Although his daily paper, The VoiceJ had altered its tone slightly, 
Kraevskii's journal, The Notes of the Fatherland was, in November, still arguing 
against the argument presented in the German press that Russian and Austrian 
interests in the Balkans were too diverse to permit any kind of long-term accord.44 
Harris asserts that, as late as the end of October, Jomini, the Russian diplomat, was 
prepared to accept Andrassy's plans for reform, not because of any merit they may 
40 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/9/1875, p.3, CoI.D. 
41 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (10) 22/9/1875, p.l, CoI.E. 
42 e.g. The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (1) 13/9/1875, p.4, CoI.B. 
43 The Times, The Herzegovina,' 6/8/187, p.5, CoI.B. 
44 Notes o/the Fatherland, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1875, p.121. 
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have had themselves, but because of a genuine concern for the likely impact upon 
Austro-Russian relations if he did not.45 Furthermore, although the Russian 
ambassador to Constantinople, Ignatiev, sent a report to the Tsar in early 
November stating that the Austrians were moving unexpectedly away from joint 
action, he also stressed that the rumours of an impending Austrian occupation 
were greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, Alexander hand-wrote a note in the 
margin, commenting that it was the 'entente a trois' (alliance of three, clearly a 
reference to the Dreikaiserbund) which secured Austria's position. 46 It hardly 
seems, then, like the articles in The Voice were paving the way for a sharp volte-
face by Russian policy-makers. Indeed it adds weight to the generally accepted view 
that it was the errors of Andrassy which proved the undoing for any scheme of 
reforms initiated solely by the Dreikaiserbund.47 
Russophobia 
It seems, then, that as Press perceptions of events in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
moved away from the idea that the crisis was simply an internal matter, or else one 
with which only Austria need be concerned, the amount of coverage it received 
increased. However, it also seems that the actions of the Russian government do 
not seem to bear out the notion that the Press was being used to prepare the 
ground for a substantial change of policy. It is necessary, then, to consider the 
relationship between Britain and Russia at this time, in order to attempt to 
determine what might be the reason behind such a strong conviction on the part of 
The Times that Russia was indeed up to something. 
During the autumn of 1875 the diaries of Lord Derby, the British foreign secretary at 
that time, depict the then Russian ambassador, Schuvalov, as repeatedly trying to 
paint himself as the model statesman. The word 'moderation' is conspicuous by its 
45 Harris, A Diplomatic History o/the Balkan Crisis, p.1S4. 
46 'Report from N.P. Ignatiev to Alexander II on the position in Hercegovina and on the rumours 
regarding Austro-Hungarian preparations for the occupation of Bosnia,' Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk: 
institut slavianovedeniia, Rossiia i vosstanie v Bosnii i gercegovine 1875-1878: dokumenty, [Russian 
Academy of Scholarship: Institute of Slavonic Studies, Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina 1875-1878: DocumentsL (Moscow, 2008), p.1S6. 
47 See e.g. Sumner, p.1S2, Harris, p.183 &c. 
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recurrence, and there are repeated assertions that any international settlement 
must be one that is imposed by all the Powers.48 Despite recording all of the 
ambassador's words, Derby also added his own illuminating commentary on the 
matter: when Schuvalov insisted that the Tsar simply wanted his moderation to be 
appreciated, Derby noted his suspicions regarding the cause of such moderation, 
implying it to be out of character for the Russians. 49 Perhaps the most telling 
remark of all came in early November, when Schuvalov paid Derby a call to provide 
reassurances that Russia only sought peace and quiet, to which Derby noted in his 
diary 'who can trust a foreign diplomatist, and who can trust a Russian?,5o It is in 
this light that all other pronouncements on Russia by Derby must be treated. It is, of 
course, important to note that suspicion and antipathy between Russia and Great 
Britain at this time went both ways. Although the irked remarks made by The Voice 
against Disraeli primarily belong to later chapters, there were editorials describing 
his speeches on Turkey as 'sooner harmful than useful.,51 A little more subtly, 
perhaps, the Russian Press sought at times to disparage British activities elsewhere, 
such as an article in Notes of the F a t h e r l a n d ~ ~ in late 1875, which deemed the best 
analogy for the position of the Hercegovinian Rayah to be that of the Irish peasant 
under British misrule.52 It is important, of course, not to read too much into a few 
newspaper articles and the odd diary entry from a politician; indeed Gleason, who 
has provided the most substantial study on nineteenth-century British Russophobia 
to date, asserts that the latter half of the century was a period of diminished 
tension between the two Powers. 53 Perhaps the most useful contribution he makes 
to this present study is his assertion that British and Russian policies were 
compatible, but that Russian professions of intent were not believed by the 
British.54 It is certainly possible to detect a current of mutual suspicion in the 
depictions and discussions of each other in the British and Russian Press at this 
48 J. Vincent (Ed.) A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15 th Earl of Derby (1826-93), 
between September 1869 and March 1878, (London, 1994), Hereafter "Derby Diaries," pp. 245, 251, 
254,258. 
49 Derby Diaries, pp.244-245. 
50 D b D· . er y lanes. 
51 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (8) 20/11/1875, p.l, Col.c. 
52 Notes of the Fatherland, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1876, p.110. 
53 J.H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, (7, 1950), p.276. 
54 Gleason, Russophobia, p.2. 
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time. However, this is far from the most acute instance of such tensions during the 
1875-78 Crisis, and the topic will therefore be considered in greater detail in the 
later chapters of this thesis.55 
The Refugees 
To the modern mind, a key feature of this period, which would have been expected 
to attract considerable attention, was the plight of the thousands of people, mostly 
the elderly, women and children, who fled Herzegovina when the violence began. In 
The Times, these figures were referred to simply as IIfugitives", a term striking by its 
neutrality rather than the more obvious IIrefugee." Although language has, of 
course, changed in the intervening period, it is certainly not the case that the word 
refugee was unknown to The Times in the nineteenth century, as can be seen by 
repeated uses of the term to refer to the Irish at the turn of the century, Spaniards 
displaced by Napoleon, and various others right up to the Boers.56 Closer to the 
scene of events, The Times had reported as recently as 1873 discussions between 
Austria and Turkey designed to stop the flow of IIrefugees" across the Dalmatian 
border.57 In this light, then, it becomes a matter worthy of some consideration that 
the term refugee should be so scarce in the Times reportage. 
To be precise, the displaced of Hercegovina were referred to in The Times as 
refugees on six occasions between the start of 1875 and the end of 1876. Of these 
instances, four were direct quotations, one from fa Consul of the Powers' one from 
the Russian telegraph agency, a third from Mr. Weselitsky, the chairman of the 
committee for the refugees, and the last in a telegram addressed to Mr. Weselitsky 
by the insurgent leaders.58 It also seems reasonable to suppose that some 
significance might be attached to the timing of these references, coming as they do, 
almost exclusively in the spring of 1876. Thus, during the autumn, when these 
55 See below, pp.178-183. 
56 The Times, 'London,' 23/9/1814, p.3, CoLC; 'French Papers,' 15/10/1814, p.2, CoLE; 'The Boer 
Republics,' 16/1/1900, p.3, CoLe. 
57 The Times, 'Austria and Turkey,' 11/11/1873, p.12, CoLA. 
58 The Times, 'The Insuranction [sic] in Herzegovina,' 15/12/1875, p.4, CoLE; 'Herzegovina,' 
10/4/1876, p.5, CoLD; 'Herzegovina and Russia,' 20/4/1876, p.l0, CoI.B; 'Herzegovina,' 25/4/1876, 
p.7, CoLB; 'Bosnia and Herzegovina,' 27/5/1876, p.7, CoLA; 'The Eastern Crisis,' 21/7/1876, p.12, 
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people first left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Austria or Montenegro, their depiction 
as "fugitives" did little to distinguish them from those who had taken up arms 
against the Turks and who now hid out in the mountains, only descending for 
occasional raids. By contrast, in the spring the pressure was being increased by the 
Porte on these people to return to their homes, with the carrot of amnesties being 
offered in conjunction with the stick of confiscation of lands for those who did not 
return. At that point, The Times can be seen increasingly allowing the idea of 
'refugee' to permeate their coverage, and this fits well with the repeated 
attestations in their articles that those fleeing were are unable to return due to the 
profound distrust which existed between them and the Turks whose broken 
promises they had trusted once too often. The Imperial firman offering an amnesty 
to anyone who returned to their home within four weeks was first reported in The 
Times in February 1875.59 Although this initial announcement was very brief and 
came with next to no elaboration, it was followed the next day by an assertion that 
the Porte's announcement put the ball firmly in the rebels court, and that the Turks 
had little optimism as to the likely result, as shown by their decision to call up a 
further 40,000 troops to the area.60 Despite the initial time-frame being stated as 
four weeks, this seems to have been a very elastic period of time and, after the 
initial announcement, little more was said about it. Instead, The Times shifted its 
attention to the Austrian authorities, who were clearly tiring of the presence of the 
Bosnians and Hercegovinians on their soil, and were starting to move more 
decisively towards moving them away. At the end of March, the Austrian governor 
of Dalmatia, Rodic, held a meeting with the Turks, in which he tried to secure 
further guarantees and concessions regarding the returning population; this 
meeting, The Times reported, ended in failure. 61 Despite this, Austria continued 
apace to urge repatriation, culminating in early May with an announcement that 
they had decided summarily to terminate all aid being provided to the refugees. 62 
Although this order was countermanded almost immediately, and an 
announcement appeared three days later that aid would in fact continue, the very 
59 The Times, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina,' 24/2/1876, p.5, CoLD. 
60 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 25/2/1875, p.5, CoLD. 
61 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 29/3/1876, p.7, Col.c. 
62 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 8/5/1876, p.7, Col.c. 
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issuing of such an order in the first place must be a telling insight into the general 
levels of tension and anxiety present at the time. 63 In this light, it becomes far more 
understandable that The Times might start to employ language that would 
engender a greater degree of sympathy amongst its readers for the displaced than 
the mildly pejorative {fugitive' that had been employed thus far. However, whilst 
the activities of Austria are a noteworthy factor, it is also necessary to turn our 
attention to activities closer to home for The Times, namely the organisation and 
agitation conducted on behalf of the rebels in Great Britain. It is certain that there 
were, at least in a limited degree, activities in Britain, but what is not clear is 
whether their most prolific periods preceded or followed this softening of language 
in The Times. The organisation responsible for carrying out most of the 
campaigning, speech-making and fund-raising on behalf of the insurgents and their 
displaced families was the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey and their 
activities will be examined below. However, much of the activity of the League was 
foreshadowed to the activities of the former Liberal Prime Minister, Lord John 
Russell. 
Lord John Russell and The League in Aid of The Christians of Turkey 
Lord John Russell's role in this crisis was doubtless a significant one, although it 
would be entirely forgivable to be unaware of this fact, given the dearth of 
information provided by Russell's biographers: Prest, for example, devotes no more 
than two pages to the 1870s, and does not make any reference to his involvement 
with the league whatsoever. 64 Likewise, Walpole has nothing to contribute on the 
matter. 65 Gooch does note that the insurrections and the related {reopening of the 
Eastern Question' were {the last of the public controversies in which he [Russell] 
took an active part.,66 However, Gooch does not include any of Russell's 
correspondence on the matter, simply noting that Russell's {mind had travelled far 
63 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 11/5/1876, p.5, CoI.B. 
64 J. Prest, Lord John Russell, (London, 1972), 419-421. 
6S S. Walpole, The life of Lord John Russell, (London, 1889). 
66 G.P. Gooch (Ed.) The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878, vol. II, (London, 1925), 
p.355. 
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since the Crimean War.,67 Any letters Russell may have written on the matter are 
also absent from the Russell collection in the National Archive at Kew, and thus it 
will only be possible to comment here on those letters which appeared in The Times 
or which have been published elsewhere as part of collections on their recipients. 
Russell's first public involvement in events came in late August 1875, when he 
wrote a letter to the editor of The T i m e s ~ ~ stating his intention to donate £50 to the 
insurgent cause.68 This, he asserted, was a repetition of the gesture he had made 
towards Greek insurgents 'many years' earlier. 69 Although this letter was printed 
with little comment at the time, it gradually made an impact on the wider 
consciousness, being reprinted in Scottish papers two days later, and prompting a 
response to The Times from Henry Drummond Wolff.70 Within the Conservative 
Party, Wolff was considered to be an authority on Eastern matters, having done 
large amounts of work on the transfer of the Ionian Islands to Greece during his 
time in the Foreign Office, and he would later be called upon by Disraeli to speak 
supporting the Suez Canal purchase.71 Despite asserting that he would not venture 
'to comment on the acts of so distinguished a statesman,' Wolff criticised Russell 
for having drawn comparisons with the Greeks. Contemporary Turkish Christians, 
he argued, were protected by the European Powers under the Treaty of 1856 
which, despite lacking an explicit right of intervention for the signatories, had an 
implicit right by its very existence. This, Wolff argued, was not the case at the time 
of the Greek rising, and as such the fact that Russell had formerly chosen to offer 
assistance to insurgents unprotected by international conventions gave him no 
right to do the same for those within the sway of treaty obligations. 72 
Russell's letter does not appear to have received much further public discussion at 
this time, but there is no doubt that it made a definite impression on the 
consciousness of at least the most politically aware classes. Lord Derby noted in his 
67 Ibid., p.355. 
68 The Times, 'Lord Russell on the Insurrection,'28/8/1875, p.7, CoI.G. 
69 Ibid. 
70 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 1/9/1875, p.9, CoI.G. 
71 M. Pugh, 'Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond Charles, (1830-1908),' Oxford National Dictionary of 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn. May 2009 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36990. accessed 22 Dec 2011]. 
72 Ibid. 
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diary the initial appearance in The Times, calling it (a strange letter/ and adding that 
(his letters to me were not at all in the same sense.,73 The diary makes no mention 
(at least in its printed form) of these other letters, and thus their exact content can 
only be guessed at, although it is not hard to spot Derby's subtext that the 
distinguished parliamentarian, now in his eighty-third year, was going senile. 
Indeed, he even goes so far as to assert that (I imagine ... he has now very little 
recollection of what he may have said or done even a few weeks ago.,74 This harsh 
judgement was not shared by all, however, and awareness of Russell's involvement 
continued to spread. By the end of the month, it was known to figures no less 
unlikely than Garibaldi, who identified Russell as the (true representative of the 
generous English nation.,75 Furthermore, one of the first reports on the activities of 
what would become (The League in aid of the Christians of Turkey' described them 
simply as (The committee which has been formed to consider the subject dealt with 
by Earl Russell's letter in The Times.,76 The fact that Russell's actions impacted upon 
at least a few key individuals can be seen by the fact that J. Lewis Farley chose to 
dedicate his book Turks and Christians: A solution of the Eastern Question to 
Russell. In Farley's words, the outbreak of the Bosnian revolt was (a little cloud 
[which] appeared on the horizon of Eastern Europe.' This cloud failed to attract any 
great notice or attention (save by a few, and amongst these, your Lordship [i.e. 
Russell] was the first to predict a storm.,77 
The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey 
The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey was an organisation founded in 
December 1875. As an organisation, its purpose was fairly obviously communicated 
by its name, although a fuller statement of its ultimate aims may be gleaned from 
the eponymous collection of documents generated by the organisation, which were 
published in 1878. 
73 Derby Diaries, (London, 1994), p.239. 
74 Derby Diaries, pp.239-240. 
75 The Times, 'Herzegovina Sympathisers,' 22/9/1875, p.7, CoI.G. 
76 The Times, 'The Herzegovina,' 8/9/1875, p.7, CoI.F. 
77 J. L. Farley, Turks and Christians: A Solution o/the Eastern Question, (London, 1876), piii. 
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The objects of the League are to aid the Christians of Turkey in 
obtaining their freedom from Mussulman oppression, and to assist in 
relieving the distress arising out of the war. The League was the first 
to arouse sympathy in this country for the oppressed Christians of 
Turkey, by placing their condition in its true light before the British 
public. It was also the first to send relief to the sick and wounded in 
Servia, as it was also the first to send relief to the sick and wounded 
Russian and Roumanian soldiers. Much permanent good has been 
achieved, but much more remains to be done. Even after peace is 
made, there will still be some millions of Christians in European 
Turkey, as well as in Asia Minor and Syria, whose interests require to 
be efficiently represented. The work which has been done is 
evidence of what may be accomplished in the future, and the Council 
earnestly appeal to those friends who have already shown their 
practical sympathy, as well as to everyone who desires the 
advancement of liberty and civilization.78 
Although somewhat long, and evidently written at a far later point in the Crisis, 
rather than simply as a foundational document, this gives us a clear insight into the 
stated aims of the League. It also shows their sense of having made significant 
achievements during the course of the crisis. It is important to note the general 
attitude implicit within the statement. Throughout the period of the Eastern Crisis, 
those advancing the cause of the South Slavs framed their arguments in moral 
terms, as seen here by the reference to 'liberty and civilization.' 
The League held public meetings in both Manchester and Birmingham at the very 
beginning of April, as well as a further gathering in London at the end of July. The 
April meetings particularly would provide an example of the sort of outside 
pressure looked for above that might have influenced the Times in its increased use 
78 League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, Letters, etc. Relating to the Operations of the Society, 
(London, 1878), p.46. This final document is missing from the recent Bibliolife re-print of the 
collection, but can be found in the electronic version of the University of California Library copy-
available at http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/league-in-aid-of-the-christians-of-
turkey.shtml [accessed 31/1/2012] 
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of the term 'refugee.' These meetings generally featured long speeches by various 
figures, elaborating the state of play in Hercegovina (from a Slavonic perspective), 
reading letters of support, and voting various resolutions. Lord Russell appears not 
to have personally attended any of the meetings, but sent letters and resolutions to 
the Manchester and Birmingham meetings, as well as an explicit statement, read 
out at the London meeting that he had 'great sympathy with the objects of the 
meeting' and that he would have liked to have attended in person but that 'the 
delicate state of his health prevented him from being able to do SO.,79 
Unfortunately, the accounts of the public meetings do not provide any detail as to 
how many attendees were present. The Manchester meeting apparently had its 
resolution carried 'amid much applause,' which certainly suggests more than a 
dozen or so assembled, but whether the crowd was dozens or hundreds is entirely 
unclear.8o Likewise, the account of the Birmingham meeting lists the most 
important ten or so speakers, but does little to indicate whether they spoke to a sea 
of enthusiastic listeners, or whether the rapturous applause which their words 
invoked was borne out of an audience's embarrassment at being outnumbered by 
those addressing them.81 In each case, the account of the meeting has not been 
penned simply for the benefit of the League's archivist, but is a reprint from a 
newspaper; The Times in the case of the Manchester and London meetings, and the 
Birmingham Daily Post for the Birmingham meeting. This adds a degree of veracity 
to the accounts, although it also makes it harder to determine whether a lack of 
reference to the number of people present at the meetings is most likely to suggest 
a high or a low turnout. 
Perhaps a better indication of the significance of the League, at least in the higher 
echelons of British politics, can be seen from its deputation to Lord Derby in July 
1876. Once again, only nine figures are named 'among those who took part' but of 
these, seven were MPs.82 Thomas Bazley, Samuel Morley, P.A. Taylor and E. Jenkins 
were all Radicals who association with this sort of cause was unsurp rising; the 
79 League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, Letters, pp.12, 23. 
80 Ibid, p.12. 
81 Ibid, pp.13-17. 
82 Ibid., p.19. 
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backgrounds of the remaining members of their party, c.J. Monk, and E. Collins 
remain rather more obscure. In this light, it suggests that the movement did have a 
significant if not necessarily influential following. 83 By the time of the London 
meeting at the end of July, almost thirty individuals were identified by name, in 
addition to 'many others' who were once again cheering. 84 With their activity never 
in doubt, and evidence of their numbers growing through the spring and the 
summer of 1876, it seems plausible that the League could well have been a 
significant force. Whether it was or not, however, is a different matter. The account 
chosen by the League in its collection of letters comes from The Times on July 
fifteenth 1876, describing the visit of the delegation to the Foreign Secretary the 
day before. Derby makes only a brief note in his diary as to having received a 
'Deputation on the eastern question' that day, headed by John Bright. 85 
Interestingly, the League's own accounts list Jacob Bright amongst the delegates, 
but not John.86 John Bright's Diary confirms Derby's comment that he was indeed 
present, and the editor notes that this marks 'the first allusion in the diaries to the 
Eastern Question.,87 Whether his brother was also present is unclear, but surely of 
only secondary importance. 
Derby's comments on the delegation are revealing, as he noted that he gave a 
reply that was 'decidedly a success as far as the audience was concerned: what it 
may be to the public I don't know.,88 This shows that at least in the Foreign 
Secretary's mind those petitioning on behalf of the Slavs remained a factional 
interest, and could not be assumed to speak for the p o p u l a ~ e . . Bright likewise 
asserted that the speech was 'memorable' and 'gave much satisfaction,' although 
he does not say to whom.89 
One of the most prominent figures in the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey 
at this time was J. Lewis Farley. A banker by trade, Farley had written extensively on 
83 The seventh MP was J. Bright, as discussed below. 
84 Ibid, p.22. 
85 Derby Diaries, p.309. 
86 League in aid of the Christians of Turkey, Letters. 
87 R.A.J. Walling (Ed), The Diaries of John Bright, (London, 1931). 
88 Derby Diaries, p.309. 
89 Diaries of John Bright. 
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the near east, having spent considerable periods of time working there. 90 Prior to 
the crisis of 1875-78, he had not been known as a particular advocate of the Balkan 
Christians, a point which was made much of by his detractors during this period.91 
Farley's biographer attributes the apparent shift in his attitudes to his former 
closeness with Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, and the fact that they had fallen from 
power and then died with their legacies abandoned.92 Farley himself, however, 
refused to concede even this much, asserting that his position had remained 
consistent, but merely that the Turkish administration had fallen beneath 
contempt, and that his long-held convictions about the material wealth and 
untapped potential of the Turkish lands was now the legacy of the Balkan 
Christians.93 Whatever his motivations, a significant contribution made by Farley at 
this time was his book Turks and Christians: a solution of the Eastern Question. In it, 
Farley sought to remove the 'disinterest' of the British public, by depicting in clear 
terms the many ways in which the Ottoman Empire was 'bankrupt both in character 
and in means.,94 In many respects, the book was an unremarkable work, combining 
the sort of sweeping and casual racist remarks that are commonplace to works of 
this era, such as his assertion that 'the poorer the Turk, the better he is.,95 Perhaps 
the most significant thing that can be gleaned from Farley's book is the matter of 
what exactly he assumed were people's misconceptions regarding Turkey. The first 
of these, was the matter of the population of Turkey: in Farley's estimation, there 
was a 'popular belief' that European Turkey was inhabited by Turks, and that 
although 'some persons have a faint ideal that there are Christians in Turkey,' none 
realised that barely a tenth of the population of European Turkey were Turks or, 
put another way, that the three million Muslims were massively outnumbered by 
90 G.B. Smith, 'Farley, James Lewis, (1823-1885)" Rev. E. Baignet, Oxford National Dictionary of 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn. May 2006 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9164. accessed 22 Dec 2011]. 
91 These detractors were not merely on the anti-Slav/ anti-agitation side of the public debate. Lady 
Strangford, who did substantial amounts of work with the Bosnian refugees during this period, was 
singled out by Farley in his book as being one of his most vocal critics; J.L. Farley, Turks and 
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eleven and a half million Orthodox Christians.96 Far more notable than his book, 
Farley's name often appeared in the columns of The Times in connection with the 
fund-raising activities which he organised on behalf of the Bosnian Refugees at this 
time, and although he had clearly failed to impact upon the consciousness of the 
Foreign Secretary, his name should at least have been well-known to the readers of 
The Times. 97 
Aside from their coverage in the British media, the League in Aid of the Christians of 
Turkey also made an impression rather further afield. The collection of letters 
included correspondence, most of it favourable in tone to Farley or other members 
of the committee, from the Archbishop of Serbia, Jovan Ristic (the Serbian Prime 
Minister), and even the secretary of the Russian Tsarina on behalf of his employer. 
Perhaps even more significant, as an indication of how wide-spread the league's 
fame had become, were the articles mentioning the League which appeared in the 
Russian Press, namely the Journal de st. Petersbourg. These reports, however, only 
appeared much later, in the autumn of 1877. In general, then, it seems as if the 
League made an impact on the consciousness of those small circles already 
concerned with events in the Balkans or with international politics, without making 
any significant discernable contribution on public opinion at large. However, whilst 
the hardening attitude of the Turkish and Austrian authorities has already been 
noted above as a probable factor in the increasing use of the term 'refugees' by The 
Times in preference to 'fugitives,' it is possible that another factor may be found 
closer to home. Given that all the League's major public meetings were reported in 
the Press, it is highly plausible that the editor of The Times felt uncomfortable 
publishing accounts of significant charitable gatherings in aid of the refugees and 
other victims, whilst at the same time dismissing those people as merely fugitives. It 
is in this context then that the impact of the League should be seen, not making a 
striking impact on headline stories, but subtly increasing the pressure on organs of 
the Press to alter or moderate their terminology, and otherwise subtly adapt their 
96 Farley, Turks & Christians 
97 Farley was a member of the deputation to Lord Derby described above, and his presence was 
reported in The Times. For his activities in fund-raising for refugees see e.g. The Times, 'Notices,' 
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coverage in a manner which would provide much more fertile ground for the far 
larger Bulgarian Atrocities agitation the following year. 
The Journals 
Although much has already been said about the way in which the revolt was treated 
by the Daily Press this was, of course, not the only form of print media reacting to 
and recounting the events in the Balkans. A significant role in public awareness was 
also played by the Russian 'thick' journals and the literary and political review 
journals of Great Britain. 
The Russian journals were considerably quicker off the mark, in terms of 
incorporating material on Balkan events into their pages, than the British 
Publications considered. Although The Quarterly Review ran an article entitled 
'England and Russia in the East' in the spring of 1875, this must be regarded as 
merely coincidental, rather than prescient. 98 The following four issues of the 
publication failed to address the Eastern Question in any shape or form, with the 
matter only being picked up again in the autumn of 1876, with an article regarding 
the Suez Canal and a piece misleadingly entitled 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' 
but which actually concerned itself primarily with the history of diplomatic relations 
between Turkey and the European Powers, and only briefly considered the present 
crisis in its closing sections. 99 Scarcely less engaged was the Edinburgh review, 
which managed to stir itself into life in the summer of 1876, with a review of 
Klaczko's Les Deux Chancellors (The Two Chancellors), a comparative biopic of 
Bismarck and Gorchakov. 10o Given the contemporary climate, it was scarcely 
possible that such a discussion could fail to touch on the current diplomatic 
activities of Europe, and indeed the final page delivered the verdict that all the 
deeds of the Chancellors, however cunning or skilful, had consistently been 
conducted without any kind of reference to Britain, and that this was their fatal 
undoing. Indeed, the writer went so far as to attribute the failure of the Andrassy 
98 'England and Russia in the East,' Quarterly Review, 138,276, (April 1875), pp.568-608. 
99 'The Canal at Suez, its political engineering and financial history,' Quarterly Review, 142,284, (Oct 
1876), pp.429-457; 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' Quarterly Review, 142, 284, (Oct 1876), 
pp.480-512. 
100 'Les deux Chancellors,' Edinburgh Review, 144, 295, (July 1876), pp.203-231. 
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Note, The Berlin Memorandum and (the intrigues' of Russia to the arrival of the 
British Fleet in Besika bay.101 This does, of course, give a very particular 
interpretation to events, but it does little to convey a groundswell of interest. 
Moving to the Russian publications, there is an immediate contrast when we 
examine The Herald of Europe which, being a monthly publication, was obviously 
able to respond to events more swiftly than a quarterly journal could hope to do so. 
However, the fact remains that before the British journals in our study had devoted 
a single word to the crisis, the Herald had written three articles, in the February, 
March and May issues.102 The Notes of the Fatherland had been even swifter to 
deal with the rebel cause and, as early as November 1875, had published a 
substantial article which considered in some detail the position of the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian Christians.103 This piece began in a tone that was most striking for 
the way in which it resembled an apologia for Islam, although the Turks would 
doubtless have considered it little more than a backhanded comment when it made 
observations such as the fact that, whilst the Koran may well have encouraged 
violence, this was no reason to assume that all Muslims were murderous, as the 
Bible encouraged peace and humanity, yet still managed to produce Catholics! 104 
Broadly speaking, the article said little that was remarkable, it detailed the 
conditions in Hercegovina, criticised poor-quality administration, and asserted that 
the Ifpaper" efforts of the diplomats were doomed to fail because the rebels would 
only be convinced by practical changes. lOS 
An initial point that can be made about almost all of this coverage, whether it be 
the opening remarks from the Russian journals, or the rather later comments from 
the British, is that it focused heavily upon the (High Political' end of the issues, 
rather than on the insurgents themselves. The most significant exception to this 
came in March 1876, when the Herald asserted that the question of how to end the 
101'Les deux Chancellors,' p.231. 
102 'Foreign Politics: Europe and the Herzegovinian Question,' The Herald 0/ Europe, (Feb 1876), 
pp.814-822; 'Foreign Politics: Diplomatic Decisions regarding the Herzegovinian Question,' (March 
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419. 
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revolt was already becoming easier to solve as the flow of volunteers over the 
border in Hercegovina was decreasing, and without them, the disturbance would 
soon peter out.106 The inaccuracy of this statement was doubtless something of an 
embarrassment for a serious publication, and perhaps the difficulty of getting 
information on events that was both sufficiently up-to-date and sufficiently 
accurate goes some considerable way towards explaining the reluctance to accord 
it too much interest in the remainder of the press coverage. By May the Herald was 
being far more circumspect, noting that the revolt, (whilst not huge) was not yet 
fading, and urging reforms to quench it. 107 Indeed, they noted, why shouldn't the 
rebels demand guarantees as to the earnestness of the Turkish reform 
proposals?108 
Conclusion 
Broadly speaking then, it can be seen that although it has now rather faded from 
the consciousness of the world, the Hercegovinian revolt of 1875 and 1876 did not 
go entirely unnoticed at the time. That said, it undeniably lacked the attention 
given to the Bulgarian uprising which came shortly after it, and other similar 
movements. 
The first reason for this, as has been seen, was the general level of unrest often 
associated with Turkey in Europe at this time; it appears that the Press, and most 
likely the politicians and the public too, took a while to be convinced of the reality 
and significance of the events that were taking place. This was combined with 
reluctance, particularly on the part of the governments, and Powers such as Russia 
and Austria, but also noted in the press, to (reopen the Eastern Question.' For this 
reason, the two areas in which Press coverage can be seen increasing notably are 
when a perception was allowed to develop that another, potentially hostile Power 
had already (opened' the question, or else when the issues were focused upon 
something far more grass-roots, which transcended politics, such as the question of 
refugees. 
106 The Herald of Europe, 'Foreign Politics,' (March 1876), p.388. 
107 The Herald of Europe, 'Foreign Politics,' (May 1876), p.41S. 
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By the second quarter of 1876, the coverage of events in the Balkans had reached a 
level which showed recognition of the significance of what was transpiring there. 
Unfortunately, perhaps, for the cause of the insurgents, by the time this came 
about, their attempt to claim something for themselves, which had long been 
overshadowed by the political activities of Europe's most senior diplomats, was 
about to be completely engulfed by a war between Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey, 
not to mention the massacre in Bulgaria that would so grip the British. However, 
the slow head of steam that had been built up would not be without effect in the 
coming months. As will be shown in the following chapters, the fact that many 
figures were already active within Britain, championing the cause of the Balkan 
Christian, would allow a far more immediate response to future events, whether 
they came in the form of 'Bulgarian Horrors/ or perceived government callousness. 
Freeman would later lament that 'for the obscure affairs of Herzegovina and Bosnia 
we could find but few hearers': that would all change when the focus of events 
shifted to Bulgaria.10g 
109 E.A. Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' The Contemporary 
Review, 29, (February 1877), p.498. 
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Chapter 4 - The Bulgarian Horrors 
If the revolt in Bosnia and Hercegovina was little regarded at the time, and 
forgotten swiftly by history, the fate of the Bulgarians the following year could 
hardly have been more different. Indeed, there was a time when every British 
schoolchild knew of Gladstone and the Bulgarian Horrors. The so called 'Bulgarian 
Horrors' were a series of attacks and massacres made by Turkish irregular troops on 
Bulgarian civilians in 1876. They were met initially with silence or derision by British 
politicians, until the spread of detail about events, largely through the popular 
press, led to an outpouring of public dismay on an almost unprecedented level. In 
the words of Grosvenor, 'the atrocities touched the g-spot of Victorian morality.'! 
This chapter will examine the events of 1876, the manner in which information 
reached the British public, and the way in which this grew into a popular 
movement. It will also examine the role of Gladstone and his writings at this time, 
attempting to delve into the motivations and the effects of his actions. 
Consideration will be made of the manner in which interest and activity in Bulgarian 
affairs built upon the 'proto-agitation' of the previous year with regard to the 
Bosnian revolt. Finally, It will compare the early silence and later outburst in 
Britain, with the steady yet understated reaction in Russia, calling into question the 
motives behind the Russian creation of a 'Big Bulgaria' at San Stefano, and indeed 
the necessity of the reaction to that treaty which came from the remainder of the 
European Powers. 
The Bulgarian Background 
The massacres in Bulgaria in early 1876 were far from unique in the history of the 
Ottoman Empire, even in the nineteenth century. Saab cites similar actions in 
Lebanon in 1860, and upon Crete in 1866-69, which were also well reported in the 
Press, but failed to generate any kind of mass movement comparable with what 
1 B. Grosvenor, 'Britain's "most isolationist Foreign Secretary": The Fifteenth Earl and the Eastern 
Crisis 1876-1878, in G. Hicks {Ed.} Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Oerbys 
and their World, (Farnham, 2011), p142. 
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happened in 1876.2 It is necessary, then, to consider the specifics of the build-up in 
Bulgaria, to examine what exactly it was about this particular confluence of events 
which prompted such widespread outrage. 
Soviet historians tended to stress the long-term economic factors in the build-up to 
the Bulgarian uprising of 1876, with repeated references to 'feudal oppression' and 
the 'Turkish yoke.,3 However, whilst the poor economic situation of late nineteenth-
century Bulgaria is not to be denied, this perspective is very much a victim of its 
historical location, and more recent studies have increasingly stressed the 
importance of cultural factors in stimulating the Bulgarian uprising, specifically a 
sense of national revival. 4 
National revival amongst Bulgarians was a broad phenomenon, stretching back 
about a century before this period, and increasing in its intensity as the period 
progressed. Combining literary, social, and political elements, some writers have 
sought to place its roots in areas as unlikely as folklore. 5 However, the more 
convincing argument seems to be that of Crampton who identifies the general 
awakening as deriving from contact with the outside world, such as the French 
Revolution.6 Although the political changes to the map of Europe, such as 
Napoleon's creation of the Illyrian Provinces, did not directly impact the Bulgarians, 
they do nonetheless seem to have been influenced by the Nationalist activities of 
their neighbours; firstly the Serbs, whose first bid for independence was launched 
in 1804, and then the Greeks who secured their independence from Turkey in the 
1820s.7 The broad phenomenon of Bulgarian cultural awakening was known as the 
'Vuzrazhdane,' literally reawakening. Anastasoff traces the beginning of the 
2 A. P. Saab, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the working classes (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 
pp.24, 28-29. 
3 L.I. Narochnitskaia, Rossiia i natsional'no osvoboditel'noe dvizheniie na Balkanakh 1875-1878gg, 
(Moscow, 1979), pp.6, 11; S.A. Nikitin, Ocherki po istorii luzhnykh slavian i russko-balkanskih sviazey 
v 50-70e godi XIXv, (Moscow, 1970), p.68. 
4 For example, M. Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making 
of Bulgaria's National Hero, (New York, 2009). 
5 C. Silverman, 'The Politics of Folklore in Bulgaria,' Anthropological Quarterly, Vo156, N02, (Apr, 
1983), p.56. 
6 R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2005), p.48. 
7 M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (London, 1999), pp.1, 
6,13. 
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Vuzrazhdane to the end of the eighteenth century, and a book written by Paiisi, 
entitled History of the Bulgarian People with an account of their Tsars and Saints 
(1762).8 Paiisi, a monk from Mount Athos, urged the Bulgarians to 'know your own 
nation and language and study in your own tonguel,9 Anastasoff argues for the 
immediate impact of Paiisi's work, as the inspiration of a national literary revival. IO 
However, Crampton points to his significance more in having provided a 'posta 
facto explanation' arguing that the work did not become widely known until much 
later, by which time nationalist feeling had been generated by the global factors 
already mentioned above.ll Regardless of the order and significance of events, it is 
clear that (by the 1870s) there existed a far greater sense of Bulgarian identity than 
had been the case before. The Bulgarian church, noted through the crisis as having 
played a central role in the lives of the Bulgarian peasantry, had been created as an 
independent exarchate in 1872, following an Imperial firman of two years earlier, 
and in defiance of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. Meininger, in his detailed 
examination of the various factors leading up to this event, notes the particular 
significance of the Church for Ottoman peasants due to the manner in which their 
lives were governed by the milet system. 12 It was into this context that the events 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina began to filter in the latter half of 1875. 
Revolutionaries and the Revolt 
There had been elements of Russian societies active in Bulgaria over the previous 
decades, a fact which was made much of both by the Turkish authorities and by 
some elements within England.13 However, they seem not to have played a 
particularly significant part in the insurrections of 1876. Botev and Karavelov, the 
two leading figures in the Bulgarian revolutionary movement at the time, had both 
spent time in Russia, but had been expelled from the country after involvement 
8 C. Anastasoff, 'Bulgaria's National Struggles,' Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, vo1232: A Challenge to Peacemakers, {1944}, p.102. 
9 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp.45-46. 
10 Anastasoff, 'Bulgaria's National Struggles,' pp.102-103. 
11 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.48. 
12 l.A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate 1864-1872: a study in 
personal diplomacy, {Madison, 1970}, p.19. 
13 The Times, 'Leader,' 9/10/1876, p.9, CoI.B. 
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with the Narodniks and a run-in with the Okhrana. 14 Although Russian state interest 
in Bulgaria at this time is undeniable, Russian foreign policy still fell under the remit 
of Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, rather than the more unilateral and 
aggressive attitude later adopted by Pobedonostsev. Aleksandr Gorchakov, the 
Russian chancellor at the time of the Eastern Crisis, is a figure who has risen to 
prominence since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the rise of a so-called 
gorchakovist tendency within Russian policy, demonstrated by the elaborate 
commemorations of the 200th anniversary of his birth, as well as the creation of a 
'Gorchakov medal.,lS Gorchakovism is broadly defined as a policy of non-
confrontational revisionism, seeking to arrest Russia's evident decline in status in 
the aftermath of the Crimean War, whilst simultaneously being very careful to 
avoid conflict, or even the impression of conflicting interests with the Great 
Powers.16 An example of this approach can be seen in Gorchakov's letter to Lord 
Derby, written prior to the Russian declaration of war against Turkey in the spring 
of 1877, asserting that the Tsar did not want to take possession of Constantinople, 
and re-stressing the fact that Alexander recognised the fate of Constantinople as a 
question of 'common interest' which needed a 'general understanding' and which 
could not belong to one European power.17 
This position did not universally dominate Russian foreign policy - Russia was after 
all an autocracy and ultimately subject to the decisions of the Tsar - the general 
influence from the government at this time was a moderating and stabilising one, 
unlike the regime which would follow it when the throne passed to Alexander III 
and much political influence passed to his former tutor, the nationalist reactionary, 
Pobedonostsev.18 The most assertive advocate of an active Russian policy in 
Bulgaria at this time was Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, and a 
man whose Panslavist beliefs and strong influence with many Turkish ministers led 
14 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp.77-78. 
15 F. Splidsboel-Hansen, 'Past and Future meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy,' 
Europe-Asia Studies, 54, 3, (May, 2002), pp.377-378. 
16 Ibid, pp.378-380. 
17 Cited in O. Novikov, Is Russia Wrong? (London, 1877), p.55. 
18 M.e. Wren, 'Pobedonostsev and Russian Influence in the Balkans, 1881-1888,' The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol19, No2, (Jun, 1947), p.132. For more on the role of Pobedonostsev, see chapter 
5, p.148. 
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his enemies to associate him with every coup, intrigue or plot in Turkey. Despite the 
common suspicion, however, Meininger has demonstrated that although Ignatiev's 
personal opinions may have been influenced by his political beliefs his, and 
therefore Russia's, actions were limited by the caution of his superiors, and by 
practicalities.19 Although agencies within Russia had long attempted to influence 
Bulgarians, their successes were limited, and the cultural impact they sought to 
provoke did not materialise. 
A key example of the manner in which Bulgarians resisted Russian influence can be 
seen in the decision, taken in the 1870s, to retain the 'post-substantive definite 
article' in the new written form of the Bulgarian language, despite the fact that this 
implied considerable practical difficulties when communicating with Russians. 2o 
Although much would change in the coming few years, with the emigration of 
figures such as Bobchev, and their involvement in Panslavist circles in Moscow, 
much of this change was brought about only during the period of Russian 
occupation during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.21 In fact, it has been argued 
by Pundeff that 'articulate political radicalism' amongst Bulgarians prior to 1878 
was found only in those who were residing abroad, thus precluding their 
involvement in the planning of the insurrection.22 That said it is important to bear in 
mind that Pundeff was writing at the height of the Cold War, when the question of 
genuine grass-roots Marxism and activism had a far sharper edge to it than mere 
academic debate. 
Whilst the Bulgarian revolt was not the Russian conspiracy that the Porte might 
have liked people to believe, it is true that it was planned entirely from Romania by 
emigres. 23 Crampton has described it as a 'disastrous shambles' noting the utter 
19 Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, esp. pp.61-62 and 195. 
20 Modern Bulgarian also lacks most of the case endings common to the vast majority of Slavonic 
languages, despite a significant group in the early nineteenth century who urged that they should be 
retained in order to demonstrate greater commonality with other Slavs; Crampton, Bulgaria, pp.61-
62; B. Comrie & G.G. Corbett (Eds.), The Slavonic Languages, (London, 2002), pp.188-189, 202-203, 
234. 
21 J.F. Clarke, 'Bobchev and Bulgaria,' Slavonic and East European Review. American Series, Vol.2, 
nol, (Mar 1943), pp.189-190. 
22 M. Pundeff, 'Marxism in Bulgaria before 1891,' Slavic Review, Vol30, no3, (Sep, 1971), p.526. 
23 R. Daskalov, Making of a Nation in the Balkans: historiography of the Bulgarian Revival, (New York, 
2001), p.201. 
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failure of the revolutionaries in several districts to convince their countrymen to 
join in.24 This fact is confirmed by Daskalov, who gives events a more sinister 
colouring, by asserting that the very plan of the conspirators was to provoke the 
Turks into bloodshed in order to undermine their authority and to provoke external 
sympathy.25 Although he later qualifies this assertion, suggesting that the extent of 
the backlash was unexpected, his historiographical discussion is mostly in reference 
to Bulgarian-language texts, and any detailed analysis of it remains beyond the 
scope of this project. The theatrical manner in which the uprising was launched is 
well-attested, with a letter being sent from the town of Koprivshitsa to (Bulgaria' at 
large, signed in blood.26 This initial theatricality failed to attract the attention of the 
British press, but it did receive coverage in the Russian Press, and throughout June 
The Voice carried intermittent reports, describing how the Bulgarian revolt was 
growing by the day, and describing the (years of being robbed' which had prompted 
the call ((to arms!"27 The tone of this reportage, then, was broadly favourable 
towards the Bulgarians, but was far from containing any significant degree of 
popular feeling. 
Regardless of the intent of the revolutionaries who planned the coup, what 
happened next is fairly broadly agreed upon. Determined to suppress the revolt, 
the Turkish authorities sent troops into the area, and unable to send troops from 
the regular army, (who were occupied fighting a war against Serbia and 
Montenegro) they sent irregulars, known as Bashi-Bazouks.28 Anyone who had 
participated in the rebellion was dealt with swiftly and mercilessly, and large areas 
were then subjected to reprisals, whether as a deterrent to future activity against 
the state, or simply as the result of irregular, blood-thirsty troops being given too 
much freedom of action. Whole villages were destroyed, with the men, women and 
children of the area being killed. For the Russian press, relaying these events to the 
public flowed naturally enough from their existing coverage, which had from the 
24 Crampton, Bulgaria, p.78. 
25 Daskalov, Making of a Nation, p.20S. 
26 M. MacDermott, A History of Bulgaria 1393-1885, (London, 1962), p.2S4. 
27 The Voice, Foreign News,' (21/6) 3/7/1876, p.4, CoI.B; (28/5) 9/6/76, p.3, CoI.F. 
28 The fact that irregular troops were used is seen by many as one of the central facts of the entire 
crisis, e.g. R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78, (Oxford, 1979), p.38. 
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very beginning noted the presence in the region of Bashi-Bazouks, and that the 
rebels were in considerable trouble. 29 In early July, The Voice first noted that the 
rebels were being silenced very firmly, and this picture grew in detail over the 
following weeks as concerns were raised about the presence and actions of Tatars 
in Bulgaria.3D Although the outbreak of war between Serbia and Turkey did occupy 
the majority of the paper's attention for a few weeks, there still remained a certain 
amount of activity trickling along until the very end of July when the editor of The 
Voice felt sufficient confidence to publish an editorial estimating as many as twelve 
thousand Turkish dead.31 However, despite all of this recounting of the events in 
Bulgaria, the focus at this time seems to have been primarily upon Serbia. Whilst 
this is of course understandable given that war between Serbia and Turkey had just 
broken out, it does add an interesting dimension to the consideration of views and 
opinions in Russia at this time. Bulgaria was perfectly acceptable as a further 
example of the misdeeds of the nefarious Turk for those who sought to argue in 
favour of Russian intervention against Turkey, but it seems exclusively to have been 
Serbia which was viewed as the means for Russian involvement.32 The Russian 
journals would not begin devoting significant amounts of attention to Bulgaria and 
the Bulgarians for another eighteen months or more; that is to say, long after a 
Russian army had occupied the area.33 
The Daily News and the Breaking of the Story 
The first that the general public of Great Britain knew about the massacres in 
Bulgaria came in June 1876, when the Daily News began printing reports from A.J. 
MacGahan.34 The first of these reports was not picked up by The Times, and indeed 
it was not until the beginning of August that The Times began devoting whole 
articles to 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria.,3S By this time, questions had already been 
29 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/6/1876, p.3, CoI.C; 22/5/1876, p.3, CoLD. 
30 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/6/1876, p.3, CoLC; 25/6/1876, p.4, CoLA. 
31 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (29/7) 10/8/1876, p.l, CoLA. 
32 The nature of this Russian involvement and the extent to which it constituted a broad popular 
movement will be discussed below in chapter 5, esp. pp.130-134. 
33 A.N. Pipin, 'Bulgaria and the Bulgarians Before the War,' The Messenger of Europe, (March 1878) 
pp.281-320; {April 1878), pp.699-732. 
34 Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, p.123. 
35 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' The Times, 1/8/1876, p.5, CoLB, Millman, p.128. 
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asked in parliament regarding the matter, and it seems that many significant figures 
in British public life had already formed their own opinions on the matter, including 
the important question of whether or not the reports could be regarded as 
trustworthy. 
Lord Derby's awareness of the allegations being made is hard to determine, on 
account of the seeming indifference he protested towards it all. In early July, when 
questions were first put to the government, he dismissed it as 'no business of 
importance.,36 However, two days earlier he had noted that the British press was 
'beginning to take sides' in the Eastern conflict, and had described the Daily News 
as 'violent for the insurgents.,37 This, combined with the letter that he received 
from Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, on the ninth indicating the 
Queen's displeasure at the Turkish usage of Bashi-Bazouks, makes it seem 
overwhelmingly likely that he was aware of the broad nature of the reports in the 
Daily News, but simply regarded them as insignificant.38 Whether he also 
considered them fictional is harder to determine. Gladstone, the British politicia n 
most immediately associated with the Bulgarian Atrocities, was even more reticent 
in his diary than was Derby. In late June, he began to write to Stratford de Redcliffe, 
the former British ambassador to Constantinople, as well as to Hartington, the 
Liberal leader in the Commons, and Forster, also a prominent front-bench Liberal, 
on 'Turkish Matters,' but beyond this he remained silent until later in the year. 39 
The Gladstone Papers have none of the correspondence referred to here, nor any 
replies which he may have received, so his thoughts at this time remain dark. 
Whatever Derby's original thoughts may have been, his views changed rapidly, and 
by the eleventh, he was noting anxiously his nervousness at having to speak that 
Thursday as 'The Liberal papers, D. News in particular, are beginning to work the so-
called "Mussulman atrocities" ... We have no news on which it is possible to rely.,40 
The uncertainty exhibited by Derby shows the failure of British government 
36 J. Vincent (Ed.) A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby {1826-93}, 
between September 1869 and March 1878, (London, 1994), Hereafter "Derby Diaries," p.308. 
37 Derby Diaries, pp.307-308. 
38 Derby Diaries, p.308. 
39 M.R.D. Foot, & H. C. G. Matthew, (Eds.) The Gladstone Diaries, (Oxford, 1968-1994), v.ix, (1986), 
pp.136-137. 
40 Derby Diaries, p.309. 
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intelligence to keep pace with the media, and certainly put the government in 
something of an embarrassing position. This shortfall is particularly surprising when 
we consider the letters sent by the British assistant consul in Bourgas. His letters to 
Elliot, the British ambassador in Constantinople, had, as early as May, been warning 
of the arrival of Bashi-Bazouks in the region and the looting of five 'peaceable' 
Bulgarian villages.41 A few days later, he wrote again of a further village being 
'stormed' after the men of the village refused to hand over their arms or to send 
away their families.42 Interestingly, it was only after making these confident 
statements that the consul issued the slightly unusual disclaimer that 'constant 
reports reach me of atrocities committed by Bashi-Bazouks, but although I fear they 
are only too well founded, I do not like to mention them to your Excellency until I 
can be certain of the details.,43 This suggest that the consul did not regard the 
previously described actions as atrocities, and it is unclear whether he made the 
same judgement about the 'general massacre' ordered by Shefkhet Pasha in a letter 
a fortnight later.44 What is clear however is that adequate information had been 
given to the British ambassador regarding at least the broad contours of what was 
going on in Bulgaria, and that his failure to convey this information swiftly to his 
superiors in London was to place them in a rather uncomfortable position. 
A More Expeditious Manner 
When the stories from the Daily News first began to spread in Britain, Disraeli's 
government was keen to downplay any suggestions of veracity regarding the 
articles. In June, Disraeli derided the allegations as being a targeted anti-
government attack.45 The most significant statement from the Prime Minister, 
however, came in July 1876 when he was pressed more specifically on the question 
of torture. Although, on this occasion, he conceded 'proceedings of an atrocious 
character,' he continued to deny that there was any evidence of torture and 
dismissed the possibility, commenting instead that 'Orientals' 'seldom resort to 
41 The National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office Papers, Fa 860/2, Letter E6, 27/5/1876, pp.123-12s. 
42 TNA, Foreign Office Papers, Fa 860/2, Letter E7, 3/6/1876, pp.133-134. 
43 TNA, Foreign Office Papers, Fa 860/2, E7, p.13s. 
44 TNA, Foreign Office Papers, Fa 860/2, Letter E9, 14/6/1876, pp.144-14s. 
4S R. Blake, Disraeli, (London, 1969), p.s93. 
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between the original report and the Prime Minister's letter. The following year, one 
of Disraeli's most vocal opponents at the time, E.A. Freeman, would note in an 
article for The Contemporary R e v i e w ~ ~ that one of the few significant effects of the 
crisis upon the government, had been to teach Disraeli that massacres were not a 
subject for 'jaunty and airy merriment.,54 Although there are no detailed records 
available to confirm or deny this, it seems reasonable to suspect that at least some 
part in this may well have been played by the League in Aid of the Christians of 
Turkey. Still holding public meetings throughout the summer, the League had, by 
the autumn, incorporated the events in Bulgaria into their existing repertoire of 
criticism for the Turkish government.55 Furthermore, although they generally spoke 
in respectful terms of government politicians, they were not slow to condemn the 
non-interventionist policies of the government when they felt that these ran 
contrary to moral imperatives.56 
Turning Turk 
The British daily publication being used for this study is, as has been stated, The 
Times. It makes sense, then, that any known shifts in the editorial policy of The 
Times will have a significant bearing on the remainder of this study. Much has been 
made in the secondary literature of The Times {turning Turk' in the summer of 1876. 
Shannon describes this as a major policy shift, and dates it precisely to the 7th of 
August. 57 However, it is somewhat unclear as to what forms the exact basis for this 
assertion. The Times of that day contained a variety of articles relating to events in 
the Balkans, including a piece entitled 'Russia and the Sclaves' [sicL half a page on 
the war between Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey, and a piece entitled 'A Turkish 
apology.'ss However the tone of these articles was rather more mixed than 
anything else. 'Russia and the Sci aves' re-printed an article from The V o i c e ~ ~ and 
asserted from it that the Russians were intent on establishing a Slav federation that 
54 E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' The Contemporary Review, 
29 (February 1877), p.Sl0. 
55 
The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, Letters, etc., Relating to Operations of the Society, 
(London, 1878), pp.27-29. 
56 Ibid, p.23. 
57 
R. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, (London, 1963), p.SS. 
58 The Times, 7/8/1876. 
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torture but generally terminate their connexion with culprits in a more expeditious 
manner.,46 This was apparently greeted by 'silence and unease' in the House, 
although other reports later cited incidences of laughter. 47 Although Blake defends 
this remark as being simply 'one of those typically orotund phrases to which he 
[Disraeli] had latterly become addicted/ contemporaries were not prepared to let 
the Prime Minister off so lightly, and it was swiftly regarded as not only a joke, but 
one in decidedly poor taste.48 The Times reported these events; that is to say, the 
comment by Disraeli and the ensuing 'laughter' from the House, twice, both in its 
normal coverage of the proceedings of the House of Commons, and in the round-up 
of the political events of the day, but in both instances did so without adding 
anything in the way of additional comment. 49 
However, this was not the end of the matter. Many have felt that Disraeli was 
damaged by these remarks and that, as a result, 'his popularity plummeted 
rapidly.'so He also did himself no favours by remarking again a few weeks later that 
the tales of the atrocities were no more than 'coffee house babble.,sl The 
prolonged repercussions of these remarks are most amply attested to by the fact 
that Disraeli himself felt compelled some two months later to write a letter to the 
editor of The Times, asserting that 'I hope the misplaced laughter of another is no 
proof of the levity of your obedient servant.,s2 Further insight is given by the fact 
that this letter from the Prime Minister was accompanied by a note from the editor 
of The Times recounting the fact that the quotation, as reported in The Times on 
July eleventh, had also appeared on page twenty-four of Gladstone's highly 
successful pamphlet.s3 Regardless of the original intent of Disraeli, the fact seems 
clear that the statement acquired a notoriety and significance that far exceeded all 
initial explanations. It is also evident that The Times was not the medium through 
which the outrage against Disraeli's remarks was achieved, given the silence 
46 Blake, Disraeli, p.593. 
47 M. Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, (Oxford, 2011), p.129. 
48 Blake, Disraeli, p.S93. 
49 The Times, 'House of Commons, Monday, July 10,' 11/7/1876, P.6, CoLC; 'London, Tuesday 11 th 
July, 1876,' 11/7/1876, p.8, CoLF. 
50 Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, p.130. 
51 Grosvenor, 'most isolationist Foreign Secretary,' pl44. 
52 The Times, The Turkish Atrocities,' 7/9/1876, p.9, CoLF. 
53 See below, pl07 and after. 
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would naturally look to Russia 'for support and defence, even without a formal 
alliance,' and that it was highly unlikely that Russia would go to war for the Slavs. S9 
A slightly more anti-Slavonic note could be found in some of the war coverage, 
including the dispatches from Belgrade which detailed how the Serbs were claiming 
to have defeated a sizeable Turkish force, along with the note that 'the amount of 
spurious intelligence from the seat of war baffles conception.,6o However, whilst 
the Serbs could scarcely have been flattered by such accusations of spuriousness, if 
this was the worst that The Times could direct against the enemy of their supposed 
new allies, it does not suggest a particularly strong conviction. The final piece of the 
day on Turkish matters did attempt to portray at least one Turkish official as a 
reasonable and humane character, but only did this by recounting how he had 
publically admitted at least some of the horrors alleged against the Turks, even 
though the overall result was that 'he makes (indirectly for the most part) a few 
admissions and many accusations.,61 
It is interesting to contrast this edition of The Times with those which immediately 
preceded and followed it. The following day, The Times announced that the Porte 
had declared 'all discussion in public or private meetings of subjects connected with 
those Constitutional reforms' which had been announced but not yet defined to be 
"High Treason./ 62 Even given the accompanying clarification that this was due to 
the complexity of the legal process and the need to ensure decision were taken 
correctly and without any undue influence, it hardly seems a ringing endorsement. 
Of course, to argue this may be to view the matter too much from a twenty-first 
century perspective which places a far higher value on freedom of speech than 
would have been the case in 1876. Indeed, towards the end of the article, the 
correspondent does commend the proposed constitution for guaranteeing 'the 
privileges of inviolability of person, domicile and property.,63 However, whilst this 
one article may speak, at least in some measure, for the Turks, only a matter of 
pages later, the lead article of the day was advising the readers of The Times to 
59 The Times, 'Russia and the Sclaves,' 7/8/1876, p.4, CoI.D. 
60 The Times, 'Latest Intelligence: The war,' 7/8/1876, p.S, CoI.B. 
61 The Times, 'A Turkish apology,' p.8, Col.c. 
62 The Times, 'Turkey,' 8/8/1876, p.3, CoI.D. 
63 The Times, 'Turkey,' 8/8/1876, p.3, CoI.E. 
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brace themselves for 'there can be little doubt that we are on the verge of 
revelations surpassing anything that imagination of civilised men could have 
. d ,64 conceive. 
A quick glance backward in time does, perhaps, show the Turks having been 
previously portrayed in a more negative light, with the Sultan having been 
dismissed the previous Saturday as 'the mere shadow of a sultan.,65 Equally, 
however, being called a 'mere shadow' would hardly be the harshest charge to 
have been laid against Murad V during his 93 day reign at the end of which, he was 
deposed on grounds of mental illness. It may then simply be the case that these 
remarks stemmed purely and simply from a genuine low opinion of that particular 
Sultan. 
As a parallel to the articles of these few days, a glance at the same period one year 
later shows a similar degree of ambivalence, which contrasted differing types of 
articles: firstly, those in which the Turks were portrayed as the more reasonable 
party, desirous of peace, whereas the Russians are depicted as seeking vengeance 
and recompense for their loss.66 Secondly, and in sharp contrast, the military 
correspondent, reporting from the Shipka Pass, began a long and invective article 
with the chilling words; 'tonight we have supped full of horrors, and I pray those 
who still favour the Turks to read attentively what I now write.,67 This is the opening 
for a series of tales of Turkish treachery, 'abominable tricks ... worthy only of 
untutored savages' and 'savage expression[s] of perfect rage and hatred.,68 As the 
week wore on, The Times continued to lavish criticism upon both parties in the war, 
with the edition of Wednesday eighth carrying reports both of the suffering caused 
by previous Turkish destruction and of fresh Russian atrocities. 69 
If then, The Times did indeed 'turn Turk' in the summer of 1876, it did so in a fairly 
moderate and measured fashion, and continued to provide ample coverage of anti-
64 The Times, 'Leader,' 8/8/1876, p.7, CoI.B. 
65 The Times, 'The Sultan,' 5/8/1876, p.5, Col.c. 
66 The Times, 7/8/1877. 
67 The Times, 'In the Shipka Pass,' 7/8/1877, p.8, CoI.A. 
68 Ibid. 
69 The Times, 'War Victims,' 8/8/1877, p.5, CoLA; 'Atrocities,' 8/8/1877, p.5, CoI.B. 
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atrocitarian (and thus anti-Turkish) meetings and activities for at least a further 
year. The topic of Bulgaria or the Bulgarians featured in 144 articles in September 
1876, more than any other month of the year, with 122 in October. Of these, 138 
and 116 respectively made direct reference to atrocities, a figure which fell only as 
far as the nineties in November and December. Obviously, not all articles were as 
strong as the letter 'Atrocities in Bulgaria/ which appeared at the beginning of 
September, and derided the 'incoherent shrieks' of those who denied the atrocities, 
and clung to a position dictated by 'the duties laid upon England by her "Imperial 
positions".,7o Still, there were repeated discussions of the extra pieces of 
information being received from the Balkans, as well as leading articles such as that 
of September sixth which described the government's position over the summer as 
being utterly indefensible on the hustings.71 Indeed, even when the paper did try to 
defend the government, it did so at the expense of the Turks, noting that 'it is 
unfair and unjust to make the misdeeds of Turkey a ground of attack on the 
Ministry.,72 All in all, then, there was hardly a strong prO-Turkish sentiment being 
clearly communicated to the readership. 
The Commission 
One topic which occupied a significant amount of the Press coverage on Bulgaria 
was the commission sent by the British government to investigate the truth of the 
stories regarding the massacres in Bulgaria, and the general conduct of Britain's 
overseas representation in Turkey. The individual sent to Bulgaria to investigate the 
truth of the reports was Walter Baring, described by The Times as the 'secretary of 
the British embassy' in Constantinople, but elsewhere referred to as a consul. 73 
Baring was accompanied on his journey of enquiry by his father-in-law, Mr 
Guarracino, acting in the capacity of interpreter. Mr Guarracino was evidently not a 
well-known figure at the time, as can be seen by the conflicting reports that were 
sent to The Times regarding him. In July a rather complimentary description was 
sent of him, extolling the various services which he had performed for the British 
70 The Times, 'Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 5/9/1876, p.4, CoI.B. 
71 The Times, 'London,' 6/9/1876, p.7, CoI.A. 
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government over a period stretching back to the Crimea. However, in mid August, 
The Times carried a report of a constituency meeting in Notting Hill, in which the 
Liberal MP Charles Dilke read out a letter that he had received from Bulgaria, 
denouncing Guarracino as a man 'bearing a very undesirable reputation.,74 The 
letter went on to denounce him, not simply as a 'Turkophile' but moreover as a 
man who 'hates and despises the Bulgarians' and 'cannot speak Bulgarese [SiC].,75 
Combined with the large presence of Turkish officials accompanying the 
commission every step of the way, doubts had to exist as to the comprehensiveness 
of the report produced. This theme was picked up again in a report two days later, 
which insisted that Baring's earnestness and sincerity was completely undermined 
by his lack of linguistic skills, and that Guarracino was too Turkophile for any 
information filtered through him to retain any credibility.76 Indeed, the article 
argued, the only 'civilised beings' capable of finding the truth were the American 
missionaries who were long established in the area and thus familiar with both the 
language and culture of the Bulgarians, without any taint of prO-Turk bias. 
Whilst the Commission may not have had a particularly profound impact upon 
public perceptions of Bulgaria at this time, it is possible in Dilke's speech to 
determine already something of a crystallisation of the dilemma that seems to have 
presented itself to British people in 1876. Dilke was notably a champion of 
realpolitik, and like his political ally Joseph Chamberlain, opposed what he saw as 
the 'sentimental generalities' of Gladstone which were to become so prominent in 
the autumn.77 Thus it was that he was able to reduce the Eastern Question at that 
time to a simple dichotomy of sympathy on one hand for the Bulgars and other 
victims of Turkish atrocities, versus suspicion of Russian activity on the other, 
whether it be the perceived revolutionary agitation which had prompted the April 
uprising, or the military conflict which the Russian army now pursued by proxy in 
Serbia. This was not a distinction which only affected the masses; in November, 
74 The Times, 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 16/8/1876, p.6, Col.A. 
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when discussing the decision to send Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, to 
the Constantinople conference instead of the Derby, Foreign Secretary, Gladstone 
received a letter from Lord Granville, his former foreign secretary and the Liberal 
leader in the House of Lordswhich posed the question as to (which would be his [i.e. 
Salisbury's] prevailing bias - sympathy with the Xtians, or jealousy of Russia.J78 As 
far as balancing these two positions goes, rather than denying the Turkish 
atrocities, or pleading ignorance (however real or imaginedt Dilke sought instead 
to compare the actions of the Turks in Bulgaria with those of the Russians in Poland 
or the British in Ireland?9 This highlights neatly the most interesting contrast 
between the British and Russian positions on the Bulgarian crisis; namely that in 
Britain sympathy for Bulgarians was seen as running counter to British interests 
(where these were deemed to be a significant factor) whereas in Russia the two 
urged action in the same direction - that is to say against Turkey. 
Gladstone, The Bulgarian Horrors, and the Question 0/ the East 
Despite the obvious fame of its author and the topicality of its theme, there is still 
something remarkable about Gladstone's pamphlet of late summer 1876, Bulgarian 
Horrors and the Question of the East. 80 Published on the sixth of September, it was 
filled with rhetoric that Millman has derided as (irresponsible' and sold for 6d a 
copy.8l Within a month, sales had topped 200,000 in a time when, Saab claims, 
similar pamphlets could scarcely expect circulation figures much in excess of 
6,500.82 Such an important source clearly warrants some more detailed 
examination, both in terms of its content and its context. 
It was the last week of August when Gladstone wrote to his friend and associate 
Lord Granville, observing (I am in half, perhaps a little more than half, a mind to 
78 A. Ramm (Ed.) The Political Correspondence 0/ Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886, 
(Oxford, 1962), v.1, p.19. 
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write a pamphlet: mainly on the ground that Parliamentary action was all but 
ousted.,83 This opening statement offers little in the way of insight into the deeper 
motivations guiding Gladstone at this time, and his diary entry of the previous day 
offers little improvement, with the simple statement 'worked on a beginning for a 
possible pamphlet on Turkish Question.,84 Given the ultimate impact that the 
publication of The Bulgarian Horrors and the subsequent campaign was to have on 
Gladstone's later political fortunes, some historians have sought to portray the 
pamphlet as having been primarily a means to an end; namely, a return to public 
prominence and a stepping stone towards the Liberal Leadership.8s However, 
despite that fact that this is what ultimately occurred, the idea that it was in some 
sense premeditated seems to be little more than wishful thinking. Staunch 
supporters of the Liberal party might well have had cause to complain at times 
concerning the way in which Gladstone created difficulties for the party, but this is 
not the same as seeking to subject and direct it to his own ends. In early October, 
Gladstone wrote to Granville 'I have not your responsibilities to the party, but I 
have for the moment more than your responsibilities to the country.,8G Later in the 
same letter he described himself as simply 'an outside workman, engaged in the 
preparation of materials.' Coming from a piece of personal correspondence to one 
of his closest political colleagues, this hardly reads like the words of a man intent 
upon a leadership challenge. Indeed, Shannon and Saab have both argued that 
Gladstone's involvement in the crisis was carried out in a thoroughgoing spirit of 
reluctance and that he 'became a popular leader against his will.,87 
Chamberlain has tried to argue for the inevitability of Gladstone's ultimate return 
following his resignation of the Liberal Leadership in the aftermath of the 1874 
general election. Her central basis for this seems to be the informal nature of the 
new leadership which she describes as an unclear mess, in which Granville acted as 
the 'social centre for the party' as well as being the leader of the Liberals in the 
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Lords, whilst Hartington or possibly Forster led in the Commons.88 However, 
regardless of what the implications of such a state of affairs might be, she clearly 
overstates the degree of ambiguity present, and Parry notes a party meeting held at 
the Reform Club on February 3rd 1875, at which a 'reluctant' Hartington was elected 
as leader in the Commons.89 Indeed, it was only in the aftermath of the 1880 
election, itself still some four years away that Gladstone's refusal to serve under 
Hartington in the cabinet led to any revisitation of the question of the official 
leadership. 
Much of the difficulty in assessing Gladstone's motives comes from the broad 
disagreement regarding the nature of his personality. Jenkins depicts Gladstone as 
almost entirely opportunistic in his actions, and cites an article written in the 
Quarterly Review in 1866 by Lord Cranborne (later Salisbury) which asserted that 
Gladstone was not only 'completely' guided by ambition, but did so in a perfect 
state of 'self-deceit ... without the faintest self-consciousness or self-suspicion.,9o A 
more apt viewpoint, however, might be found in the quotation often attributed to 
Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin: "There go the people. I must follow them, for I am 
their leader." Ramm has noted in her analysis of the Gladstone-Granville 
correspondence, the manner in which the electorate increasingly occupied the 
principal role in Gladstone's decision-making, filling a space that had previously 
been occupied by Granville.91 Thus, however derisively Jenkins may describe 
Gladstone as 'following public opinion, rather than forming it,' it is instead clear 
that he remained a man of conviction, but spoke most vocally on the matters in 
which the electorate, and the populace more broadly, had, he believed, already 
expressed a clear interest.92 Were Gladstone to have been simply following sheep-
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like the tide of public opinion, then the spring of 1878 would have seen an abrupt 
volte-face, far from the reality which manifested itself, as will be shown below.93 
Perhaps it is also helpful to have a broader understanding of what may have fuelled 
and inspired the pamphlet, and this may come from Matthew who asserts that 'the 
inner force of a Gladstonian pamphlet was always religious,' a factor inevitably 
likely to increase the strength of the tone. 94 This notion is supported by Derby who 
noted in his diary on the day after publication that the pamphlet was 'a fierce and 
violent denunciation of the Turks ... in which religious zeal appears plainly under the 
guise of sympathy for the oppressed races.,95 This, however, is the only reference 
which he makes to the pamphlet, despite the following weeks of his diary being 
heavily occupied with the Eastern Question generally. The Times carried mention of 
the pamphlet every day or two throughout September, although these tailed off 
rapidly in October and November with only a few references being made in each 
month.96 
Returning to Millman's notion of the content of the pamphlet as 'irresponsible,' it is 
necessary to consider directly the text itself. The Bulgarian Horrors began with a 
commendation of the behaviour of the British public, and the manner in which they 
were able to trust to the superior knowledge and instincts of their government; 
hardly the most subversive opening available to Gladstone.97 Obviously, however, 
the purpose of The Bulgarian Horrors was not to heap praise on the government, 
and the congratulation of the public was coupled with a lamentation of the way this 
trust had been forced to 'subsist' without any information, or discussion of 
Bulgarian matters prior to the end of July.98 Indeed, Gladstone was prepared to 
assert that deliberate obstacles had been placed in the way of discussion, including 
93 See below, chapter 7, esp. Pp.183-186. 
94 H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone 1807-1874, (1986), p.13. 
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the brevity of the parliamentary session, which necessarily constricted the amount 
of time in the House available for discussion. 99 Evidently, this sort of accusation 
defies any real degree of investigation, as the lack of time evidently did place a 
mechanical limit on the debating time available, but there appears to be no 
evidence available of a deliberate curtailment of the session on the part of 
government - Derby for example is notably silent on any such conspiracy should it 
have occurred. 
Where Gladstone can be called more closely to account, is in his conclusion as to 
what was ultimately revealed once the government's delaying tactics were 
exhausted, and Britain and its agents were revealed as being guilty of 'moral 
complicity with the barest and blackest outrages upon record within the present 
century, if not within the memory of men.,lOO This outrage, he concluded, had been 
perpetrated by the Turks, 'the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.,101 At 
this point, it is clear to see that Gladstone is allowing emotion and literary style to 
trump clear-headedness. In sharp contrast to Saab's notion that Gladstone 
furnished the atrocities campaign with 'reason and justification,' at this point he 
seems to be carried away by emotion. 102 Indeed, Shannon asserts that Gladstone 
was 'never less in control' than at this point in time. 103 Broadly speaking, the 
pattern shown above seems to dominate the pamphlet throughout; beginning with 
careful reasoning, Gladstone would periodically erupt into violent invective, before 
arriving at a decidedly moderate conclusion. In one section, Gladstone was able to 
provide a detailed blow-by-blow account of the reporting of the crisis, and the 
questions asked and answered (or not) within the House, concluding with the 
simple assertion that the presence of the British fleet in Besika Bay needed to be 
publicly explained as humanitarian in purpose, rather than military.lo4 
Perhaps the most famous line of the pamphlet, and one which deserves some 
attention, is the famous 'bag and baggage' quotation, part of a passage which 
99 Ibid. 
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shows once again the apparent incompatibility of Gladstone's rhetoric and his 
105 demands: 
Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible 
manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their 
Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakarns and 
their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out 
from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough 
riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can 
make to the memory of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated 
purity alike of matron, of maiden, and of child; to the civilization 
which has been affronted and shamed; to the laws of God or, if you 
like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large. 106 
In the face of such a colourful, emotive, moralising passage, it can hardly be 
considered a surprise to learn that many readers simply missed the fact that what 
Gladstone demanded in conclusion to this tirade, was an end to Turkish executive 
power - that is to say, the granting to Bulgaria of autonomy.107 Gladstone's ultimate 
conclusions in his pamphlet were decidedly moderate in both their nature and their 
tone: an end to 'anarchical misrule,' preventative measures against a recurrence of 
the atrocities by removing Turkish administration from Bosnia and Bulgaria, and by 
these steps, to 'redeem' the good name and reputation of Britain. 1oB However, the 
manner in which he framed these demands was bound to provoke a stronger 
reaction than this simple restatement would suggest they perhaps warranted. 
Indeed, it led Disraeli to remark in a note to his private secretary, Corry, that 
Gladstone was 'quite mad: really devilish man; possessed by an evil spirit of 
envy.,!09 
105 Shannon notes that the 'bag and baggage' line was actually a quotation from Stratford de 
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The Atrocities Campaign 
Across Britain in the second half of 1876, there were many public meetings, 
assemblies, speeches and the like, calling upon the government to be more active 
in regard to events in Bulgaria, or simply expressing a collective dismay at what had 
transpired. Gladstone and his pamphlet were closely associated to this mass 
outpouring of activity.11o However, despite many attempts, both at the time and 
since, to link them, it seems clear that the atrocities campaign was not simply a 
Gladstonian movement, and it is necessary to consider what exactly the movement 
was, in order properly to appreciate the manner in which it was depicted in the 
Press. 
Wohl and Feuchtwanger have both seen anti-Semitic prejudice as a key element of 
the British atrocity campaign, almost to the point of reducing it to nothing else. 111 
By contrast, Shannon viewed this as a thoroughly superficial aspect of what 
happened, seeing it as a growth out of the 'proto-agitation' carried out the previous 
year on behalf of the rebels and refugees in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which 
ultimately grew into the "significant manifestation of moral sentiment on a popular 
level" that Gladstone required prior to getting involved. 112 For Saab, it was 
overwhelmingly a working-class mass movement, although, along with Shannon, 
she confirms the significance of W. T. Stead's Darlington Northern Echo which often 
provided fresh information from Bulgaria and led the call for action. 113 Stead's 
action was over a broad range of activities, from using the Northern Echo to 
organise public meetings, to leading a campaign for a national 'day of atonement' 
for Bulgaria.114 
Stead would in time become known as a staunch supporter of the Radical Liberal 
agenda, and achieve significant prominence as a campaigning journalist. Baylen 
identifies this involvement with the atrocities campaign as a breakthrough point in 
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making The Northern Echo 'one of the most renowned north country dailies.,lls The 
Northern E c h o ~ s s involvement with the atrocity campaign is also linked closely to its 
future support for Gladstone's Midlothian campaign of 1880, which have been seen 
as instrumental in securing Gladstone's landslide victory.1l6 
Prior to the publication of his pamphlet, Gladstone had in fact been largely silent on 
the subject of Bulgaria. Gladstone explicitly stated in his correspondence with 
Granville that 'I have tried and shall try to avoid speaking: but if I do not speak I 
must write.,1l7 Perhaps more significantly his pamphlet, appearing as it did on sixth 
September, came too late to have been a significant factor in many of the public 
meetings which were held during the first few weeks of September 1876. There is 
ample documentary evidence of these meetings, as most of them concluded with a 
resolution to send a copy of the motions passed to Lord Derby.1l8 For the most part, 
the motions were forwarded by the mayors or guilds of small cities and large towns 
condemning the massacres, with examples appearing from Nottingham, 
Canterbury, Middlesbrough, Bodmin, Whitby, Darlington and Exeter to name just a 
few. 119 Amongst these run-of-the-mill declarations from public meetings, there are, 
a few which are notably different, coming not from towns as a whole, but from 
more specific interest groups (often occu pying a broader geographical area, such as 
the expression of 'horror and indignation' sent to the Foreign Secretary by the 
Baptist Union of Wales).120 It seems difficult to ascertain why exactly such 
organisations felt the need to send their own messages, separately from the towns 
and cities in which they lived, and logistically it is almost impossible to determine 
whether the signatories also attended more geographically defined meetings. 
The widespread nature of the public meetings made a significant impact upon 
Derby, who felt the change in the mood of the country to be (remarkable', 
commenting: 'meetings are being held daily in the provinces' to urge the 
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government against aiding the Turks.121 He was also clear about what he perceived 
as being the causes and nature of these meetings, adding 'To a considerable extent, 
these meetings are got up for party purposes, being generally attended by Liberal 
MPs and nonconformist preachers: but they undoubtedly represent also a large 
amount of genuine popular feeling.,122 Although clearly annoyed by his political 
difficulties, it is noteworthy that Derby here testifies to an underlying general 
opinion. This comes in stark contrast to his remarks noted earlier when he was 
petitioned on behalf of the people of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and had noted that 
as excitable as the delegation might be, 'what it may be to the public I don't 
know.,123 This clear development in the foreign secretary's views was recorded on 
second September, before the motions would fully have begun to reach him, and 
implies that his reaction was prompted by more than simply an overflowing in-tray. 
It is important, then, to consider what it was that had led Derby to change his mind 
in this way, and the best way to do this will be to consider the manner in which 
these meetings had been covered in the contemporary press, and how Derby 
responded to this reportage. 
Derby was far from complimentary towards the agitation movement when he 
noted in his diary, again on second September: 'The outcry is so far inconvenient 
that it weakens our hands abroad, & strengthens those of Russian statesmen, but it 
is not unnatural, and at this time of year can do little harm.,124 This last point is 
presumably a reference to the fact that Parliament had dissolved in early August 
until the following year and thus the chances of MPs feeling obliged to ask 
questions on behalf of an aroused electorate was reduced. Sadly, his diary does not 
contain any comment on the petition, also in the Foreign Office compilation of this 
time, addressed by the Mayor and Aldermen of Penzance directly to the Queen, 
urging a recall of Parliament for the explicit purpose of discussing the Bulgarian 
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Question.125 Interestingly, there does not seem to have been any corresponding 
press campaign, at least in The T i m e s ~ ~ for an early recall. 
Later Press portrayals of Turkey 
The manner in which Turkey was regarded in the media in the latter part of 1876 is 
important. In the October edition of the Quarterly Review, there appeared an 
article claiming to be an {examination of the conduct of the Ministry and the chiefs 
of the opposition in reference to the Eastern Question.,126 However, it was over 
twenty pages before the contemporary British government was even mentioned 
(for a paragraph or two), with the majority of the article being devoted to an 
analysis of the historical place of Turkey within Europe. In this context, the country 
was depicted as {threatening,' and European attempts at improving and reforming 
Turkey were dismissed as little more than {carving on rotten wood.,127 In this light, 
it is unsurprising that the article fails to contain strong endorsements of Turkey or 
to urge backing for the Sultan's government. However, it is somewhat unusual, 
given the climate of the time as just described, that the argument is framed not in 
favour of the Bulgarians, but specifically against the Turks, asserting that both in 
fact and in the utterances of Derby, it was clear to see {the utter impossibility of any 
English Ministry proposing active measures in support of the current regime in 
Turkey to the generation of Englishmen who had heard and believed the stories of 
the Bulgarian massacres.,128 Whilst this remark would doubtless have found 
popular support, it seems strange that the suggestion is even being made as, at this 
point, few besides the Turkish ambassador were calling upon the government to 
make any such steps. 
A more significant point lies in the Q u a r t e r l y ~ s s opinions regarding what British 
interests and duties did dictate in regard to Turkey, analogising the United Kingdom 
to a physician who saves the life of a sick man only for that man to go on to commit 
murder.129 The author of the article ultimately argues in favour of multi-Power 
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intervention to guide the Sultans and to reform the Turkish, largely because any 
removal of that state would lead to {an amount of European disturbance which no-
one could contemplate without horror.,13o This is hardly a {bag and baggage' 
endorsement of the removal or curtailment of Turkish power to commit excesses of 
the kind which even the most sceptical were prepared to concede had occurred. 
If the Quarterly/s views were somewhat surprising, the views of the Edinburgh 
Review remained opaque. In the final issue of 1876, the Edinburgh Review carried 
its only notable article on Eastern affairs of that year; a lengthy review article which 
considered both a travelogue based on experiences in Bosnia the previous year and 
the blue book Correspondence respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina/ presented to 
parliament that July. Granville noted in a letter to Gladstone, that the tone was so 
supportive of the government that it {might have been, and perhaps has been 
dictated by Derby.,131 Certainly, the article focused rather more on the revolts as 
{the harbinger of brighter and better days,' rather than on the sufferings inflicted by 
Turkish reprisals. 132 This fits a more general theme of October being a quiet period 
for coverage of Bulgaria, with The Times only managing a single article solely 
devoted to the topic.133 
The opening months of 1877 saw something of a renewal of media interest in the 
Eastern Question, due in no small part to the launch of the journal Nineteenth 
Century. Nineteenth Century was founded by Sir James Knowles as a 'platform from 
which men of all parties and persuasions might address the public in their own 
names.,134 Knowles was moved to found Nineteenth Century as a result of a dispute 
with the new owners of The Contemporary Review which he edited until January 
1877.135 The Contemporary itself had been established as a more explicitly religious 
counter to the outspokenly secular Fortnightly Review in 1866. During the second 
half of 1876, the Contemporary had, on average, carried one or two articles a 
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month on Eastern matters, from a variety of authors. Yet, after Knowles' departure, 
it published only three articles for the rest of the year, all of them coming from the 
pen of the self-confessed {atrocity-monger' Edward Freeman.136 Nineteenth Century 
by contrast produced a broad gamut of articles appearing with regularity on a 
variety of aspects of the Eastern question. However, whilst the turn of 1877 saw a 
renewal of journalistic attention on the matter of the Eastern Question, much of 
what was written concerned itself with the question of British interests and the 
appropriate nature of British foreign policy at this time.137 
As a comparison, it is perhaps worth noting at this point that the actions and the 
fate of the Bulgarians occupied far less of the attention of the British journals at this 
time than did the Suez Canal purchase. 138 The precise details of Disraeli's actions 
regarding Suez do not belong here, nor the Press reaction, as it was far removed 
from being a public movement. However, it is interesting to see that even when 
such a large-scale movement as the Atrocities Campaign was underway, many still 
preferred to focus their energies on the questions of High Politics and the actions of 
statesmen. Beyond this, it is also necessary to bear in mind Gladstone's own 
assertion that those who had been actively involved in the atrocities campaign {may 
well experience a sense of relief when the scene is shifted from Bulgaria, or from 
Constantinople, to Egypt.,139 Gladstone's weariness of Bulgaria by this point in the 
proceedings is understandable. However, he was somewhat unclear as to why 
exactly it was that he found discussion of Egypt evoked an atmosphere so {free and 
almost fragrant.,14o 
Despite the avoidance in some quarters, and the delays in others, it would be a 
mistake to think that the Atrocities Campaign entirely failed to impact the British 
journals. Although 1876 had seen few take advantage of the short period of time 
136 F. Barlow, 'Freeman, Edward Augustus (1823-1892)', DONB, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10146. accessed 19 July 2011]. 
137 See below, pp.183-186. 
138 E.g. Anon, 'The Great canal at Suez: its Political Engineering and Financial History,' Quarterly 
Review, 142:284, (October 1876), pp.429-4S7; E. Dicey, 'Our Route to India,' Nineteenth Century, 1, 
4, (Jun 1877), pp.6SS-68S. 
139 W. E. Gladstone, 'Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,' Nineteenth Century, 2, 6, (August 
1877), p.149. 
140 Ibid. 
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they had, 1877 did see a number of articles considering the movement on a mass 
level. This was the clear aim of Freeman's article of February 1877, 'The English 
People in Relation to the Eastern Question.,141 As noted above, Freeman was a 
prominent figure in the Atrocity Campaign, and his article was in keeping with this 
tone, arguing strongly the case of the Bulgaria ns. More significant, however, is how 
he related the question to the people of Britain. He asserted that since before the 
Great Reform Act of 1832 (at least) 'there has been no such general stirring of the 
national heart and the national conscience as that which was wrought when the 
people of England first heard in all its fullness the true tale of Turkish doings in 
Bulgaria.,142 Clearly intent on making his point, Freeman noted how the British were 
'stirred' or how people 'shuddered' repeatedly in the opening section of his 
article.143 He asserted that the movement was without parallel in its spontaneity 
and universality, before launching into a detailed consideration of how the various 
strands of opposition to the movement had sprung up, claiming that the 
Conservative 'headquarters' had incited a previously ambivalent party, whilst 
others had opposed the national movement simply 'because it is national.,l44 As far 
as Freeman was concerned, Christianity and freedom, of which he proudly 
proclaimed himself a long-standing partisan, largely unaffected by the recent 
upsurge of support, were both 'unfashionable' causes, which had been enough to 
incite opponents against them. 145 Despite all this, he still asserted that the 
movement was truly a popular one, as it was not confined to a single class, sect, or 
party, and because it had an impact upon the government. 146 The existence of this 
article is useful insofar as it shows clearly that The Contemporary Review was willing 
to allow the opinions of the Atrocity Campaign to be voiced explicitly on their 
pages, something which it appears the Edinburgh Review was not. 147 However, it 
tells us almost nothing about the wider receptions these sentiments received. 
141 E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' The Contemporary Review, 
29 (February 1877), pp.489-S14. 
142 Ib'd I ., p.489. 
143 Ib'd I ., pp.489-491. 
144 Ibid., pp.490, 501, 503. 
145 Ibid., p.sOS. 
146 Ibid., p.SlO. 
147 Ib'd I ., p.s03. 
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Conclusion 
All in all, then, there were a mUltiplicity of factors surrounding the Bulgarian 
uprising and the subsequent massacres, which account for the level of public 
attention generated. The long decades that Britain had supported Turkey, seeking 
to reform it along Western lines had failed to produce tangible results, and the slow 
but steady stream of information stemming from the previous year's revolts in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina had forced many to begin questioning what exactly was 
being gained from these reform attempts, and how much more time the Turks 
should be given. 
From a Russian perspective, Bulgaria received only limited attention, and then, only 
insofar as it added weight to the case being already made for the enlargement of 
Serbia. In this context, the notion that San Stefano and the resultant 'Big Bulgaria' 
were part of a long-standing and well-established Russian plan seems to hold little 
water: nothing had been done to establish the notion in the minds of the Russian 
public, an action which could hardly have been beyond the scope of the Tsar's 
ministers and agents had it been sufficiently desired. In Russia, friendship with 
Turkey was never an issue, and the only issues of relevance were whether sizeable 
portions of the Slavonic population of Turkey could be given autonomy, or liberated 
from Turkish rule altogether, without causing excessive disturbance to the peace of 
Europe. This lack of obvious vested interest is perhaps the major factor in 
accounting for the scant interest which Bulgaria did receive in the Russian Press: 
the apparent dichotomy between morality and interest simply did not exist. It also 
probably helped prevent the occurrence of a situation such as in Britain whereby 
the laconic correspondence of the ambassador at Constantinople left the 
government uninformed, in exactly the area where it might appear to have 
something to hide. 
Had the Cabinet been properly informed in June, it seems plausible that Disraeli 
might have been more careful in his remarks to the House, or at the very least that 
Derby would have ensured that a more clearly and moderately stated summary of 
the government's position was made. In this case, it is probable that the key 
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movers in the agitation movement might not have felt that they had so much with 
which to contend and that the whole business would have passed relatively calmly 
into the history books. This, certainly, is the position which Freeman adopted, 
asserting that both the Liberals and the Conservatives had 'sinned' in the past 
regarding Turk and Slav, but that the failure of Derby and Disraeli was that they had 
not 'atoned' for their actions; if they had, then they would have been 'equally 
welcomed' by the pro-Bulgarian campaigners, as could be seen by the fact that no-
one had said a bad word about Salisbury who was just as much a Tory as they 
were. 148 Nonetheless, the mass activity of September 1876 is undeniable. The 
rapidity with which it followed the publication of Gladstone's Bulgarian Horrors 
shows that it cannot simply have been inspired by the pamphlet, but that it was the 
result of a prolonged building of public feeling and activity based on actions such as 
the proto-agitation for the Bosnian and Hercegovinan cause the year before. That 
said, the rhetoric of Gladstone, aside from the bare fact of his involvement, helped 
propel the atrocities movement to a degree of exposure which it could not 
otherwise have hoped to obtain. 
148 Ibid., pp.495, 499-500. 
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Chapter 5 - The Russians March to War 
In the summer of 1877 Lev Tolstoi published the final section of his epic Anna 
Korenino, in which one of the novel's major protagonists, Count Vronskii, departs 
for the Balkans, intent on fighting for the Serbs against their Turkish overlords and 
not expecting to return with his life. Koznyshev, half-brother of the novel's hero 
Levin, watches the volunteers depart, accompanied by the professor Katavasov. 
Koznyshev reminisces on how 'the heroism of the Serbs and Montenegrins, fighting 
for a great cause, aroused in the whole nation a desire to help their brothers not 
only with words but by deeds.'l The figures whom Katavasov and Koznyshev 
encounter are generally unimpressive, being described variously as 'effeminate, 
spoilt and delicate,' a 'drunkard and a thief whom no one would employ any longer' 
and other caricatures who collectively produce 'a disagreeable impression.,2 
However, it is Koznyshev's first recollection that has stuck, and the literary picture 
painted by Tolstoi has become the popular recollection, indeed the accepted 
version of events for most scholars not re-considering the Eastern Crisis itself.3 
This chapter will examine the reaction of the Russian public to events in the Balkans 
in the summer of 1876, and consider the extent to which there was a meaningful 
public 'outcry.' In order to further our appreciation of how significant the Russian 
reaction was, parallels and contrast will be drawn with the contemporary British 
press and reactions within the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the chapter will 
examine the relationship between what actually occurred in Russia at this time, and 
the literary perceptions and portrayals, notably the manner in which this singular 
notion of a people, collectively inflamed on behalf of a particular cause, has gained 
such lasting currency. Overall, it will be shown that the vague references to 
'activity,' 'enthusiasm' and the like can only really be verified or quantified when 
1 L. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina: Translated by L & A Maude, (London, 1992), p.909. 
2 Tolstoy, Anna Karen in a, pp.914-91S. 
3 For example, Knight asserted that public opinion 'drew the regime into a war that it would likely 
have otherwise avoided' - N. Knight, 'Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation?' Kritika, 7,4, (2006), 
p.736; 'the government was obliged by the people to officially declare war.' - S. Lure, 'Rossiisskaia 
gosudarstvennost' i russkaia obshchina' in S. Lure, Metamorfozy traditsionnogo soznaniia, (St 
Petersburg 1994) cited in S. Kaspe, 'Imperial Political Culture and Modernisation in the Second Half 
of the Nineteenth Century,' in J. Burbank, M. Von Hagen, A. Remnev, (eds) Russian Empire: Space, 
People, Power, 1700-1930, (Indianapolis, 2005), p.482. 
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they intersect with financial collections taken up for the South Slavs. These 
collections were the only truly reliable indication of what Ipeople' really thought 
and did in Russia at this time. 
Orthodox Accounts 
Although Russian actions elsewhere have already been considered at some length, 
this chapter will focus on Russia itself during this period. Alexander II reigned as 
Tsar of Russia from 1855 until his assassination in 1881. He was already into the 
final quarter of his reign when the people of Bosnia rose against their Turkish 
overlords and re-ignited Ithe eternally insoluble Eastern Question' in 1875. 4 The 
early part of his reign had been marked by sweeping legislative changes known as 
the IGreat Reforms' and, for the most significant of these, the emancipation of the 
Serfs in 1861, he had earned himself the epithet Ithe Tsar Liberator.' More than 
this, Alexander II is seen by some as having Ifor the first time opened the door to 
public participation in political affairs.'s By these latter years, however, he is 
generally regarded as having taken a more reactionary outlook; angered by the 
Polish revolt, and only a horse's nostril away from being assassinated by a Polish 
revolutionary, he became affected by a Itenseness.,6 He increasingly exhibited a 
general hostility to calls for more reform or social innovation and appointed the 
conservative scholar and academic c.P. Pobedonostsev as tutor to his son and heir 
Alexander Alexandrovich.7 Geyer, whose work has done much to emphasise the 
inseparable nature of Russian foreign and domestic policy, notes that Alexander 
exhibited an instinctive aversion to reform demanded from below, and that he 
regarded public opinion of any kind as destructive, referring to it as Igazetobolezn" 
- literally, newspaper sickness.8 As noted above, Alexander made assorted changes 
to the role and status of the official state censor, but not in a fashion which 
4 F. Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz, (Evanstown, 2000), vol.l, 
p.S22 
5 L. Engelstein, Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path, (lthica, 2009), p.46. 
6 W.G. Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, (London, 2002), pp.12S-127. 
7 R. F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, his life and thought, (Indiana, 1968), p.33. 
8 D. Geyer, Russian Imperialism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914, 
(Leamington Spa, 1987), p.29. 
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provided firm encouragement for either reactionaries or reformists. 9 Broadly 
speaking Alexander's reign was thus characterised by a mixture of Zhukovsky's 
liberalism and his father's militarism, but lacking the will and persistence of either. 10 
A vast number of contemporary accounts almost universally attest to the existence 
of a mood of popular enthusiasm for the Serb cause in Russia at this time, yet little 
is done to define or substantiate this argument. The Times in England expressed a 
strong belief that the movement was never particularly widespread and that it 
rarely extended far beyond Moscow and Kiev.ll This contrasts sharply with the view 
of the Parisian Journal des debats, which offered the following bold assertion in the 
autumn of 1876: 
We knew that Russia was marvellously organised for those great 
national agitations which, beginning at the top, rapidly spread 
among all classes, pass from Court to aristocracy, aristocracy to 
army, from army to bourgeoisie, and gradually extend to the 
populace, but the unanimity of sentiments, yearnings and hopes now 
displayed by her exceeds all that we had seen of the like of late 
years.12 
Whilst other sources were perhaps less confident about the manner in which this 
expression of 'sentiment' had come about, this is the tone which was to be found 
across Europe.13 By June, Turgenev was convinced that Russia 'cannot avoid war' 
due to the strength of the manifest feeling. 14 At the same time, Pobedonostsev was 
expressing concern at the likely direction of what he viewed as an overwhelming 
'wave of nationalism.,15 This view has traditionally been upheld by historians; 
Polunov describes an 'upsurge of public activity of a sort that Russia had scarcely 
seen since the Napoleonic invasion,' and MacKenzie talks of a 'unanimous 
9 See above, pp.22-23. 
10 Polunov, Russia in the Nineteenth Century, p.92. 
11 The Times, "Russia," 30/11/1876, p.5, CoI.B. 
12 Journal des debats, 20/9/1876, p.1, CoI.B. 
13 E.g. 'Russian Wars with Turkey,' Edinburgh Review, 146, 229, (July 1877), p.259. 
14 N. Zekulin, 'Turgenev's 'kroket v Vindzore (« Croquet at Windsor »)" in P. Waddington, (Ed.,) Ivan 
Turgenenv and Britain, (Oxford, 1995), p.195. 
15 Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, p.123. 
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outburst.,16 Although the apparent unanimity of these views must, of course, lend 
them some weight, these varied sources all have in common, not only their shared 
belief in the Russian 'movement' of 1876, but an equally common lack of any 
concrete reasoning behind this attitude. MacKenzie undermines his own assertion 
by conceding that 'the bellicose views of the Russian press reflected only a vocal, 
educated minority in the principal cities.,17 Beyond this, a certain healthy scepticism 
towards claims for an 'enflamed public' is probably best retained. 
Cherniaev and Kireev 
Keeping in mind a certain degree of hesitancy in accepting the various accounts of 
the public furore that surrounded the reporting of the Serbo-Turkish war in Russia, 
it is important to consider why exactly it was that Russian interest became so 
focused on this conflict. It has already been shown that the 'Bulgarian Horrors' 
provided significant impetus to educated opinion in Great Britain, and that previous 
interest in Bosnia had been minimal. 18 Russia, by contrast, had been remarkably 
disinterested in both conflicts, with Press interest instead being focused on events 
in Serbia. One reasonable explanation that presents itself, is the involvement of 
Russians in this campaign. Whilst it should not be overstated, there is no doubt that 
both the media and their readership often took greater interest in events which 
they could relate more directly to themselves. 
This section will consider the cases of two particularly prominent figures, Mikhail 
Cherniaev and Nikolai Kireev, before discussing the larger numbers of Russian 
volunteers who involved themselves in the Serbo-Turkish conflict. Many, such as 
MacKenzie, have argued that a little-regarded conflict in the Balkans took on a 
significant new dimension when a Russian officer, named Cherniaev, was appointed 
a general in the Serbian army. General Mikhail Grigorovich Cherniaev was already 
something of a minor celebrity in Russian society at this time, having famously 
16 Polunov, Russia in the nineteenth Century, p.167; D. MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-
S/avism, 1875-1878, (New York, 1967), p.llS. 
17 MacKenzie, The Serbs & Russian Pans/avism, p.99. 
18 See above, pp.90, 120. 
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captured Turkestan in 1865, despite being under orders to retreat. 19 By the middle 
of the 1870s, he had left the military and was the editor of the Panslavist 
publication Russian World (Russkii M i r ) ~ ~ a post which he occupied right up until the 
point where he left Russia, and appeared in Belgrade to offer his services to Prince 
Milan. The Voice had previously published little on the Eastern Question. 2o He was 
not an entirely unknown figure to informed Britons either, although the extent to 
which the readers of The Times would have recalled a man mentioned ten times in 
the 1860s, and once earlier that decade, in 1873, is questionable. 21 
Beginning with the paper's announcement of Cherniaev's arrival in Serbia and his 
subsequent appointment to a Serbian command on twenty-first May, there seems 
to have been a veritable flurry of journalistic activity.22 Whereas in the first third of 
the year, The Voice had produced little more than a few editorials noting how 
concerned the Russians were for the fate of Balkan Christians and how peaceful 
Russia had been since the Crimean War, they suddenly began to offer regular 
updates from the Balkans.23 The T i m e s ~ ~ referring to him as Tchernayeff, also noted 
his imminent departure from St. Petersburg and his arrival in Belgrade, describing 
him as a 'well-known Siavophil officer and writer.,24 Cherniaev has certainly been 
cited by many, both at the time and since, as being the key factor in the change of 
public attitudes, with MacKenzie describing him as having been 'unquestionably the 
most popular man in Russia.,25 Dostoevskii, despite giving him the dubious epithet 
of 'most naive of heroes,' did note that 'since his departure for Serbia he has 
acquired remarkable popularity in Russia.,26 In fact, one of the few to raise his voice 
openly against Cherniaev seems to have been Turgenev, who commented to a 
friend that he thoroughly 'loathed' the man.27 An aspect of Cherniaev's voyage to 
19 D. MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876),' The Journal of Modern History, 
Vo136, N03, (Sep, 1964), p.280. 
20 L. McReynolds, The News under Russia's old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press, 
(Princeton, 1991), p.30. 
21 The Times, 'Russia in Central Asia,' 21/1/1873, p.7, CoLA. 
22 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (21/5) 2/6/1876, p.3, CoLD. 
23 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (1) 13/1/1876, p.l, CoLA, and (8) 20/4/1876, p.l, CoLB. 
24 The Times, 'Herzegovina,' 11/5/1876, p.5, CoLB; The Berlin Conference,' 20/5/1876, p.9, CoLA. 
2S MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice,' p.279. 
26 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, vall, pp.601, 610. 
n Zekulin, 'Turgenev's Kroket v Vindzore,' p.200. 
126 
the Balkans which was not considered to any notable degree by the Russian press, 
but which did receive at least a brief consideration in The Times was the ambiguity 
of having a semi-retired Russian general occupying a military post in a conflict 
Russia was not part of. At the very end of May, The Times noted briefly that 
Cherniaev was still technically a Russian Officer and remained on half-pay in that 
capacity, before delving deeper into the matter in the early part of June. They 
described the lengths gone to by the Russian consul-general to have Cherniaev 
shunned by Prince Milan, as well as the Serbian decision to grant Cherniaev Serbian 
nationality in an attempt to minimise the embarrassment and potentially ensuing 
anger experienced by Russia as a result of the whole affair. 28 
The widespread claims of Cherniaev's great and enduring popularity are hard to 
substantiate. As has already been noted, The Voice did provide fairly regular 
updates on the general's activities and whereabouts; however, little in their tone 
suggests that they were particularly partisan in his favour and (by and large) the 
reports were simply bland, factual descriptions of what he and his men had been 
doing. Worse still, when the paper did dedicate an editorial to Cherniaev, it was to 
deride him for his foolishness in giving orders in Russian which, unsurprisingly, 
aggravated the Serbian troops, and generally for quarrelling with the Serbian 
government.29 This at-best lukewarm coverage is particularly notable given that the 
editor of The Voice, Kraevskii, was a long-time supporter of Cherniaev in his central 
Asian campaigns, and has been described as the 'standard-bearer of the Russian 
mission in Asia.do If even Kraevskii's publication did not lionise Cherniaev, then it 
seems a puzzle as to who did. The Times provided scarcely less coverage than the 
Russian Press, and referred to Cherniaev by name over two hundred times during 
the crisis. By and large, this was confined to factual descriptions of the movements 
of his troops, or of the proclamation he issued urging all the Christians of the 
Turkish lands to rise Up.31 On occasion, he was singled out for his 'boldness' or his 
'hot-headedness' which was part of the 'reputation' that was drawing recruits to 
28 The Times, 'News in Brief,' 26/5/1876, p.5, CoLB; 'Servia,' 1/6/1876, p.5, CoLe. 
29 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (27/9) 9/10/1876, p.4, CoLB, (2) 14/10/1876, p4, CoLA. 
30 A. J. Rieber, 'Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous,' Russian Review, 53, 3, 
(summer 1994), p.333. 
31 E.g. The Times, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 7/7/1876, p.5, CoLA; 10/7/1876, p.7, CoLA. 
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the Serbian cause.32 Generally, however, the articles were less emotive and more 
descriptive, no doubt aided by the fact that Cherniaev's bold opening thrust of the 
campaign soon stalled into what could at best be described as masterful inactivity.33 
Perhaps the strongest words of praise that the Times put his way, was when 
reference was made to 'the gallant Tchernayeff,' although this was in a letter from 
Archibald Forbes, reprinting a letter he had sent to the ed itor of the Serbian 
newspaper Istok (The East) and which appeared in The Times to repudiate a charge 
of plagiarism.34 Perhaps the reason for the large amount of coverage Cherniaev 
received in Britain can be seen in the Times article of October 1876 which 
expressed a firm belief that he had been Isent on a sort of semi-official mission by 
the Russian war Office' and that Ithere reigns complete harmony between 
Tchernayeff and the Russian military authorities.,35 The notion that Cherniaev 
headed a clandestine Russian participation in the war will be discussed later in this 
chapter, whilst the attention paid by the British Press to Russian diplomatic 
schemes will be considered at greater length in chapter 7. 
Although perhaps not as well known as Cherniaev, Nicholas Kireev was another 
volunteer with a particularly significant impact upon the course of events at this 
time. The particular significance of Kireev's contribution was two-fold. Firstly, he 
performed the ultimate service to the cause of publicity by dying in battle; fiercely 
outnumbered, and against an enemy commander who refused to release his 
body.36 Secondly, he had a very eloquent and energetic sister, Olga Novikov, who, 
although primarily active in England, was prompted by her brother's untimely 
demise to embark on an epic bout of correspondence and agitation to argue the 
Slavonic cause, and the Russian one more generally.37 The demise of Kireev has 
32 The Times, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 11/7/1876, p.S, CoLA; 'The War in Servia,' 12/7/1876, 
p.9, CoLE. 
33 The Times, 'Servia and Turkey,' 24/7/1876, p.6, CoLA. 
34 Forbes makes it clear that he refers to the Serbian Istok, and not to any Russian publication of the 
same name which would, of course, be translated The Source. The Times, 'English Correspondents in 
Servia, (Letters to Editor), 2/10/1876, p.l0, CoLC. 
35 The Times, 'The Eastern Question,' 21/10/1876, p.S, Col.A. 
36 W. T. Stead, (Ed), The MP For Russia: The Reminiscences and Correspondence of Madame O. 
Novikov, (London, 1909), p.206. 
37 Stead, The MP For Russia, pp.236-238. For more on the actions of Novikov during this crisis see 
below, pp.131, 140, 193. 
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been widely regarded as a major catalyst to public interest in Russia at the time. As 
I.S. Aksakov, the chairman of the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee and 
leading voice of Pan-slavism in Russia, put it in his address to the July 1876 meeting 
of the Moscow Slavonic Committee when eulogising Kireev; (he was one of US.,38 
The Orthodox Observer (Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie) was a publication that had 
previously confined itself to considering the religious aspect of the Slavonic 
question, or to appealing for 'exclusively monetary' donations to the Slavonic 
cause.39 However, in the July edition of 1876, the Observer published a brief 
account of Kireev's memorial service (it was described as a funeral both in the 
Orthodox Observer and The Times, but this seems unlikely given that the Turkish 
army still had possession of his body), following which the editor of the journal 
stood up and addressed the assembled crowd.40 In his address, the editor described 
Kireev's death as 'the first Russian sacrifice' of the Serbo-Turkish war and called 
Kireeva 'Crusader' who took up arms to protect 'faith, homeland and freedom.'41 
Dostoevskii noted in his July diary that 'the People' 'have heard and prayed in 
church for the repose of the soul of Nikolai Alexeevich Kireev, who gave his life for 
the cause of the People.,42 The impact of Kireev's death in Russia was also attested 
to further afield: Captain Salusbury, a companion of Cherniaev's, claimed that when 
the news reached Russia, it prompted many more to enrol. 43 A British historian at 
the time went still further, claiming ambitiously that 'the phantom of the young 
Kireef [sic] ... proved even perhaps more powerful than the sentiment for the Holy 
Shrines.,44 Whilst the potential significance of Kireev's death seems clear, it is 
important to temper this with a consideration of the manner in which it was 
reported and described at the time. The funereal speech given by the editor of the 
Orthodox Observer did not conclude with an appeal for all Russians to follow 
Kireev's example directly. In fact, despite calling Kireev's decision to go to war both 
38 'Meeting of the Slavonic Committee, 14th July,' Orthodox Observer, (August 1876), p.801. 
39 'From the Moscow Slavonic Committee', Orthodox Observer, (May 1876), p.192. 
40 'A word on the funeral of N.A. Kireev,' Orthodox Observer, (July, 1876), pp.599-600. 
41 'Funeral of Kireev,' Orthodox Observer, p.599. 
42 Dostoevsky, Writers Diary, voLl, p.557. 
43 P. H. B. Salusbury, Two Months with Cherniaev, cited in Stead, The MP for Russia, p.209. 
44 i.e. the supposed cause of the dispute which led to the outbreak of the Crimean War. A. W. 
Kinglake, The Invasion o/the Crimea, 6th Ed, {London, 1877}, p.4. 
129 
'heroic' and 'Ioving/ the editor instead asserted explicitly that not all needed to 
take up arms and leave the country, and urged them rather to consider other ways 
in which they might serve the cause.4S 
This coverage occurred at a significantly more involved level than that of the British 
Press where (it seems) Kireev's death was also reported. It would be easy to miss 
the significance of the brief note in The Times on July twenty-eighth that Ristic, the 
Serbian Prime Minister, had sent a telegraph to the Russian press informing them 
that he had 'been attending a funeral service in honour of M. Kiregeff, a Russian 
officer killed in the Servian ranks.A6 Furthermore, the inability of the British Press 
(at this time) to transliterate consistently or coherently many less familiar Russian 
names precludes any real degree of certainty about their activities. 
As interesting as the cases of these two individuals are, the primary concern of this 
study is not to consider these individuals per se, but how they were represented in 
the Press, and thence how this presentation impacted the consciousness of the 
social elites whose views can be accessed with any degree of certainty. In the case 
of Cherniaev, the level of coverage seems to suggest a relatively low level of 
interest, and there is little to suggest that this coverage would either reflect or 
precipitate a wide-spread case of popular interest. 
Volunteering and Fund-raising 
More broadly-based voluntary activity did take place. Evidently less-known figures 
will have attracted less coverage, but nonetheless enough of a picture can be 
constructed to demonstrate whether we are dealing with the sort of minority, 
factional activity that might be found for any cause, or whether there is evidence of 
the Press depicting a genuine mass movement. One of the earliest Russians to 
volunteer to fight in the Balkans of whom anything much is known was S.F. 
Sharapov. Sharapov was a student at the St. Petersburg Engineering College 
between 1873 and 1875, and spent much of his time composing constitutions and 
anonymous petitions to the Tsar. This came to an abrupt end in October 1875, 
45 'Funeral of Kireev', Orthodox Observer, p.600. 
46 The Times, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 28/7/1876, p.5, CoI.A. 
130 
when he illegally crossed the border and headed south to join the rebels. He is later 
noted as giving a speech in support of fa young Yugoslav democratic republic,' and 
became a coordinator of partisan activity before he was captured by the Hungarian 
authorities in the spring of 1876. 47 However, Suslov, the only scholar in recent years 
to turn any serious attention to Sharapov, cites police reports for these dates, not 
press articles.48 He seems to have been isolated and ignored, both at the time and 
since, and this helps us to place Sharapov's activities, however valiant, firmly in the 
category of factional action. 
Whilst the Press gave little attention to Sharapov and his comrades, this is not, of 
course, the same as asserting that there were no volunteers marching from Russia 
to Serbia in the summer of 1876. It does, however, remain questionable as to 
whether they went in any appreciable numbers. The exact number of volunteers to 
depart is a rather difficult figure to arrive at, due to the sometimes rather 
sensationalist reports and highly differing numbers given by various sources. 
Consequently, there is a clear disagreement regarding the number of volunteers 
who went: MacKenzie claims that there were no more than around 5,000, a figure 
echoed by Jelavich.49 This contrasts sharply with the contemporary reports of The 
Times, which claimed in October 1876 that 50 or 60 Russians marched to war every 
Saturday, adding to the 20,000 Russians already under arms in Serbia, a figure 
which could rise as high as 100,000 by the following spring. 50 Novikov in her 
pamphlet Is Russia Wrong? contested the figure of 9,000, implying that this was a 
common claim in London at the time, but she insisted that it was far lower, and that 
sufficient funds were only ever raised to send 4,000. 51 
As far as reportage from the Russian Press is concerned, the picture was almost 
always vague. The Voice did report on groups or individuals departing for Serbia, 
but rarely with any amount of detail being supplied, even so far as numbers of 
47 M. Suslov, 'Slavophilism is the true Liberalism: The Political Utopia of S.F. Sharapov (1855-1911),' 
Russian History, 38, 2, (2011), pp.285-6. 
48 Ibid. 
49 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Panslavism, p.122; B. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements 
1806-1914, (Cambridge, 1991), p.170. 
50 'Russia and the Russians' The Times, 24/10/1876, pA, CoI.B; 'Russia,' The Times, 10/10/1876, p.3, 
CoI.E. 
51 0 . Novikov, Is Russia Wrong? 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.26. 
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people involved.52 At other points in time, The Voice felt more able to talk 
authoritatively about the number of medical personnel going to Serbia than about 
combat volunteers, on one occasion providing a moderately detailed description of 
a 12,000 rouble medical unit that was about to depart the capital. 53 
Perhaps a better means of considering mass support is to examine the question of 
fund-raising. Substantial amounts of money were raised during the period 1875-
1878 for a variety of causes and organisations connected to the Eastern Question. 
Determining what was raised by whom, however, and indeed how discerning the 
public were in allocating their gift is problematic. Stead cites Aksakov's claim that 
Cherniaev first sought to go to Serbia in September 1875 but that it took the 
Moscow Slavonic Committee until March 1876 to raise the necessary 6,000 roubles 
required to send him. However, it is also worth keeping in mind MacKenzie's 
assertion that Cherniaev's September 1875 attempt to raise a regiment failed due 
to lack of volunteers. 54 However, MacKenzie, following Nikitin's view on the matter, 
puts the figure raised by the Slavonic Committee up until the Spring of 1876 at a 
significantly higher 70,000 roubles.55 This, surely, cannot have been devoted solely 
to the travel costs of Cherniaev. Documentary evidence for the levels of giving 
available is, somewhat paradoxically, both excessive, and insubstantial at the same 
time. The Voice ran a series of reports, in a miniscule font which almost defies 
legibility, quite literally listing donations given to various funds, sometimes stating 
explicitly what the fund was, and sometimes providing little more than a line such 
as 'for the victims of the conflagration.,56 There were also occasions where multiple 
lists of donations appeared in the press on the same day, one of which might simply 
be 'collections from the readers of The Voice,' whilst another was a publication of 
the wider fund-raising by the St. Petersburg section of the Siavon ic Benevolent 
Committee.57 In addition to these lists, published in the daily Press, there were also 
accounts published in the August 1876 edition of the Orthodox Herald, which 
52 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (19/6) 1/7/1876, p.4, CoLe. 
S3 The Voice, 'Internal news,' (27/8) 8/9/1876, p.2, Col. E. 
S4 Stead, The MP for Russia, p.229; MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, p.58. 
ss MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in practice,' p.281. 
S6 The Voice, 'Home News,' (25/6) 7/10/1875, p.3, Co1.2. 
57 The Voice, 'Home News,' (9) 27/11/1875, p.2, CoI.B. 
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reported from the July meeting of the Moscow Slavonic committee, giving a 
particular eye to the financial details of the society. 58 
Time Period Funds Raised (in roubles) Monthly Average ( in roubles) 
September - December 1875 68,834 17,209 
January - May 1876 54,123 10,825 
June 1876 28A96 28A96 
Total (To end June 1876) 151A53 15,145 
Table 1: Fund-raising totals for the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee: Sep 1875 
June 187659 
As the secretary to the committee noted, these figures represented a steady 
income through the autumn, averaging a little over 17,000 roubles per month, 
which dropped by 35% as a monthly average for the opening few months of 1876. It 
was June 1876 in which the donation figures truly exploded, with a startling 28A96r 
41 kopeks being received in the course of a single month.6o The Voice first began to 
publish donation figures at the end of summer 1875. These reports came in the 
(Home News' section, often as the last item, appeared in a small type-face, and 
generally lacked an introduction. By the end of September, the St Petersburg 
branch of the Slavonic Benevolent committee had raised around a thousand 
roubles, whilst a week or so later, The Voice itself had raised just over two thousand 
roubles directly.61 A more detailed picture of the accounts of specific organisations, 
such as the Slavonic Benevolent Committee, has been considered by Nikitin.62 
However, the figures used here are an indication of what was publically available in 
the Press at the time. Indeed, this is the problem with assertions such as those of 
MacKenzie that, even at the beginning of 1876, (almost 360,000 roubles had been 
sent to Hercegovina,' from across the Empire. He does not explain how this figure 
58 'Meeting of the Slavonic Committee, 14th July' Orthodox Observer, (August 1876), pp.798-803. 
59 All figures taken from 'Meeting of the Slavonic Committee,' p.80l. 
60 Ibid. 
61 The Voice, 'Home News,' (17) 28/9/1875, p.2, CoI.D; (25/9) 7/10/1875, p.3, CoI.B. 
62 A.S. Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858-1876 godakh, (Moscow, 1960). 
133 
was arrived at, nor whether anyone at the time would have been aware of the 
amount.63 
Aside from the purely monetary aspect of the donations, they illuminate other 
aspects of popular support. Although certain organisations or individuals are listed 
giving large lump sums, many of the donations reported in The Voice are from much 
smaller groups or individuals, and for smaller amounts. Thus it seems possible, 
albeit within the narrow category of newspaper-reading St. Petersburg society, to 
assert the existence of a genuine, popular interest in Balkan events. Even in the 
reduced type-face adopted for these announcements, the lists of donors, typically 
appearing at monthly intervals, took up mUltiple columns of the paper. Given that 
half of The Voice/s eight pages were typically given over to advertising - a 
proportion that was, presumably, fixed for commercial viability - the devotion of as 
much as half of the remaining four pages represents a significant investment by the 
editors. Reproducing the same information at full-size would have taken up 
significantly more room at a time when there was a flurry of activity on the 
international political, diplomatic and even military scene, all clamouring for 
attention. Furthermore, there seems to have been little more than convention 
requiring the publication of these lists, and thus the very fact that The Voice 
organised the collections implicitly entailed an acceptance of the responsibility to 
publically acknowledge those who had contributed. 
Slavonic Fraternity 
Aside from simply reporting fund-raising figures, it has already been remarked that 
The Voice initially adopted a somewhat lukewarm attitude towards the events in 
the Balkans. 64 There was a significant amount of reportage regarding the Serbo-
Turkish war and the build-up to it, but this had generally taken the form of 
straightforward description, rather than detailed analysis or editorial comment. 
From the summer of 1877, however, it did begin to contribute to the media aspect 
of the Slavonic movement in others ways. Perhaps the key figure in the 
development of this reportage was the law professor and historian A.D. Gradovskii. 
63 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Panslavism, p.73. 
64 See above, pp.12S-127. 
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Very much a man of Alexander II's era, Gradovskii considered the Russia which 
emerged after the 'Great Reforms' of the 1860s to be a more nationally united 
state in which the former Siavophil - Westerniser debates had no place. 65 In his 
writings, he generally held to a strong nationalistic line, attributing the decline of 
Kievan Rus' to an influx of too many foreigners. 66 This said, he should not be taken 
for a violent racist, at least by the standards of his time. For example, he criticised 
Dostoevskii's particular brand of nationalism, accusing him of attempting to 
appropriate solely for Russia, 'virtues which were European, or even universal to 
mankind.,67 Gradovskii's main contribution at The Voice was to pen a series of 
appeals 'for the Slavs.,6B These were editorial style pieces in which Gradovskii freely 
used terms like 'historic mission' to describe Russia's place in the unfolding series of 
events.69 He also claimed a place of expertise for Russia, such as in his 'letter to 
Disraeli' which portrayed Russia as the one who 'knew the Slavs.,7o Although he 
never reached Dostoevskii's heights in asserting Russia's right to seize 
Constantinople, he provided a strong note of Slavonic conviction in an otherwise 
decidedly less than tUb-thumping publication, throughout the summer of 1876.71 
Aside from the activity he urged upon others, Gradovskii also attested to the 
amount of activity already taking place, asking rhetorically, if so much had been 
done already just because of a 'rumour of war. What on earth would happen in the 
event of an actual war?'72 
Unsurprisingly, the Slavonic theme, and particularly the idea of fraternity between 
Russians and other Orthodox peoples, enjoyed a period of popularity in the 
religious journals. The Orthodox Observer produced a series of pieces entitled 
'Slavism and Orthodoxy' in the autumn of 1876.73 Even bearing in mind the 
65 H. Rogger, 'Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,' Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol4, No3, (April, 1962), p.261. 
66 J. W. Slocum, 'Who, and When, were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the category of "aliens" in 
Imperial Russia,' Russian Review, Vol57, N02, (April, 1998), p.184. 
67 H. Kohn, 'Dostoevsky's Nationalism,' Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol6, No4, (Oct, 1945), p.4ll. 
68 The Voice, 'For the Slavs,' (8) 20/7/1876, p.l, CoI.A, and afterwards. 
69 Ibid. 
70 The Voice, (3) 15/8/1876. 
71 See below for Dostoevsky, p142. 
72 The Voice, 'For the Slavs,' (8) 20/7/1876, p.l, CoI.A. 
73 'Slavism and Orthodoxy,' The Orthodox Observer, (November 1876), pp.523-538. 
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limitations of timing suffered by journals versus newspapers, it still seems that the 
Orthodox Observer was lagging somewhat behind the conventionally accepted 
timeframe for the peak of the Slavonic movement?4 It must be noted that this was 
not the first time that the journal had published on the Slavonic question, with 
appeals for aid having been a regular feature throughout the spring. 75 However, the 
autumn does see a discernable change in the nature of the articles which were 
published, hence the importance of timing. The October edition of the publication 
saw a recounting of the farewell speech given by Archbishop Platon of the Don to a 
group of Don Cossacks about to set off for Serbia?6 Aside from standard words of 
well-wishing and a warning of the misfortunes and privations these volunteers were 
likely to see, the Archbishop's address is most notable for his attitude to their 
future activities. He issues to the volunteers a strict reminder that 'you are not 
going to fight with Turks and kill them, but to help and protect your brother Slavs.,77 
Whilst an attempt to limit violence by a man of the cloth is hardly unsurprising, the 
fact that he spoke to volunteer soldiers with an exhortation that 'if you must clash 
with the enemy' be brave and noble, should at least be of interest. 78 The Siavism 
and Orthodoxy articles were significant in that they marked a change from short 
pieces recounting events of the Slavonic Committee or speeches by leading clergy, 
and moved for the first time towards a more extended, editorial-style piece. 
As far as the content of the articles go, the first at least is largely unremarkable, 
alternating between deriding the Turks for their behaviour, and the West for 
approving of the Turks' acts. 79 Turkish behaviour in the war, the author claimed, 
went well beyond the simple horrors of contemporary warfare, and instead the 
troops conduct themselves 'with all the terrors of the barbarians.,8o After further 
noting a comment from a Turkish writer that 'the true believer must not let slip an 
opportunity to kill an infidel,' the author then turns his attention to the West, 
74 See above pp.54-S9 for a consideration of the relative characteristics of journals and newspapers. 
75 'From the Slavonic Committee' Orthodox Observer, (February 1876) pp.397-398, (May 1876), 
pp.191-193, (July 1876), pp.S98-S99. 
76 'Speech to the Don Cossacks, departing for Serbia', Orthodox Observer, (October 1876), pp.406-
408. 
77 Ibid., p.407. 
78 Ibid., p.407. 
79 'Slavism and Orthodoxy', Orthodox Observer, (November 1876), pp.S23-S38. 
80 Ibid., p.S28. 
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questioning how they are able to remain deaf to all the horrors which unfold?81 For 
the most part, the article does not venture beyond simple criticism of others and a 
representation of the Orthodox world as embattled. A few significant points are 
made, however, such as the assertion that what goes on in Serbia is every inch 
Russia's problem, not because Russian blood has now been spilt there, but because 
they are co-religionist brothers.82 
Moving beyond the printed world, there was of course other activity at this time, 
albeit often harder to pinpoint and to define. Various sources attest to soirees 
thrown by the great and the good of Russian society at the time, in order to raise 
funds for the Slavonic cause. Many have noted the significance of the Tsarevich, the 
future Alexander III, during this period: a figure whose interest in the crisis is often 
remarked upon, and is generally seen as having provided important support for the 
Slavonic cause. 83 Despite this, his involvement has rarely been considered in detail, 
and his personal papers have been neglected by specialists until Astankov's recent 
work.84 Astankov concedes that it is difficult to determine the role of Alexander 
Alexandrovich at this time, whether it be as an active participant in a movement, or 
as the leader.85 It is known that one of the most significant of the various pro-
Slavonic soirees of this period was held at Petergof, the Imperial Palace a few miles 
outside St Petersburg, in August 1876. This party, hosted by the Tsarevich, not only 
raised an estimated 80,000 francs, but also witnessed various readings of 
Turgenev's Croquet at Windsor, despite that fact that this piece had been refused 
publication by the censor.86 Furthermore, Alexander Alexandrovich's 
correspondence shows an acute awareness of the political position at the time, as 
he wrote to his uncle the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaievich, and to Ignatiev (the 
ambassador in Constantinople) urging that war be declared as soon as possible. 87 
The Empress, Maria Alexandrovna, was at this time patronising the Russian Red 
81 Ibid., pp.529, 531. 
82 Ibid., p.523. 
83 MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, p.93. 
84 
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Cross, and as such receiving donations of money, clothes and medicine for the sick 
and wounded, not only from St Petersburg society, but also from sources as far-
flung as J. Lewis Farley and the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey.88 This 
activity provides a sharp contrast with Alexander Alexandrovich, who was confiding 
to his closest confidantes his fears and anger at his own inability to shape policy and 
occasionally allowing his anger to spillover into racist diatribes against the non 
ethnic-Russian members of his father's government, such as when he told his wife 
that eighty million Russians wanted war, but not the finance minister Reutern, 
adding 'the Devil take that foul German !,89 All in all then, the evidence from within 
Russia does seem to be pointing towards a significant amount of activity, albeit 
often of an unquantifiable nature. 
Russia in the eyes of the World 
A fuller discussion will now follow of European, and specifically British, views of 
Russia's involvement in the crisis. Although the theme has already been touched 
upon to an extent, this direct consideration of how the British Press portrayed 
Russia at this time raises certain questions of the cultural context. 90 However, for 
the moment it must be recalled that there was a substantial current of Russophobia 
within many elements of articulate British society, and that British reportage of 
Russia during this period must therefore be viewed with this in mind. 
As already noted, The Times gave figures for the numbers of volunteers which 
considerably exceed those given by many modern-day historians. Indeed, they felt 
able to talk of 'the Russo-Servian army' when describing the Serb armed forces. 91 
This line, that the Serbian army was substantially comprised of Russian subjects, 
and indeed, as was noted above, the notion that Russia was in effect carrying on a 
war by proxy, was not a position held solely by The Times. In early 1877, Lord Derby 
echoed the sentiment himself in the House of Lords, an action sufficiently 
provocative to draw a letter from the pen of Cherniaev himself. The letter, written 
88 League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, Letters etc., Relating to Operations of the Society, pp.37-
39. 
89 Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' pp.130-131. 
90 For a fuller discussion, see below, p178 and after. 
91 'Russia' The Times, 10/10/1876, p.3, CoI.E. 
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in French, was published, untranslated, in its entirety. In it, he expressed his 
'surprise' at Derby's assertion that the Serbian army was 'almost entirely' Russian 
and that, as such, Russia was indeed participating in the war although not 
formally.92 As a riposte, Cherniaev asserted that he had, under his command, a 
mere 1,806 soldiers and 646 officers who were Russian volunteers and that he 
could provide the paperwork for all of them. Indeed, he claimed, his entire force 
only numbered 28,000, scarcely allowing for the thousands upon thousands of 
Russian volunteers ascribed to him.93 There are, of course, problems with this 
argument; Cherniaev himself asserts that the troop figures he gives are for 'the 
present moment' allowing for a somewhat higher number who had previously 
joined but had since been killed, invalided out of action, or simply changed their 
minds. Furthermore, the fact that he can provide paperwork for some soldiers does 
nothing to prove the absence of other soldiers. However, none of this is sufficient 
to assert positively the existence of a larger corps of volunteers, simply to conclude 
the insufficiency of Cherniaev's rebuttal. 
Aside from Cherniaev himself, The Times also made regular reference to the 
presence of Russian volunteers in the Serbian army, often in tandem with their 
articles regarding the location and activity of Cherniaev himself. However, these 
references were generally too abstract and brief to permit any meaningful 
discussion, or any conclusions to be drawn from them about the extent of the 
Russian presence within the Serbian forces. The notion of Russians as part of the 
Serbian military had begun to permeate the consciousness of educated British 
society, as can be seen by the way in which Russia was talked about by those 
considering the Balkans at this time. 
An interesting case in this respect is Gladstone. Although very much an inhabitant 
of the milieu described above, with all its attendant Russophobe propensities, 
Gladstone himself was not one of these figures. In one of the earliest speeches he 
made on the Eastern Question at this time, he harked back to the Crimean War and 
made reference to the 'designs dangerous to the peace of Europe which it was 
92 The Times, 'General Tcherniaeff on the Servian Army,' 24/2/1877, p.7, CoI.F. 
93 Ibid. 
139 
believed were entertained by Russia,' a belief which he implicitly did not share.94 In 
fact, perhaps the most significant observation which can be made about 
Gladstone's attitude to Russia is the fact that it was a further year before he made 
any significant reference to Russia in his speeches, rising once again to address the 
House and mocking the notion that a grand conspiracy was unfolding, 
(masterminded by the formidable foursome of Bismarck, Alexander II, Gladstone 
and Disraeli), to unseat the Sultan, and replace him with the Duke of Edinburgh. 95 
Whilst this notion was laughable, if only for the supposed partners in crime it 
proposed, the more significant fact would seem to be that Gladstone had managed 
to lead his entire 'atrocities campaign' against Ottoman Turkey and the violence 
being carried out in Bulgaria, with scarcely a mention of Russia. 
Gladstone had been in correspondence throughout much of this time with Olga 
Novikov, the outspoken advocate of the Russian cause living in London. They first 
met in October of 1876 and exchanged letters throughout much of the winter of 
1876-77.96 Given that this was the same period in which Novikov began her 
correspondence with the English Press, defending Russia and culminating in the 
publication of her pamphlet Is Russia Wrong?, it seems incredible that Gladstone 
can have been so oblivious to the widespread suspicion with which Russia was 
regarded in Britain, or of the degree to which Russia was viewed as being 
inseparable from the Eastern Question.97 Novikov's pamphlet attempted to address 
some of the issues which had seemingly passed Gladstone by: the opening chapter 
cited a piece of advice from Salisbury urging the British people to buy large-scale 
maps in order to see the distance between Russia and India.98 Consequently, it is 
possible to discern a strengthening current of suspicion (or worse) towards Russia 
in the latter part of 1876 and into 1877. 
In the opening months of the crisis, publications such as The Times had been more 
concerned with Russian activities in Turkestan than the Balkans, and confident that 
94 Gladstone to the House of Commons, 9/2/1876, Gladstone Papers, Add.Ms.44664. 
95 Gladstone to the House of Commons, 17/2/1877, Ibid. 
96 Foot & Matthew, (Eds.), Gladstone Diaries, vol IX, pp. 164-166, 168, 169, 172, 175, 183. 
97 Stead, The MP for Russia, p.303, 327, 400. 
98 Novikov, Is Russia Wrong? p.19. More detailed consideration will be given to Novikov's work in 
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these posed no particular threat to British interests. 99 However, as events 
progressed, the assertions of Russian intentions to comply with international 
consensus became more and more scarce, giving way to incredulous examinations 
of Russian policy and disbelief at the words her actions belied. loo Increasingly, 
Russian denial was seen as 'unconvincing,' and her military activity and sabre-
rattling were the principal 'obstacle' to peace being secured. lOl Considering the 
Russian perspective along with the British, it is possible to be a little more precise 
about what was happening and the nature of the enthusiasm for the movement. 
The whole idea of Slavonic fraternity and, more specifically, the intense activity 
which supported that idea, seems to have been primarily a Moscow activity, which 
only later spread to St Petersburg in force. This can be seen in various forms, such 
as the simple fact that although St Petersburg was the capital of Russia at this time, 
it was consistently the Moscow Slavonic Committee which was the prime mover in 
important events. The St Petersburg branch of the Slavonic Committee only really 
became a significant organisation during this crisis, and although its fund-raising 
was not insubstantial, it was always dwarfed by the activities of its Moscow 
counterpart. It is a considerable leap, however, to move from this confidence that 
the movement spread (however slowly) from Moscow to Petersburg, to drawing 
any real conclusions as to whether this spread towa rds the capital mirrored a 
similar spread in opinion and influence from the people towards the government. 
One major factor which undermines any notion of a government swept along by 
the inflamed masses is noted by Dostoevskii: all Russians at this time who wished to 
leave the country were required to apply for a specific passport for that very 
purpose. Therefore, Dostoevskii questioned how the government could have been 
coerced, or even taken unawares, by the floods of volunteers, when they 
themselves had openly issued the passports which made the very expedition 
possible.lo2 Even if we accept at face value MacKenzie's assertion that when 
99 Letters to the Editor, The Times, 9/7/1875, p.8, CoLB; 13/7/1875, p.12, CoLB; 21/7/1875, p.ll, 
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100 E.g. 'The Eastern Problem', The Times, 29/12/1876, p.4, CaLF. 
101 'Russia' The Times, 4/12/1876, p.5, CoLB, 'The Protocols, The Times, 22/3/1877, p.9, CoLA. 
102 Dostoevsky, Writers Diary, vol2, p.l085. 
141 
Cherniaev left Russia, his visa was for a visit to Palestine and that Alexander" had 
already instructed the 3rd section that he was not to be allowed to join the 
Hercegovinan rebels, it is clear that this concern on the Tsar's part apparently did 
not extend to the thousands of volunteers who later embarked to join him. 103 
Russian Literature and the Eastern Question 
The links between the Eastern Crisis and Russian literature are strong, both in terms 
of the impact that the Crisis had upon Russian writers at the time, and in terms of 
the impact that their literary writings have had upon perceptions of the crisis since. 
Tolstoi is far from the only significant literary figure in Russia to have turned his 
attention to the Eastern Question, and his views were not shared by all: In the 
second section of his June Diary, Dostoevskii launched into a full-scale discussion of 
the Eastern Question with the observation (Again a tussle with Europe ... again in 
Europe they are looking mistrustfully at Russia.,lo4 This makes it all the more 
remarkable that the words of the passage should have had such an impact, both in 
terms of the relative paucity of their exposure, and in terms of the context in which 
the characters are depicted. This was not the first time that a work of Tolstoi's had 
accomplished such a feat; indeed Lieven has noted that (War and Peace has had 
more influence on popular perceptions of Napoleon's defeat by Russia than all the 
history books ever written.,lOS 
The other notable member of the Russian literati to concern himself with the 
events of the crisis was Ivan Turgenev who produced the short, highly political 
poem, Croquet at Windsor. Turgenev's poem has been described as a particularly 
remarkable piece by Zekulin, who notes that it is unusual both as a poem from a 
novelist who (despised his own poetry' and as a political piece from a man who 
habitually (subordinate[d] politics to his arts.' It was also adopted as the anthem of 
the Panslavists yet the author (rejected categorically' Panslavism. 106 
103 MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice,' p.282. 
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The writings and attitudes of the three writers differ widely. Although he would 
later discuss the flow of cash and volunteers to the peninsula, Dostoevskii's 
discussion is framed in terms of foreign hostility to Russia. For Dostoevskii, his 
interest in the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula is natural, because Russia is the 
'protector and guardian' of Orthodoxy.107 Count Tolstoi, the historian of 'the placid, 
middle-stratum Moscow landowning family,' offers a more self-absorbed 
consideration of the motives and feelings of the Russian populace, which depicts 
many characters from Moscow society bustling round on behalf of the Slavonic 
cause, something which he does not seem to be doing simply to publicise the 
movement, given the popular antipathy which he attributes to it. lOB Indeed, 
Countess Vronskaya remarks to Koznyshev that her chief fear for her son in his 
Balkan adventure is that the whole enterprise 'is not very favourably regarded in 
Petersburg.,109 Lastly, Turgenev directs a stream of furious invective at Great 
Britain, and specifically at Queen Victoria, for British passivity over the 
humanitarian crisis in Bulgaria. llo 
An interesting comparison can be drawn from the differences between the writers' 
differing accounts of the volunteers' departure for Serbia. Although Tolstoi's 
account seems, from the perspective of nearly 150 years, to be virtually 
contemporary, in fact there was almost a year between the events fictionalised and 
their publication. This time period is significant, both in terms of the apparent 
mood of the country, and in terms of the direction of official policy. In the Summer 
of 1876, the Slav cause in the Balkans focused on the Serbo-Turkish conflict and, at 
least in Tolstoi's view, whilst it may have had some support among the People, it 'ce 
n'est pas tres bien vu a Petersburg.,l11 By the spring of 1877, on the other hand, 
Russia was undertaking a full-scale military invasion of Turkey which would 
eventually be stopped only a few miles from the outskirts of Constantinople and 
required a full-scale Congress of the Great Powers to fully pacify. 
107 Dostoevsky, Writers Diary, vol.l, p.529 
108 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, vol2, p.851. 
109 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.918. 
110 Zekulin, 'Turgenev's kroket v Vindzore,' p.197. 
111 lils not very well viewed in Petersburg" the line was written in French in the original Russian 
version of the novel, and remains so in many translations. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.918. 
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Therefore, whilst Tolstoi was only able to provide a single sketch of the volunteers 
and to depict them as personalities (not particularly endearing personalities, as has 
already been noted), Dostoevskii is able to return on various occasions to the issue 
of the volunteers, and to offer his rebuttals to those who claimed that they were 
little more than 'lost souls who had nothing to do at home.,1l2 Turgenev, busy with 
Queen Victoria's nightmares, had nothing to say in his poem about Russian 
volunteers, despite noting privately that, were he younger, he would himself go and 
fight. l13 This was a far from uncommon theme amongst the artistic community at 
the time, with the writer Vsevolod Garshin and the painter Vasily Polenov both 
serving in the Balkans.1l4 Garshin was not, technically, one of the volunteers as he 
was refused a visa to travel on account of his liability to serve in the Russian army, a 
liability which was invoked and ultimately saw him fighting in Bulgaria with the 
Russian army.llS However, his outspoken comments on the fact that 'the Turks 
have butchered 30,000 defenceless old men, women and children' before the war 
and his string of invective pieces afterwards, which were censored as 'tendentious, 
harmful and anti-patriotic,' leave no doubt as to his opinions.1l6 Sadly, little of what 
has been written on Garshin has concerned itself with h is involvement in the Russo-
Turkish war, most writers concerning themselves instead with the mental illness 
which afflicted the writer and characterised the fan cult which surrounded him in 
his later years.1l7 
In the light of Dostoevskii's decision to engage with the novel on this topic, it next 
needs to be established how exactly the two texts can be considered. The crux of 
the argument between Dostoevskii and Tolstoi here (at least in Dostoevskii's eyes, 
as it was he who chose to frame the argument), concerns 'the People,' as noted in 
112 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, vol1, p.600. 
113 Zekulin, 'Turgenenv's Kroket v Vindzore,' p.200. 
114 Polunov, Russia in the nineteenth Century, p.167. 
115 P. Henry, A Hamlet of his Time: Vsevolod Garshin: the man, his works and his milieu, (Oxford, 
1983) p.37. 
116 Ib·d I ., pp.37, 52. 
117 R.D. Wessling, 'Vsevolod Garshin, the Russian Intelligentsia, and Fan Hysteria,' in A. Brintlinger 
and I Vinitsky, Madness and the Mad in Russian Culture, (Toronto, 2007), p.7s. 
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chapter 1 and this is what we see played out here between Dostoevskii and 
I . 118 To stor. 
In the final chapters of Anna KareninaJ Koznyshev (ineptly aided by Katavasov) 
confronts Levin whilst, at the same time, stepping back a level, Dostoevskii 
confronts Tolstoi (whose views he sees largely articulated in the words of Levin). 
Koznyshev's argument is the well-known position, that (the movement' of the 
summer of 1876 was a genuine one and that the People, as a whole, were making 
(an expression of human, Christian feeling.,11g Levin, by contrast, was angered at 
the notion of Christian feeling expressing itself through violence, something which 
would doubtless resonate well with the former British Prime Minister Lord Russell, 
who was quoted in The Times in October 1876 advocating (Christian precepts more 
than Christian Faith.,120 Levin felt that, if there was such violence, it could only 
come during a war and asked sarcastically, ((who has declared war on Turkey? Ivan 
Ivanich Ragozov and the Countess Lydia Ivanovna, assisted by Madame Stahl?"121 
This naming of figures identified with the Slavonic Committees was evidently a 
sarcastic gesture, but the fact remains that, for Levin, and it seems for Tolstoi, war 
is an action beyond the jurisdiction of the individual, confined to the competence of 
the state. 
Dostoevskii countered this, both with the observation that war had, of course, been 
declared by Milan of Serbia and Nicholas of Montenegro and, more pertinently, 
that (the Great Russian and general cause' was a human one, not a political one. 122 
Whilst Dostoevskii's observation that the volunteers were merely contributing to an 
existing war, not starting their own private conflict, probably deals more directly 
with Levin's question, Tolstoi opts, instead, to have him answered by Katavasov 
who asserts that (when the Government does not fulfil the will of its citizens, then 
society announces its own will,,123 This provoked a further debate between the 
various parties regarding the question of whether or not the People truly 
118 See above, p17. 
119 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.949. 
120 'Lord Russell on Russia and Turkey,' The Times 6/10/1876, P.7, CoI.F. 
121 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.948. 
122 Dostoevsky, Writers Diary, vol.2, p.l082. 
123 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.949. 
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understood the matters at stake and whether they could thus be considered to 
have an opinion on things. Levin seizes upon the nebulousness of the term 'People' 
and asserts: 
Clerks in district offices, schoolmasters, and one out of a thousand peasants, 
may know what it is all about. The rest of the eighty millions, like 
Mikhaylich, not only don't express their will, but have not the least idea 
what it is they have to express it about! What right have we then to say it is 
the will of the People?124 
For Tolstoi, this is largely where the argument ends, with Levin having the final say, 
alone in the safety of his head. For Dostoevskii, however, it was necessary to 
consider Russia's long history of Crusades and Pilgrimages, arriving at a conclu sion 
that although the vast majority of Russians were doubtless ignorant of the intricate 
details of what went on in Serbia or Bulgaria, they nonetheless knew that 'the holy 
places and all the Eastern Christians who live in them have long been under the ru Ie 
of godless Agarians, Mohammedans and Turks.,125 More to the point, it was 
because of the knowledge that they 'feel afflicted at heart,' that Dostoevskii was 
able to assert that the outpouring of emotion of the previous summer was 
genuine.126 
Perhaps the weakest point in Tolstoi's case, and undoubtedly the moment at which 
Dostoevskii is convinced he stumbles, is when he has Levin say 'there is not, and 
cannot be any immediate feeling of compassion for the oppression of the Slavs.,127 
As Dostoevskii points out, this statement was written and published at a time when 
the various atrocity reports from the Balkans had largely been established in the 
public eye as both accurate and shocking. 128 Thus, for a father such as Levin to deny 
even the possibility of compassion, on hearing of children having their fingers cut-
off one-by-one in front of their parents, or being deliberately blinded by needles, 
124 Ib'd I ., p.951. 
125 Dostoevsky, Writers Diary, vol2., p.l088. 
126 Ibid., voI2., p.1088. 
127 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, p.949. 
128 See above, esp. pp.98-102. 
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comes across as positively baffling.129 It would seem, then, that it is possible to 
conclude that Tolstoi (or at any rate Levin) goes too far when he dismisses any 
possibility of the existence of a feeling of compassion for the Slavs on the part of 
the Russian People. However, it is worth pondering who exactly Tolstoi and 
Dostoevskii are referring to; Levin seems to be making a categorical statement, 
inclusive of all people, but based on his observations of his own obshestvo. By 
contrast, Dostoevskii is clearly speaking of the narod, or at least of his own 
romanticised notions thereof, when he asserts that there is genuine feeling, and 
that the people are more than simply 'inert, drunken taxation units.,130 To an extent 
then, the two writers are talking at cross-purposes referring to different sections of 
society, but each using their chosen section as shorthand for the whole. 
The chronology of the crisis (in terms of how it was perceived in Russia) is 
particularly significant as an insight into the contrasting ways in which the two 
writers related to it. Dostoevskii claims, in March 1877, that the previous June had 
been 'an impassioned and a glorious time,' a statement which perhaps implies that 
such heights of ecstasy had already been decidedly lost. 131 As has already been 
noted, the spring of 1875 seems to have been a particularly lucrative time in terms 
of the amounts of funds raised for the Slavonic cause, our most reliable barometer 
of interest. However, the question of what happened later is more of a grey area. In 
February 1877, Dostoevskii was insisting that, although the movement had been 
'denied' by some during the winter, it had nonetheless continued unabated. 132 
However, this contrasts with an apparent stagnation of donations, volunteers, and 
(generally speaking) activity in the Balkans. 
The Shape of Government Policy 
Having considered a selection of the various forms of public activity in Russia on the 
part of the Slavonic cause, as well as the ways in which it was presented in the 
Russian Press at that time, it is worthwhile briefly considering Russian government 
129 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, vol2., pp.l094-95 
130 Ibid., Vol2, p.932. 
131 Ibid., vol2, p.889. 
132 Ibid., Vol2, p.852. 
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policy in an attempt to discern how far it was affected by these various influences. 
Regardless of what public opinion might do in Russia, the key figure in all policy-
making remained the Tsar. An example that is often called to mind when 
considering Alexander II and public opinion is his widely-publicised comment at the 
time of the emancipation, that it would be better to abolish serfdom from above 
than to wait for it to be abolished from below.133 This would seem to suggest that 
Alexander might have been induced to act if he genuinely believed that a loss of law 
and order was imminent. In this vein, we can see that some key figures in the 
government seem to have regarded the movement in 1876 as having been (at least 
potentially) a genuine threat to government stability. Pobedonostsev, a man who 
was far from being fond of popular movements, urged the government in October 
1876 to 'seize the leadership of this wave of nationalism and direct it against a 
foreign enemy, or face the likelihood that the movement would turn against the 
state, first in distrust and then in enmity.,134 The notoriously autocratic Alexander III 
once remarked to his foreign minister that 'public support for the regime's foreign 
policy was politically crucial,,135 Likewise, at the height of this crisis, the future 
Alexander III received a letter of warning from his close advisor Pobedonostsev, 
which asserted that so much excitement had already blown up, that if 'failure and 
shame' were to result abroad, then the anger would turn inwards against the 
government.136 
The important question, then, is to what extent these views were allowed to 
actually influence the government's policy. Before any factors can be identified in 
affecting the position of the government, it is first necessary to identify what the 
government's position was. As early as August 1875, Alexander II had authorised a 
collection for the population of Bosnia and Hercegovina, at the request of the 
Petersburg Slavonic Committee.137 This was followed in September by the 
133 Polunov, Russia in the nineteenth Century, p.92. 
134 Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, p.123. 
135 D. Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present, 
(London, 2003), p.282. 
136 Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' pp.129. 
137 Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut Siavianovedeniia, Rossia i Vostanie v Bosnii i Gercegovine 
1875-1878: dokumenti, (Moskva, 2008), p.1Sl. - Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Slavonic 
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allocation of an impressive thirty thousand roubles for the provision of bread to 
refugees. 138 Thus, although these efforts are entirely humanitarian, it is clear that 
from the outset the government was acutely aware and actively involved in the 
events of the crisis. Furthermore, in mid-October, Mezentsov, the head of the 3rd 
section, sent the Tsar a letter saying that it was felt by 'many serious people' that 
the continued activities of the Slavonic committee would give rise to the impression 
in Western Europe that despite her official policy of non-interference, Russia was 
providing the materials to prolong the insurrection.139 This should provide, if it were 
needed, clear evidence that both the Tsar and the senior figures around him were 
well aware that their actions might lead others to question the sincerity of their 
formal pronouncements regarding Russian neutrality. 
It is also possible to see clearly that both the Tsar and Chancellor Gorchakov 
remained well aware of the political goings on in the Balkans well into the following 
spring, an example of which can be seen in a Telegram received by Gorchakov from 
Kartsov in Belgrade, detailing a Serbian proposal for Bosnia to be placed under 
Serbian control and Hercegovina under Montenegrin.140 The surviving copy of this 
telegram carries a margin note from Alexander II expressing his personal 
agreeability to the idea, coupled with doubts regarding its practicality.141 From 
these few snapshots, a picture forms of a government that was engaged with the 
crisis; if not before factional interests such as the Slavonic Committee, then 
certainly long before the Eastern Question supposedly became a mass 
phenomenon in the summer of 1876. What there is not, at this stage, is any 
indication that Russian politicians regarded war as a likely occurrence. 
With the outbreak of the Serbo-Turkish war in 1876, the correspondence continued 
to flow thick and fast between Russian diplomats and, once again, the pen of the 
138 Ibid., p.1S1. 
139 'Report notes from the representatives of the 3rd section from chancellor N.V. Mezentsov to 
Alexander" about the takings donated to the Moscow Slavonic committee for the uses of the 
families of the insurgents in Bosnia and Hercegovina' - Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, p.1S1. 
140 Telegram from Kartsov to Gorchakov on the request from Serbian Prince Milan Obrenovic on the 
possibility of transferring Bosnia to the control of Serbia, and Hercegovina to Montenegro, Russia 
and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina, p.281. 
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Tsar can be spotted agreeing, for example, with suggestions that Beust had stirred 
up the Vienna press towards an (English' attitude. 142 Far more significant, however, 
is a telegram from Ignatiev to Gorchakov, sent in October 1876, (precisely the time 
when even Dostoevskii would have to concede a wide-spread (denial' of the 
popular movement in the public sphere.)143 It is in this telegram, coming at a quiet 
point in the general hubbub about the Slavonic question, that Gorchakov first urges 
the necessity of Russian mobilisation. l44 This mobilisation, he argues, will be 
necessary regardless of the outcome of any talks in Constantinople, in order for the 
Russians to secure their interests in Bulgaria. Furthermore, it comes not as part of a 
plan for the liberation of all Slavdom, but with a ready acknowledgement of the 
practicalities of international politics: (us in Bulgaria, and if necessary, the Austrians 
in Bosnia.,145 However necessary this admission may have been in the world of 
diplomacy, it provides a clear indication that the first call for engaging the Russian 
military, approved by Alexander, was not the act of a government buckling, or even 
acquiescing, to the mob, but a cold political calculation. It is around this time, (i.e. 
the late autumn of 1876) that Russia began to make the logistical preparations 
necessary for a campaign in the Balkans, setting two separate organisations to work 
on preparing the telegraph and postal links which would be required. 146 
Despite assertions by figures such as Geyer that the government exhibited an 
(increasing desire not to resist society during this time of crisis' there is little to 
suggest that this was in fact what the government desired.147 Whilst there is 
probably much to be said for the view, articulated in The Times, that Russia had 
largely (stumbled' into war step-by-step, even a slight scratching of the surface 
shows clearly a government that was involved in the events of the crisis 
142 'Report from E.P. Novikov to A.M. Gorchakov on the attittude of J. Andrassy regarding the 
Austro-Hungarian refusal to fight in the Balkans and his satisfaction with the Reichstadt agreement,' 
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throughout.148 Although the Russians had not completely abandoned themselves to 
blind fate, many figures (such as Milyutin) were prepared to pronounce solemnly 
that 'Russia's honour forbids us to stand about any longer with lowered guns just 
for the sake of peace.,149 
Conclusion 
Although the popular imagination seems to draw rather more from Tolstoi and 
rather less from fact than is to be recommended, it does seem that there is enough 
evidence to conclude that a genuine public movement on behalf of the Slavonic 
cause did exist in Russia in 1876. In many respects, this movement experienced a 
far more moderated depiction in the contemporary Russian Press than has often 
been implied, with much of the enthusiasm being reported through the newspapers 
of rival nations such as Britain, where there was a specific political interest in 
suggesting the notion of an active and well-planned Russian scheme for Balkan 
hegemony. Indeed, once again, it is possible to see the far broader spectre of 
Russophobia in Britain influencing the depiction of events at the time, and thus the 
perception passed down to history. 
This cause was no doubt helped by partisans of the Slavonic movement lauding the 
outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877 as a victory for 'The People' over 
Petersburg 'insensitivity,' but it should not be assumed that the Russian 
government had been in any way coerced. lso In fact, the Russian government 
seems to have had a clear policy throughout, which was consciously and 
aggressively pursued in the face of an adversary who proved more stubborn than 
anticipated. Alexander had more faith than Reutern, his minister of finance, in the 
efficiency with which a war could be prosecuted, and assisted by a Chancellor 
notoriously ignorant of geography, they regarded war with a perhaps ill-advised 
lack of apprehension. lSi Whilst it is true that Gorchakov made reference to the 
pressure from public opinion when in discussions with other diplomats, it seems 
148 'Russia, Austria, and Turkey,' The Times, 27/12/1876, p.3, CoLD. 
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clear that this was simply a manoeuvre to strengthen his own hand and that, 
ultimately, the power of public opinion had no more effect on the activities of the 
Russian army than Lt. Kizhe. 
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Chapter 6 - Greece and the Eastern Crisis 
The historiography of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 has tended to dismiss the role 
of Greece as small: the Greek army never entered a formal state of war with 
Turkey, no large scale rebellion seriously threatened public order, and repeated 
reassertions were made in both Athens and Constantinople of the good relationship 
prevailing between the two states.1 However, this attitude is in sharp contrast with 
many contemporary opinions and at many points during the crisis, the British Press 
seemed convinced that at any moment, the Sons of Achilles would rise up and 
shake off the shackles of Turkish domination. As an editorial in The Times noted in 
August 1877: 
Their fathers had the Gods for their friends and were not overburdened 
by the claims of their companionship. There needs but one example, and 
it cannot be delayed, to lift up the sons to the level of their sires. 
Historians have also pointed to a revitalisation of Philhellenism in Britain at this 
time: although less well-known than his activities regarding Bulgaria, the articles 
and speeches of Gladstone were of particular significance, leading Kofos to assert a 
resemblance between this expression of sympathy with Greece and the Bulgarian 
Atrocities Campaign.2 At the opposite end of the spectrum from this kind of mass 
activity, Kovic also asserts {the reinvigoration of philhellene sentiments within 
British public opinion.,3 However, he attributes this upsurge less to the activities of 
Gladstone and more to those of the Prince of Wales, whose wife Alexandra was 
sister to George I of Greece. Hionidis goes so far as to discern in 1878 {a dramatic 
change in British attitudes and an implicit reversal of the country's [Le. Greece's] 
image in Victorian Britain.,4 This chapter will examine whether the notion of 
popular Philhellenism can be substantiated, and consider why exactly it was that so 
1 The Times, 'Greece and the Eastern Question,' 22/5/1877, p.lO, CoLD. 
2 E. Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878, (Thessaloniki, 1975), p.199; Gladstone also had a 
strong interest in Classical Greece, which undoubtedly fed his interest in the contemporary 
Greeks,see H. Lloyd-Jones, blood For the Ghosts: Classical Influences in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, (Oxford, 1982), pp.llO-125. 
3 M. Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, (Oxford, 2011), p.252. 
4 P.1. Hionidis: The Greek Kingdom in British Public Debate 1862-1881, (London, 2002), p.197. 
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much attention, often containing confident predictions, was expressed in the British 
Press, before moving on to consider why it was that these predictions failed to 
translate into action. It will also contrast this with the more reserved and 
occasionally downright hostile portrayals evident in the Russian Press. 
Background: Greece in the Concert of Europe 
The history of Greece's gradual removal from the Ottoman sphere of influence, its 
attempts to establish independence, and its seemingly inevitable embroilment in 
the dealings of the Great Powers during the nineteenth century, is a long and 
complex one. Greece was the first of the Balkan nations to be given an independent 
state, despite not having been the first to stage a concerted revolt against the 
Turks.s Furthermore, the new Greek state was not established by a treaty between 
the new Greece and their former rulers Turkey, but by a convention of the 
European Powers.6 This marks Greece out as having been, from its outset, a matter 
of significant interest for the European Powers. This interest becomes particularly 
unusual when bearing in mind that the signatories of the 1830 convention included 
the notoriously Conservative figures of Tsar Nicholas I, Charles X of France, and the 
Duke of Wellington. 7 Beaton has pointed to the identification with classical ideas as 
a crucial factor in this recognition, allowing the Greeks to portray th e creation of a 
national state as a restoration, rather than an innovation.8 However, this notion is 
somewhat problematic. Koliopoulos and Veremis note that there had never been a 
historic state of 'Hellas' and that Ancient Greece was always primarily a cu Itural 
rather than a political entity.9 This left the exact nature of the "Greekness" that was 
being re-established decidedly vague: in 1872, the Metropolitan of Caesarea spoke 
lamenting the 'passing of the ancient Greek glory,' and made it clear that, by this, 
he meant the demise of the Greek language as the educated tongue of Asia 
5 R. Beaton, 'Introduction,' in R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.) Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, 
Romanticism and the uses of the Past (1797-1896), (Abingdon, 2009), p.l. 
6 T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropulos & H.J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An 
Historical Perspective, (New York, 1976), p.19. 
7 Beaton, in Beaton & Ricks, Making of Modern Greece, p.3. 
8 Ibid, p.S. 
9 J.S. Koliopoulos & T.M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel,from 1831 to the Present, (London, 
2002), p.l. 
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Minor.lO For others, the historical or literary aspects were more significant. Aside 
from the ambiguities in definition, there were also practical difficulties in the 
nineteenth century, and Hatzopoulos cites the Greek claim of Classical identity as 
being the main element in alienating Hellenes from Slavs within the rather 
grandiosely-described 'pan-Balkan Orthodox World.,ll Kitromilides sees the Greeks 
as having put themselves in a position where their 'self-definition was based 
primarily on a historical connection with ancient Hellenism.,12 Koliopoulos & 
Veremis argue that the difficulty the Greeks created for themselves was that, by 
adopting Western ideals of Classical Hellas as their foundation myth, they thereby 
lost any indigenous basis for the establishment of their state. 13 
Aside from Greece and Turkey themselves, Britain and Russia had long been the 
two most active and significant external Powers to affect the continuing struggle for 
increased Greek liberation. Indeed, Soviet historiography was keen to claim sole 
credit for Russia's part in the liberation of the Greeks. This can be seen in the work 
of Narochnitskaia, who attributed the establishment of Greek independence solely 
to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29; an argument backed up with a quote from 
Engels.14 However, few would still subscribe to this theory, and the root of British 
involvement is traced by many, such as Dakin, to the 1825 'Act of Submission' - a 
document in which the Greeks requested the sole protection of Britain. 1s It was also 
a primarily Anglo-Russian naval force that confronted the Egypto-Turkish one at 
Navarino in 1827, laying the military groundwork for the establishment of a Greek 
State. 16 For Russia, there was also a strong religious link and Obolensky has asserted 
the existence of an Orthodox 'Commonwealth' in pre-Ottoman Europe, which 
10 H. Exertzoglou, 'Metaphors of Change: "tradition" and the East/West discourse in the late 
Ottoman Empire,' in A. Frangoudaki and C. Keyder, (eds) Ways to Modernity in Greece & Turkey: 
Encounters with Europe, 1850-1950, (London, 2007), pp.47-49. 
11 M. Hatzopoulos, 'From resurrection to insurrection: "sacred" myths, motifs and symbols in the 
Greek War of Independence,' in Beaton & Ricks, Making of Modern Greece, p.81. 
12 Cited in I.A. Tassopoulos, 'Constitutionalism and the Ideological conversion to National Unity 
under the Greek Constitution of 1864,' in Frangoudaki & Keyder, Ways to Modernity in Greece, p.14. 
13 Koliopoulos & Veremies, Greece: The Modern Sequel, pp.263-4. 
14 L.I. Narochnitsakai, Rossiia i national,no osvoboditel'noe dvizheniie na Balkanakh 1875-1878gg, 
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united the lands of Byzantium, the Balkans and Russia. 17 Prousis argues that this 
phenomenon extended well into the Ottoman era and was only shattered by the 
rise of nationalist rivalries in the nineteenth century.18 
Beyond vague notions of religious or cultural affinity, the first Russian Tsar to 
actively pursue links with Greece was Catherine the Great, who dreamed of 
restoring the Byzantine Empire under the reign of her grandson Constantine. 19 
Prousis argues that Catherine's talk of protecting the Greeks was merely a pretext 
for Russian expansion, but the fact remains that links between Greeks and Russians 
were actively sponsored by official Russia from her time onwards. 20 Tensions 
between Britain and Russia also fed directly into the way in which the two Powers 
related to the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, with Figes arguing that 
British support for Greek independence (as opposed to simple autonomy) stemmed 
from a fear that any autonomous region would simply become a Russian satellite, 
whereas an independent kingdom could be brought more into the British sphere of 
influence. 21 Whilst all of this is significant, it is still some way from showing a link 
between the political elites of Britain, Russia and Greece, and establishing any kind 
of grass-roots link between the peoples. Prousis asserts that 'the prospect of Greek 
liberation aroused sympathy within nearly all sectors of the Russian public.,22 
However, he offers little elaboration on this notion. Likewise, Milori asserts a British 
Philhellenism as derived from the perceived cultural superiority of Greece over 
Rome, but does little to explain how it manifested itself. 23 The extent to which 
Greek matters received coverage in the Press during our time-period provides an 
important insight into the extent of Philhellenism in Britain and Russia. 
17 Cited in T.e. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, (DeKalb, 1994), p.3. 
18 Ibid, pp.3-4. 
19 O. Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade, (London, 2011), pp.13-14. 
20 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p.S. 
21 Figes, Crimea, p.4l. 
22 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p.26. 
23 M. Milori, 'Europe, the classical polis and the Greek nation: Philhellenism and Hellenismin in 
nineteenth century Britain,' in Beaton & Ricks, Making of Modern Greece, p.6S. 
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The Silent Minority of the Balkans 
Although Greece was not mentioned significantly alongside Bosnia and Hercegovina 
in 1875, the issue of Greek behaviour, and the fact that many Greeks wanted, or 
even expected, something from the ongoing situation was not a fact which escaped 
the British Press. In the spring of 1876, The Times first carried a report of a 
statement issued by Greece, pointing out to the world their peaceful attitude thus 
far, and expressing a hope that it would be 'reciprocated by a really friendly policy' 
on the part of the Turks.24 This was followed in June by a rather more detailed 
letter to the editor of The Times from 'An Athenian,' which considered the Greek 
situation in more detail.25 The correspondent cited active Turkish colonisation of 
the Hellenic Provinces by Circassian immigrants and Bashi-Bazouks as a principal 
source of friction between the two nations, and cast Ignatiev as a major disruptive 
force in the situation, constantly striving to prevent any kind of long-term 
settlement of the Graeco-Turkish question, as it provided a 'useful source of 
antagonism.,26Although it had not been made a particular issue in the Press, this 
was, of course, not the first time that Ignatiev had been involved in the Greek 
aspect of the Eastern Crisis. Indeed, as early as January 1876, Derby had noted in 
his diary that the Russian Ambassador to the Porte had been doing his best to stir 
up the Greeks against both the Turks and the British, although he consoled himself 
with the note that 'Russia is now very unpopular in Athens.,27 
An idea which also began to gather momentum as time progressed was the manner 
in which Greece had behaved itself during the crisis, not resorting to violence like 
the nations around them. In conversation with a rather frank Turkish ambassador, 
who had confided that 'the loss of a province or two would not be utter ruin' for 
the Turks, Derby had been led to wonder just how long Greece would remain 
content if they saw Bosnia being given independence. 28 Rather in tune with this 
24 The Times, 'Greece,' 22/4/1876, p.7, CoLe. 
2S The Times, 'Greece and Turkey,' 7/6/1876, p.l0, CoLD. 
26 Ibid. 
27 J. Vincent (Ed.) A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15 th Earl of Derby (1826-93), 
between September 1869 and March 1878, (London, 1994), Hereafter "Derby Diaries," 18/1/1876, 
p.27l. 
28 Derby Diaries, 13/4/1876, pp.290-1. 
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train of thought, the 'Athenian' correspondent to The Times concluded with the 
observation that the Greeks had thus far kept remarkably quiet under significant 
provocation, without resorting to violence in the manner of the Slavs, and asserted 
that this required some kind of recompensary support on the part of the Powers.29 
The timing of this letter is particularly interesting, as it falls between two meetings 
held by official representatives of Greece with the British foreign secretary. Derby 
noted that, on May 30th, he had met with Gennadius (the Greek charge d'affaires), 
who 'wanted to know what Greece was to get as a reward for behaving so well,' 
and then on July seventeenth with the King of Greece who 'said naively that he 
thought his people would be discontented if they got nothing for their good 
conduct.,3O On both occasions, Derby was non-committal in his replies and 
somewhat dismissive in his diary, assuring the Greeks that extra lands were 'not 
mine to give.,31 This gives rise to the question, as to whether the 'Athenian' 
correspondent was more than simply an inhabitant of the Greek capital, and 
perhaps occupied some official position in the Greek bureaucracy, possibly even the 
charge d'affaires himself.32 
These early articles pose something of an interesting question rega rding the 
attitudes of the British Press towards Greece at the time. On the one hand, the very 
fact that they were printed suggests a certain level of support for the Greek 
position. After all, the updates from Greece were not in and of themselves 'news' 
unless some kind of change in the position of Greece was expected. On the other 
hand, the articles (at this stage at least) did not contain any kind of strong warning 
against violence on the part of Greece. Nor did they receive any follow-up or 
exhortation to the Powers to take up the case of Greece, posing the question as to 
what exactly was expected to be achieved by them. After these initial articles, there 
was barely any significant mention of Greece throughout the summer months and 
only intermittent updates during the autumn of 1876.33 
29 The Times, Greece and Turkey, 7/6/1876, p.l0, CoLD. 
30 Derby Diaries, 30/5/1876, p.299; 17/7/1876, p.310. 
31 Ibid., 17/7/1876, p.310. 
32 Investigation has been unable to verify whether or not this is the case. 
33 E.g. The Times, 14/8/1876, 29/8/1876, 4/10/1876, 10/10/1876. 
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In the summer of 1876, the debate about Greece began to take on an additional 
dimension, as the role of Russia was raised explicitly for the first time. A reminder 
was given of the influence of Russia in the establishment of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate, and the bad-feeling that this had caused amongst many Greeks, 
including much of the church hierarchy, who regarded the Bulgarians as 
schismatic. 34 The Times correspondent put this in very stark terms, asserting that 
'as Russia has abandoned Greece, Greece has abandoned Russia, and awaits the 
appearance of a new protector.,35 In Russia, The Voice was also being more explicit 
in regard to Greece, with a St Petersburg editorial column lamenting the continued 
neutrality of the Greeks.36 However, aside from this chastisement for not being 
more active and throwing their lot in with the Slavs, the Greeks received little 
attention in the pages of the Russian Press during the summer of 1876. It is 
interesting to note that, for The Times/ the question of Greece was regarded as a 
flash-point in the antagonism brewing against Russia, whereas for Russia, the Greek 
question only related to their attitude towards the Slavs, and the behaviour of the 
British was instead looked at askance in regard to Bulgaria and Serbia.37 
Heroic Greece: The Burden of the Legacy 
The Heroic mythology of ancient Greece was alluded to repeatedly in the 
descriptions of Greece during this period. One of the earliest uses was made by 
Garibaldi in an open letter to the insurgents, which lumped all the Christians of the 
Balkans together, before urging them onto heroism with the reminder that 'Among 
you were born Leonidas, Achilles, Alexander, Scanderbeg and Spartacus. And today, 
even among your robust populations, you may still find a Spartacus and a 
Leonidas.,38 Canaris, the new head of the Greek government from 1877 was also 
compared to Leonidas by a Times columnist.39 The Times talked of the ancient gods 
of Classical Greece, whilst Milan of Serbia's appeal describing them as the 
34 The Times, 'The Kingdom of Greece,' 29/8/1876, p.9, CoLA. For more on the Bulgarian Exarchate, 
and the significance of Russian involvement, see T.A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the establishment of 
the Bulgarian Exarchate 1864-1872: a study in personal diplomacy, {Madison, 1970}. 
35 The Times, 'Kingdom of Greece,' 29/8/1876, p.9, CoLA. 
36 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' 10 {22}/8/1876, p.1, CoLB. 
37 E.g. The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' 27/1 {8/2}/1878, p.1, CoLB. 
38 The Times, 'Herzegovina {by telegraph},' 13/10/1875, p.5, CoLA. 
39 The Times, 'The Greek Coalition Ministry,' 22/6/1877, p.4, CoLA. 
159 
descendents of Themistocles and Botzaris was repeated and circulated within the 
press.AO Indeed, Gourgouris asserts that, in the West, 'Greece's modernity was 
never articulated independently of its antiquity.,41 In this light, it seems almost 
striking that when Gladstone's new work on Homer was reviewed in The Times in 
March 1876, it was not used as an opportunity for drawing parallels and contrasts 
with the contemporary population of Greece.42 Nor did this work attract any 
attention from the major review journals at the time, such as The Quarterly Review/ 
or The Edinburgh Review. The Contemporary Review/ which would later publish 
Gladstone's major political article on the role of the Greeks in the Eastern Crisis did 
also carry a piece entitled 'Homerology' by Gladstone. However, this was once 
again a purely scholarly piece, concerned with Greek adjectives and the relationship 
of deities within the Greek Pantheon, which at no point transcended the boundary 
with contemporary politics.43 It seems, then, that whilst there was often interplay, 
particularly in terms of the language between modern and Classical Greece, 
Hionidis is right to insist that, by the 1860s, 'British understanding of modern 
Greece constituted a distinct and well-defined entity.,44 
The most interesting aspect of this use of language is the notion that these heroic 
comparisons may ultimately have acted against the Greeks in terms of how they 
were perceived by their contemporaries. A Times correspondent in the summer of 
1877 recalled how the Greeks were being disparaged by English opinion for 
mismanagement of their finances and of behaving badly towards their creditors. 45 
However, he asserted, were Greece to be measured against Turkey, she would be 
judged far more favourably; the problem lay in the excessive expectations placed 
upon them: 'instead of comparing them with the Acheans of Homer or the Hellenes 
of Thucydides/ he asked, 'why should we not contrast their present condition with 
40 The Times, Editorial, 23/8/1877, p.7, CoLB; 'The War,' S/7 /1876; Greece and the War, 10/10/1876, 
p.8, CoLC 
41 S. Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, colonisation, and the institution of modern Greece, 
(Stanford, 1996), p.73. 
42 The Times, 'Mr Gladstone on Homer,' 3/3/1876, p.4, CoLC; Gladstone actually published twice on 
Homer in 1876, firstly his Homeric Synchronism: an Enquiry into the Time and Place of Homer, and 
then a short volume, simply entitled Homer, Lloyd-Jones, blood for the Ghosts, p.llS. 
43 W.E. Gladstone, 'Homerology,' The Contemporary Review, 28 (Ju11876), pp.282-309. 
44 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.10. 
45 The Times, 'Greece for the Greeks,' 14/6/1877, p.S, CoLA. 
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that of their fathers or grandfathers.,46 This issue of questioning the standards by 
which the Greeks were judged would arise again in due course, when the issue of 
what the Greek state had achieved was contrasted with the fact of what it had had 
to work with.47 Where the Greeks were not derided for failing to match the 
standards of their heroic forebears, it seems that they were, at times, simply 
ignored, and Lloyd-Jones notes that Gladstone was somewhat unusual in being a 
devotee of Homer and Classical Greece who also 'showed strong sympathy with his 
Greek contemporaries.,48 
Gladstone's Greek Campaign 
In December 1876, an article by Gladstone appeared in The Contemporary Review, 
entitled 'The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem.,49 Given the significance of 
Gladstone's writings for other aspects of the crisis, this article is worthy of some 
analysis, both in terms of what it said, and in terms of the degree of public reaction 
it was able to provoke. 
Gladstone was well-known as a classical scholar and had already written various 
pieces on Greek antiquity even during the short period of the Eastern Crisis. 5o Up 
until this, however, he had not spoken on the subject of contemporary Greece 
despite being urged since 1875 as 'a Phil hellene and a Philanthrope' to write 
something in support of the Greek cause. 51 In October 1876 he had spoken out 
loudly against 'Judaic sympathies,' an action which had provoked little beyond 
widespread confusion, but nonetheless an act which was believed to be motivated 
by 'admiration for, and sympathy with, the Greek church.,52 The article for the 
C o n t e m p o r a r y ~ ~ Gladstone claimed, was prompted by a public gathering in Athens, 
shortly before he wrote, of over 10,000 people. This claim has, however, been 
questioned by those who see a more political motivation to the article, and believe 
46 Ibid. 
47 See below pp.172-176. 
48 Lloyd-Jones, Blood for the Ghosts, p.113. 
49 W.E. Gladstone, IThe Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem,' The Contemporary Review, 29, (Dec 
1876), pp.1-27. 
50 The Times, IMr Gladstone on Homer,' 3/3/1876, p.4, CaLC 
51 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.208. 
52 Derby Diaries, 13/10/1876, p.333. 
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that the timing of the article was due to the fact that, in December 1876, Gladstone 
felt that he could use Greece as an example of 'the successful implementation of 
liberal principles to the conduct of British policy abroad.,53 This argument is 
supported by the fact that, having written his first article, Gladstone was silent on 
Greece until the summer of 1878 when Greece was once again an ideal topic with 
which to attack Disraeli's conduct of foreign policy.54 
Even if we accept Gladstone's assertion regarding his motivation for writing, the 
exact meeting to which he refers is difficult to identify with any degree of certainty. 
One such meeting took place on the twelfth of November, and was noted very 
briefly in The Times, as a gathering of around 7,000 people. 55 However, In Russia, 
The Voice published a brief series of reports, also noting that there had been 
protests in Athens, but about a month earlier. 56 In fact, at the beginning of October, 
The Voice had noted two separate gatherings within a day or so of each other: 
firstly a public meeting of around 5,000 people, and then a further meeting of 
nearer 8,000, including various professors and respected Athenian academics. 57 
This meeting was described by The Times as a gathering of 'fugitive Cretans resident 
in Athens/ and received only a brief mention towards the end of an article more 
concerned with Greece's relation to Serbia's war. 58 On the other hand, the 
November meeting received little more attention and attracted no detailed 
commentary, nor an elaborating article from any special correspondent, and 
concluded with the observation that 'Perfect order prevailed.,59 All in all, the 
October meeting is probably the most likely one, given the fact that it concluded 
with a resolution to send a note expressing 'heartfelt thanks to those Englishmen 
who have taken the lead in the vindication of the cause of the Christians of the 
S3 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.209. 
S4 Ibid, p.214. 
ss The Times, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, CoLF. 
S6 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' 1(13)/10/1876, p.4, CoLB. 
57 The Voice, 'Telegraphs,' (21/9), 3/10/1876, p.3, CoLE. 
58 The Times, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, CoLe. 
59 The Times, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, CoLF. 
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east,' which was to be sent directly to Gladstone himself, as 'the representative of 
the English nation.,6o 
This scant coverage in the Press demonstrates an attitude in sharp contrast to 
Gladstone's excitement that 'the silence of the Pnyx at Athens was broken ... by the 
stir of an assembly,' an event more momentous in that it was occurring 'for the first 
time during two thousand years.,61 This attitude was continued in The Times/ with a 
comment published on the release of Gladstone's article, which downplayed any 
likely impact (at least by comparison with The Bulgarian Horrors), as 'the subject is 
not one that excites popular passion.,62 However, Gladstone's excitement is, 
perhaps, more likely to have found its origin in the changes he perceived within 
Greek society. Tassopoulos has argued that Greece was unusual in that it developed 
formal and theoretical democracy before it developed popular associations, and 
views the 1860s and 1870s as a vital period in the reconciliation between 
Nationalism and Liberalism in the Greek nation.63 Therefore, whilst the gatherings 
were unremarkable, in the contemporary European context, they marked a 
vindication of those who had previously expressed confidence in the Greeks as 
being suitable material for building a modern nation. 
In Gladstone's eyes, the purpose of the meeting was to advance a claim 'on behalf 
of the Hellenic provinces still in servitude,' for 'an equal share in the emancipation,' 
that the Balkan Slavs were hoping was about to be administered by the Great 
Powers at a conference in Constantinople in early 1877. 64 His language here is 
significant, as he refers to the 'Hellenic provinces,' a term which immediately 
implies the affinity of those regions with Greece, and which similarly downplays the 
significance of any Muslim or Slav elements therein, who might harbour ambitions 
of political unity with the new Slavonic states about to be expanded or created, or 
even to remain an integral part of Turkey. Gladstone also talks as if the activity and 
the initiative came from the provinces themselves, and that the residents of Athens 
60 The Times, 'Greece and the War,' p.8, Col.e. 
61 Gladstone, The Hellenic Factor,' p.l. 
62 The Times, 'London, Friday December 1, 1876,' 1/12/1876, p.9, CoI.A. 
63 Tassopoulos, 'Constitutionalism and the Ideological conversion to National Unity under the Greek 
Constitution of 1864,' in Frangoudaki and Keyder, Ways to Modernity in Greece & Turkey, p.14. 
64 Gladstone, The Hellenic Factor,' p.l. 
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were simply proxies exercising their greater freedom to act. By contrast, The Times 
had described the meeting as having agreed to found a (Fraternity club ... for 
promoting military preparations and political unity among political parties.,65 
Although the ultimate objective was perhaps the same - namely the addition of 
Thessaly and Epirus to the Greek kingdom - The Times frames the matter far more 
in terms of the expansionist ambitions of the Greek state, rather than the liberation 
of the oppressed, as per Gladstone. 
The amount of interest which Gladstone's involvement in the Bulgarian atrocities 
campaign had generated invites the question of whether his contribution to the 
Greek question would have any significant impact on the amount which appeared 
on Greece and the Greeks in the British Press. Kofos sees the article as having been 
the key to a revival in British Philhellenism.66 However Hionidis, whilst noting a brief 
marked increase in Press interest in Greece in the wake of the article, believes that 
(the Press was roused more by the weight of the article's author than by the subject 
as such.,67 Shannon has noted in regard to The Bulgarian Horrors/ that had the 
pamphlet been more original and informative, then it would also have been less 
effective. 68 This seems to be exactly the phenomenon observable here: rather than 
being lead by the public mood, Gladstone had tried to innovate and the result was 
anti-climactic. In the opening quarter of 1877, there was broadly the same amount 
of attention given to Greece in The Times as there had been in the final quarter of 
1876.69 Obviously events provided fluctuations in the precise tone and the detail of 
what was written about Greece, but the overall picture remained the same; 
disinterested mentions, but nothing amounting to a coherent programme regarding 
Greece. For a fuller and more sustained period of interest in Greece, on the part of 
the British Press, it would require the significant events that were to occur in the 
Balkans in the opening months of 1878, namely the brief Graeco-Turkish conflict, 
and the military defeat of Turkey by Russia, both of which will now be discussed. 
6S The Times, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, CoI.F. 
66 Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p.199. 
67 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.213. 
68 Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, p.ll0. 
69 175 articles containing the word 'Greece' or 'Greeks' for October - December 1876, 190 for 
January - March 1877, the proportion of these taken up by scholarly articles on antiquities or other 
matters unconnected to the Eastern question was about the same in each period, The Times. 
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Greece and Turkey in Conflict 
Perhaps the most significant moment in the Eastern Crisis, from a Greek 
perspective, came in February 1878, when the Greek Army crossed the border into 
Thessaly, a Turkish province, but one with a high Greek population, and the area 
which was regarded as the most incontestably 'Greek' of the Turkish provinces by 
Greek expansionists and Philhellenes. A declaration issued a day later (February 
second 1878) assured the Powers that this was both a temporary and a defensive 
occupation in order to preserve the general peace. It seems evident that the Greek 
decision to march into Turkey relied heavily upon the assumption that the Turkish 
army would be too pre-occupied dealing with the, now mobile, Russian forces. 
However, on the third day of their occupation, the Greek government learnt that 
Turkey and Russia had, in fact, signed an armistice and the preliminaries of peace 
on January thirty-first. This led to a certain degree of panic, and a swift 
countermanding of their orders, meaning that the troops were back on their own 
side of the border by the ninth of February. 
It seems clear from those records which afford us a behind-the-scenes view of 
events that this mobilisation was far from unexpected. Derby recorded a series of 
meetings and conversations during the autumn of 1877 in which Greek 
representatives were 'talking big' about their various plans. 70 He also dismissed 
claims by Greek ministers and even the King that the Greeks had no plans to make 
war, dismissing one denial from an official as 'so gross a fiction that I wonder he 
thinks it worth telling.,71 However, despite all this, there was little in Press activity 
to suggest the imminence of military activity. As far as the mobilisation itself is 
concerned, the manner in which these activities were regarded in Britain and Russia 
differs significantly. The Times, despite having previously offered a reasonable 
amount of commentary on Greece, was remarkably reticent on this particular topic. 
The outbreak of the insurrection in Thessaly was reported in late January, along 
. I 72 
with a note a few days later that the insurgents were reporting ear y successes. 
70 Derby Diaries, 11/11/1877, p.4S2. 
71 Derby Diaries, 14/10/1877, p.44S; 3/12/1877, pp.4S8-9. 
72 The Times, 'Greece,' 21/1/1878, p.S, CoLE; 'War Excitement in Greece,' 30/1/1878, p.S, CoI.B. 
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However, far more emphasis was placed upon the general state of discontent in 
Athens, with the populace apparently sensing the imminence of peace, and the 
Times correspondent asserting that 'the consciousness that Greece has established 
no claim to be considered, caused here feelings of great bitterness, especially 
against the late ministry.,73 This comment provides a fairly explicit explanation for 
what may be considered the actual motives for the Greek border-crossing a few 
days later, but The Times appears to have been reluctant to infer the link. February 
began with articles providing wider context for likely Greek actions, including a 
piece from the Athens correspondent entitled 'Hellenism.' In this, he stated the 
ambitions of He"enists as being 'liberating and unifying with the present kingdom 
of Greece the peoples and territory of Turkey in Europe situated south of the 
Balkans and the river Scumbi in Albania, and along the coast of the Black Sea from 
Cape Emineh to the mouths of the Danube.'74 He further described this instinct as 
being common to all the people of Greece and as being 'the natural and most 
powerful opponent of Panslavism.J75 This last assertion, perhaps, provides the 
explanation for the significant gulf in perspectives between the Russian and the 
British Press. Whereas the Athens correspondent of the Times was prepared to take 
the Greek side on the question of whether the Powers had created an impossible 
situation by liberating one half of the Greek people and not the other, The Voice 
adopted a far less approving attitude towards them. 
Somewhat behind The Times in its news-gathering, The Voice printed a telegraph on 
February fifth stating the Greek government's assertion that their troops were 
going to Thessaly to prevent Greeks there from being attacked. 76 The first article as 
such appeared a few days later and essentially just recounted the fact that The 
Times had already announced the crossing of the border by between twenty five 
and thirty thousand Greek troopS.77 The fact that The Voice was unable to provide 
any original reporting of its own, and instead made do with recounting the prior 
observations of The Times might, in part, be attributable to the fact that there was, 
73 The Times, 'War excitement in Greece,' 30/1/1878. 
74 The Times, 'Hellenism,' 1/2/1878, p.3, CoLE. 
7S The Times, 'Hellenism,' 1/2/1878. 
76 The Voice, 'Telegraphs,' (24/1/1878) 5/2/1878, p.4, CoLE. 
n The Voice, 'Military Department,' (26/1/1878) 7/2/1878, p.3, CoLB. 
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at the time, an unusual atmosphere in Athens, rife with rumour, and devoid of clear 
and reliably accurate information. Indeed, the correspondent for The Times had 
even gone so far as to say that 'the fiction and unreality which dominate in an 
Eastern town when momentous events are passing in its neighbourhood had 
already begun to assert their sway.,78 However, given the rather broader paucity of 
The V o i c e ~ s s reporting from Athens, it seems more likely that they simply had not 
deemed the area of sufficient interest to have a man on the ground full time. 
At the same time as The Voice was reporting the Greek army's crossing of the 
border, it also carried a report that the Turkish fleet was in the Aegean, preparing 
for a bombardment of Piraeus, the port of Athens. This had apparently provoked 
widespread panic, leading the Greek government to appeal to the Powers for 
protection, and to consider withdrawing the fleet. 79 The lack of detail in their 
reports up to this point makes it difficult to predict the likely attitude which would 
have been adopted by The Voice, let alone by Russian opinion generally, had the 
Greeks persevered with an ultimately successful military campaign against Turkey. 
What is certain is the degree of antipathy which they evoked by their decision to 
withdraw. On February the eighth Greece was, for the first time in this period, the 
subject of the lead article in the paper, an editorial which asserted that the Greeks 
had long ago decided to launch hostilities and mocked them for having waited until 
peace talks were imminent.8o It went on to conclude that the Greeks had clearly 
never intended to wage a sustained campaign, as shown by the way in which they 
had so easily been scared off. Instead, the Greeks simply wanted a share of the 
spoils.81 This argument was taken to its logical conclusion a week later in a report 
from The V o i c e ~ s s special correspondent (for some reason stationed in Vienna) who 
produced a vitriolic report, deriding the Greeks as the 'natural enemies' of all Slavs, 
and laughing at those who had expected their help six months earlier, when all the 
time their sole aim was to 'Hellenise the Slavs.,82 Perhaps more ominously, the 
reporter finished by turning his attention to Lord Derby and arguing that, whilst 
78 The Times, 'Greece and the War,' 7/2/1878, p.4, CoLe. 
79 The Voice, 'Telegraphs,' (26/1/1878) 7/2/1878, p.4, CoLD. 
80 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (27/1/1878) 8/2/1878, p.l, CoI.B. 
81 Ibid. 
82 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (3) 15/2/1878, p.4, CoLD. 
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Derby might claim he was seeking international protection for the Greeks from the 
Turks, it was in fact the Slavs from whom they needed protecting, those who had 
fought, who opposed Hellenism, and who now 'wanted their dues.,83 The fact that 
The Voice, a Russian newspaper which, if not excessively nationalistic, knew which 
way the readership was likely to think in a time of war, sided with the Slavs and 
against the Turks is hardly surprising. What is more significant is the fact that this 
was the point at which they spoke out definitively, perceiving the conflict to have 
crystallised. It is impossible to establish how the reaction might have been different 
had the Greeks acted earlier. 
Greeks and Slavs: a Conflict of Interests? 
The purported conflict of interests between the Greeks and the Slavs was a point 
which received decidedly varied amounts of attention during this period. At the 
very start of the Hercegovina revolt, Kofos identifies significant hostility to the Slavs 
in the Greek press.84 Having already alluded to it on a few occasions, The Times 
raised the issue specifically in October 1876, when their Greek correspondent 
asserted that 'the one thing of which Greece stands in dread is the slow extinction 
of their race beneath Slavic expansion.,8s This antagonism seems to have been 
relatively recent in origin and events like the establishment of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate in the 1860s are probably central to it. Although Meininger tries to depict 
the creation of an independent Orthodox church as being primarily a defensive 
measure against the rise of Uniate churches and the associated shift from Russian 
to French influence, this does not seem to have been a message that reached the 
majority of Greeks.86 Given the manner in which Ignatiev had pressurised and 
intimidated a succession of Patriarchs in order to have the exarchate established, 
the arousal of Greek hostility, even from the outset, is understandable. This 
becomes even more the case when the issue of territory is raised. For Meininger, 
b f . 87 the schism in the Orthodox Church was only caused by the sa otage 0 extremists. 
83 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (3) 15/2/1878, p.4, CoI.E. 
84 Kotas, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p.44. 
85 The Times, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, CoLe. 
86 Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, p.22. 
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However, he himself admits that Bulgarian attempts to include Macedonian 
territory in their exarchate were 'provocative,' and this seems to be something of 
d 88 an un erstatement. By the early 1870s, there was a clear perception amongst 
Greek nationalists that, in the event of continued Turkish retreat from the Balkans, 
there would ultimately come a point at which Greek, Bulgarian, and possibly 
Serbian, interests would find themselves in direct conflict, most probably around 
the area of Macedonia. This theme seems to have been a fairly common sentiment 
amongst the Greeks in 1876, and was periodically noted in the British Press, but 
never seems to have registered in the Russian media.89 
The greater awareness of the British (rather than Russian) Press of Greek concerns 
perhaps helps account for the fact that, in early 1877, it was to The Times that 
Alexander Byzantios, the editor of a Greek journal Imera chose to write. Byzantios 
complained in a long letter, printed in the original French, that the special privileges 
to be accorded to the Slavs by the Constantinople Conference would inevitably 
place a heavier burden of Turkish activity upon the Greeks. 90 Along with Byzantios's 
letter in this edition, there was also an editorial commending the letter as 
'deserving respectful consideration,' and expanding upon the argument implicit in 
the letter.91 Although the editor felt that Byzantios stopped short of highlighting 
properly the likely sufferings of the Greeks as a result of the additional protections 
likely to be given to the Slavs, he felt confident enough to summarise the situation 
as it appeared, stating: 'attempts have been made for many months past to din into 
our ears the truth that the Trans-Balkan provinces of Turkey are not the only parts 
of the Ottoman Empire which suffer from misgovernment.,92 However, the ultimate 
conclusion which this article drew was not, in fact, one of conflict, but that reform 
for the Bulgarians would lead inevitably to the same reforms for Greeks. Thus, the 
88 Ibid., p.1S6. 
89 E.g. The Times, 'Greeks and Slavs,' 26/9/1876, p.9, CoLA; 'The Eastern Question,' 23/10/1876, p.S, 
ColA 
90 The Times, 'Greek and Slav,' 5/1/1877, p.3, CoLD. 
91 The Times, 'Lead Article,' 5/1/1877, p.9, Col.c. 
92 Ibid. 
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Greek was encouraged to celebrate his neighbour's fortune, as it would (be his 
tomorrow.,93 
An interesting example of the Graeco-Slavonic hostility can be seen in the person of 
Prince Milan Obrenovic of Serbia. Serbia had first made demands on Macedonia in 
1869, and was thus, in Greek eyes, just as much of a threat to their interests as a 
hypothetical Bulgaria.94 However, Serbia's ruler, at least publically, viewed the 
Greeks rather more as potential allies than as eventual enemies. Various appeals 
were made by the Serbian ruler, often in colourful language, as can be seen in the 
Times report of his call to 'the glorious descendants of Themistocles and Botzaris,' 
to join him in his war against Turkey.95 However, Kofos believes that these appeals 
for Greek action only served to undermine the government, which at that time was 
broadly against war, and to strengthen the opposition. 96 It was around this time 
that Russian interest in Greece began to reach a noticeable level, with The Voice 
reporting at the beginning of October 1876 that Graeco-Turkish relations were 
deteriorating.97 This has been seen by Kofos as a reaction to the fact that Serbia 
was on the verge of collapse in its war with Turkey.98 Whatever the cause, the late 
autumn of 1876 marked a moderate flurry of journalistic activity in terms of Greece. 
The Voice carried an article reasserting the Greek desire for assistance from the 
Powers.99 This demand came in the form of a note sent by the Greek government to 
the powers, stating that (the opinion of society strongly demands the improvement 
of the condition of Greeks in Turkey.,loo Perhaps the more ominous aspect of this 
note however was the fact that it also contained the warning that if the Powers , , 
did not act to aid the Greeks of Turkey, then the Greek government would itself 
(take the necessary measures to bring about this aim.,lol Furthermore, it seems that 
these were not simply empty words, given that Athens itself was, at this time, 
93 Ibid. 
94 Meininger, Ignatiev and the Bulgarian Exarchate, p.109. 
95 The Times, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, CoLe. 
96 Kotos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p.67. 
97 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (24/9)6/10/1876, p.4, CoLD. 
98 Kotos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p.74. 
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experiencing demonstrations in favour of war against Turkey.lo2 However, it was 
not until the very end of 1877, and into 1878, that the potential for Graceo-Slavonic 
conflict began to be fully explored in Britain. 
The eventual fall of Plevna in December 1877 and the subsequent advance of the 
Russian army south towards Constantinople changed the atmosphere for many of 
the discussions which had been going on regarding the future of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Up until this point, whilst the conflict of interests between Greeks and 
Slavs had been alluded to in Britain, it had not properly been 'probed into.,103 The 
belief amongst many, after the fall of Plevna, that Turkey-in-Europe had ceased to 
exist and that the only question now was as to the nature of the replacement, 
profoundly altered people's thinking. Kofos notes that rumours were rife of the 
Greek army rising to demand war against Turkey for a larger share of the spoils and 
it was in this atmosphere that many in Britain began to see the Greeks as the 
obvious solution to Slavonic, and thereby Russian, hegemony in the Balkans. lo4 In 
this vein, a Times leader of early March asserted 'it may be a wise policy to promote 
the development of the Greek power as a counterbalance to the new Principality of 
Bulgaria.,los Indeed, Hionidis sees a profound re-shaping of the portrayal and 
perception of Greece in Britain at this time, borne out of a positive comparison with 
Russia as viewed from a narrow British, Russophobe perspective. lOG Although the 
failures of the Greek Kingdom had become an accepted commonplace, these were 
now played down as the Press began to emphasise the liberal, modernising 
qualities of the Greeks as opposed to the reactionary nature of Russia. lo7 However, 
whilst this idea retained a certain degree of plausibility, it quickly faded from view 
once the possibility of war between Britain and Russia began to loom large, with 
the Press taking the unsurprising view that a war involving Britain would be of 
102 Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p.74. 
103 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.223. 
104 Kofos, Greece and the Eastern crisis, p.141; Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, pp.212-13. 
105 The Times, 'London,' 7/3/1878, p.9, CoI.A. 
106 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, pp.226-7. The broader nature of British Russophobia will be 
discussed in the following chapter, pp. 178-183. 
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greater interest to their readers than the question of which group of Balkan 
Christians was to receive the most favourable territorial settlement. lOB 
Greece and the Congress of Berlin 
Greece was not, ultimately, admitted to the Congress of Berlin as a full member, 
although it did receive some additional territory, albeit far less than most Greek 
nationalists had demanded. Both of these matters were noted in The Times and the 
British Press more generally, albeit with differing amounts of attention. The article 
'Preparations for the Congress' on June tenth 1878, observed that Greece 'like 
Servia and Roumania' would be represented by her Foreign Minister, as opposed to 
the larger delegations representing the Powers, and noted the slightly unusual 
nature of this comparison, considering that Greece 'as an independent kingdom is 
regarded in Athens as in a different position from that of Roumania, Servia and 
even Montenegro.109 However, when, a few days later, The Times published a full 
list of the delegates attending the conference, Greece was not only missing, but 
without any comment that this was the case. 110 Their omission hardly seems 
surprising when it is borne in mind that Disraeli's correspondence from the autumn 
of 1877 all the way up to the spring of 1878 generally sees Greece absent from his 
comments and thoughts regarding who was to get what when the European 
settlement was ultimately made. lll Olga Novikov, in a letter to The Northern Echo 
described Greece as a 'poor little state/ which had trusted Britain, but had its trust 
betrayed.112 However, whilst this is not the sole instance of such an opinion being 
expressed, there is nothing to suggest that it represented a wide-spread or ardently 
held belief. 
The second aspect of Greek disappointment at the Congress was the fact that, 
having not been given full admittance to plead their case, the decisions made in 
their absence went largely against them. This was also noted briefly by the official 
reporters of The Times, and with considerable gusto by those who wrote letters to 
108 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, p.230. 
109 The Times, 'Preparations for the Congress,' 10/6/1878. P.5, CoI.A. 
110 The Times, 'Latest Intelligence,' 13/6/1878, p.5, CoI.A. 
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the editor. In June, there were two letters published regarding Greece particularly. 
The first of these came from the pen of a Mr. W.J. Codrington, who cited arguments 
from the papers of his ancestor, Admiral Codrington, compiled for the 1827 treaty 
on the Greek borders, and argued strongly in favour of the extension of Greece as 
far as was possible. l13 The other letter relied less upon the accumulated papers of 
bureaucratic opinion and instead championed the cause of Greece from a moral 
standpoint. The author, identified only as 'E. H.,' argued that although Greece had 
been given its independence, this had in fact been a cruel trick by the powers, who 
had provided it with insufficient land to sustain itself, leaving the wealthiest and 
most naturally productive areas inhabited by Greece in the hands of the Turks. 114 
Long-term survival for Greece, it was predicted, was only possible if the Powers 
made the territorial extensions necessary to counteract this imbalance. lls The 
moral argument more generally was a popular one at this time, with Times 
reporters emphasising the significance of the Powers 'promising to bring forward 
the Hellenic question,' as the main reason for the termination of the Greek advance 
into Turkey, and downplaying the significance of a Greek fear of military 
annihilation following the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish armistice. 116 This, then, 
was a return to the idea previously popularised in The Times that Greece had acted 
with restraint brought about by the good advice of the Powers, (chiefly Britain), 
rather than by fear, indecision or lack of military infrastructure. It behoved the 
Powers to make good on the promises which had accompanied this advice, namely 
that the Greek cause would be advanced more than it would have been by force of 
arms. As already noted above, whilst this viewpoint was not necessarily one which 
was rejected as the crisis progressed, it was one which quickly found itself crowded 
out. A full congress of the Great Powers of Europe and a redrawing of the map of 
the Balkans and the Caucasus produced far more topics of interest than simply the 
fate of Greece. 
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This was even more the case in the Russian Press. On July eighth, The Voice devoted 
the entirety of its opening page to an editorial on the settlement that had been 
reached at Berlin, in wh ich Greece barely received a mention. Instead, on page four, 
somewhere in the depths of the 'Foreign News' section, there was a brief note on 
the fact that Turkey was being encouraged to reach an agreement with Greece over 
their mutual border.117 Whilst there is no denying that the result of the Congress 
was both a disappointment to the Greek nationalists, and less dramatic than the 
fates of Bulgaria, Serbia or others, the gulf between what had been expected (or at 
least demanded) by partisans of the Greek cause, and what had been given in 
reality would surely have provoked considerable amounts of comment from a 
publication more concerned with Greece's fate. Interestingly, however, the silence 
of The Voice does seem to have been borne solely out of indifference. This 
contrasts strongly with the British situation, where one reader of The Times, Mr 
John Trevor Barkley, wrote a letter to the editor, denouncing in the strongest terms 
the complaints made on Greece's behalf. 'Why?' he asked, did everyone insist that 
Greece was being treated so badly, when she was in fact to receive a total of five 
and a half thousand square miles of additional territory, an area the size of 
Yorkshire. This was more than any other nation except Russia had received, not 
only more than Romania or Bulgaria, but more than Serbia and Montenegro 
combined !118 
The issues with the viewpoint advanced here are, of course, multiple. First and 
foremost, as Kofos has noted, the frontier negotiations between Greece and Turkey 
did not begin until the seventeenth of July, and were not concluded until the 
following year, so the notion that Greece was assured an additional parcel of 
territory of any set size was rather fanciful. 119More significant, however, is the 
question of how representative Barkley's views were: however inaccurate they may 
be, if they could be identified as encapsulating popular sentiment, they would still 
be highly significant for us to consider. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
117 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (26/6) 8/7/1878, p.l; 'Foreign News,' p.4, CaLC. 
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Whilst Barkley followed the pattern of thought noted above in attributing Greece's 
gains to its 'deferring to England's advice during the war/ his letter otherwise 
remains almost entirely isolated.120 He acknowledged in his opening paragraph that 
'nine men out of ten' sympathised with Greece and there seem to have been no 
other letters or reports penned by representatives of the tenth. 121 Thus, however 
interesting a contrast he is able to provide, he does not seem to represent anything 
that could legitimately be described as an alternative current of public opinion, at 
least on the evidence available from The Times. 
Aside from this discussion in the letters column, the fate of Greece at the Congress 
of Berlin also prompted an article in Nineteenth Century, penned by Stratford de 
Redcliffe, formerly Stratford Canning, long-time British ambassador to the Porte 
and a diplomat who had been extensively involved in the original discussions 
leading to Greek independence. His article, 'Recollections of the Revival of Greek 
Independence/ was historical in character, but made it clear from the outset that 
this topic was 'closely connected with the interests of that country in its present 
and prospective state.,122 Redcliffe wrote quite prolifically for Nineteenth Century 
during this period, including a two-part 'bird's eye view' of Turkey in the summer of 
1877, and a further piece in the autumn on the general state of International 
Relations at the time. 123 However, this was the only piece in which he focused upon 
the Greek issue. The Greek article itself said little of note, aside from offering 
further examples of mutual hostility and suspicion between Great Britain and 
Russia, and copious self-congratulation on the part of the author.124 The main body 
of the article was a long account of events around the British Embassy in 
Constantinople and the ambassador's journeys across Europe to various other 
125 . I I' t' courts many years earlier. However, the conclusion was partlcu ar y Interes lng, 
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as it stated confidently that the Congress of Berlin had now 'set at rest' the 
question of Greece's boundaries. 126 
Whilst de Redcliffe may have felt that the question of Greece's boundaries had 
been set at rest, the general feeling of the Liberal party seems to have been the 
exact opposite. After the Congress of Berlin, Hionidis presents a portrait of a diverse 
group of Liberal politicians with contrasting views on the fate of Greece, but united 
in their conviction that the government had acted incorrectly.127 The most 
significant figure in this regard was probably Charles Dilke, the Radical MP who had 
previously been estranged from much of his party, due to his deep-rooted and 
racially conceived antipathy to the Russians and, by extension, the south-Slavs. 128 
Furthermore, Dilke, like Chamberlain, simply found Gladstone too much of a 
moraliser to ally with him, at a time when Gladstone's morally-based Liberalism was 
such a prominent stream within the Party.129 Hionidis presents the discovery of the 
Greek cause as something of a revelation to Dilke who found in it an ideal solution 
for the difficulty presented by a Radical opposition to Turkey and a racial opposition 
to Russia and the South-Slavs.130 Although Dilke's biographer skims over his 
involvement with Greek matters, it does seem that hi'S advocacy of the Greek cause 
was to have significant influence on his political career, pleasing the Party leaders 
by finding a clear way to oppose the government on Foreign Policy with reference 
to British Interests, rather than to morals. 131 
Conclusion 
It seems that whilst Greece did attract some attention from the British and Russian 
Press during the period, and whilst that attention was often couched in language 
reminiscent of Classical mythology, there does not seem to have been the kind of 
public excitement shown in Great Britain for the Bulgarian Atrocities, nor in Russia 
126 Ibid., p.392. 
127 Hionidis, The Greek Kingdom, pp.231-2. 
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for the fate of the Balkan Slavs. Whilst the Greek Government acted with restraint, 
it was commended by diplomats and educated British opinion. When it chose to 
act, it was firstly encouraged by the Russian press and then condemned for its self-
interested timing and the attendant failure to come to the aid of the Slavonic cause. 
By and large, Greece seems to have remained a subsidiary aspect of the revolt for 
almost all parties concerned. For Russian journals like The Herald of Europe, it was 
sufficiently minor to be denied even a single article during the crisis, whilst topics 
like 'The Magyars and the Eastern Question,' were given space.132 Ultimately, 
though, Greece seems to have been utilised in an expedient fashion by various 
groups for their differing ends. Those partisan to the Slavonic cause saw Greece in 
terms of the support it could offer to the Slavs, whilst others like Gladstone looked 
for the re-awakening of cultural ideas and traditions lost for thousands of years. 
Even Gladstone, it appears, valued Greece more for the political end to which he 
could work it, and saw little in the way of a popular movement to be engaged with 
through advocating the cause. For his fellow Party members, Greece was simply a 
stick with which to beat Disraeli's government. Few, if any, occupied themselves 
with thoughts of the Greek people of their own day. Whilst this incorporation of 
Greece into the partisan political debates of the British Parliament distract slightly 
from the fact, it is interesting to note that, once again, a situation and a people in 
the Balkan Peninsula came to the fore in the British Press by means of their 
relationship to Russian aims and desires. 
132 The Herald of Europe, tThe Magyars and the Eastern Question,' September 1877. 
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Chapter 7 - But by Jingo if we do ... 
We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do 
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too. 
We've fought the bear before, and while we're Briton's true , 
The Russians shall not have Constantinople. 1 
Whilst this thesis has thus far focused on popular and Press reactions in Russia and 
Great Britain to the events in the Balkans between 1875 and 1878, it has time and 
again found their attentions focused rather more on each other than on the Balkan 
crisis. This was particularly the case in the final part of 1877 and into 1878, when a 
strong reaction grew up in Britain against Gladstone and the atrocities campaigners 
who had urged action on behalf of the Slavonic Christians. Instead, these 
campaigners, known popularly as 'Jingoes', clamoured for a British military 
intervention on the side of Turkey, and against Russia. Although the military 
campaign was not forthcoming, their success in impacting public consciousness was 
such that their shadow is cast back across previous Anglo-Russian events, and 
scholars will talk of the 'Jingoistic rhetoric of the Crimean War.,2 The 'Jingo' 
movement marked one of the high points of a deep-rooted antipathy between 
elements of Russian and British society that continued across two hundred years or 
so. This chapter will consider the portrayals and manifestations of this Russophobia 
in Britain and the corresponding Anglophobia on Russia's part, both generally and 
in this crisis in particular. Within this period, it will also examine the role played by 
the Press in each. 
Background: Russophobia and Anglophobia 
Despite the longevity and significance of Russophobia in Great Britain, this topic has 
generated a limited historiography. Gleason's The Genesis of Russophobia in Britain 
(1950) provides an invaluable introduction to the topic, but stops in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, before the outbreak of the Crimean War. In justifying his 
1 By G.H. MacDermott, 1878. See K. Baker (Ed.) A Children's English History in Verse, (London, 1999), 
p.207. 
2 M Baker, 'One Man cannot an "Eastern Europe" make, but he can certainly try: Charles Fredrick 
Henningson and the ideological construction of Eastern Europe,' Ab Imperio, 1, (2003), p.549. 
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decision to do so, he makes an interesting point that a study which ended at Crimea 
would imply the inevitability of war, whereas his decision to cover only the period 
up to the end of the 1840s emphasises the long-term possibility of peace.3 Moving 
to more general works, many studies of the colonial (little wars' of the late 
nineteenth century make brief reference to the topic, as do studies of the Crimean 
War, the attitudes of Britain to the Russian Revolution, the Cold War, and even 
recent diplomatic disputes between Britain and Russia in the early twenty-first 
century, but none provide a comprehensive overview of the topic. 4 
There is increasing scholarly agreement that Europe's perception and fear of Russia 
largely stemmed back to 1812 when the seemingly invincible armies of Napoleon 
had not only met their doom in the frozen Moscow winter, but had been driven all 
the way back to Paris. 5 The most significant contribution of recent years on the 
Russo-French conflict was made by Lieven, whose detailed study of the 1812-1814 
campaigns includes references to the intimidation of Austria by Russian military 
Power, as well as the British observer Stewart who (combined admiration with 
alarm' at seeing the Russian army cross the Rhine. 6 This demonstration of might by 
a largely unknown state, and one which had only recently been on the opposite 
side to Britain, was enough to provoke a significant degree of disquiet amongst the 
British. Gleason, however, has stressed the significance in the early nineteenth 
Century of the personal antipathy towards Russia on the part of key diplomats such 
as Canning and Castlereagh.7 The figure who most obviously sat as the focal point 
for British Russophobia was Nicholas I, self-proclaimed (gendarme of Europe.' The 
interventionist implications of this title were only strengthened decades later wh en 
he sent Russian troops into the Hapsburg Empire to put down the Hungarian 
uprising of 1848. However, it also seems that Russophobia was more than simply a 
political factor. Gleason goes on to argue that a combination of Russia's prolific rate 
3 J.H. Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, a study of the interaction of policy and 
opinion, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p.276. 
4 E.g. O. Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade, (London, 2010); B. Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars, 
(Ware, 1973). 
5 Eg. Figes, Crimea. 
6 D. Lieven, Russia against Napoleon: The battle for Europe 1807-1814, (London, 2009), pp.461, 477. 
7 Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia, p.32. 
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of territorial expansion and the propaganda of individuals such as David Urquhart 
led to Russophobia becoming a mainstream factor in British society.8 
Although his death in 1877 prevented him from making a particularly significant 
impact upon the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78} it is nonetheless worthwhile pausing to 
consider David Urquhart and the significance of his activities during the mid-
nineteenth century. A former diplomat and Turcophile who had spent much time 
working for the British government in the Ottoman Empire and its vicinity} Urquhart 
was dismissed from the Foreign Service by Palmerston when an attempt at baiting 
the Russian Navy backfired} an action of which Urquhart always swore Palmerston 
had full knowledge. 9 Urquharfs personal bitterness at Palmerston and his 
Turcophilia gradually fuelled a hatred of Russia} and a strenuous attempt to reshape 
the entire nature of the way in which British Foreign Policy was made. Although he 
was ultimately unsuccessful in this attempt} he did nonetheless exert considerable 
influence over certain minority groups and individuals who would later be active in 
the so-called 'Jingo} movement. 
Ultimately} his influence on mainstream politics seems to have been limited} and 
even his biographer concedes that he was 'dismissed as something of a crank by 
most of his political contemporaries.}1D Clearly} then} the fact that Uruqhart was 
able to establish Russophobia as a mainstream current of opinion does not mean 
that it is possible to argue a general hatred for Russia and Russian s amongst the 
British masses. However} it is still a point of significance and a nod to the notion 
that 'it is articulate sentiment that counts.}ll Furthermore} whilst he 'distanced 
himself from the more vocal elements of this Russophobia} Disraeli did on occasion 
. -'cooperate} with Urquhart in the first half of the nineteenth century.12 By the latter 
half of the century} it seems to have become an accepted commonplace that British 
and Russian interests were fundamentally incompatible} a notion that would 
8 Ibid., pp.86, 180, 200-204. 
9 M. Taylor, 'Urquhart, David (1805-1877),' Oxford National Dictionary of Biography, (Oxford, 2004), 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28017. accessed 14 Nov 2011]. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gleason, Russophobia, p.279. 
12 M. Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, (Oxford, 2011), p.44. 
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remain in circulation into the twenty-first century.13 Some felt that the perception 
stretched beyond this and the Atrocity campaigner E.A. Freeman went so far as to 
assert in an article in The Contemporary Review that IEnglishmen have been 
brought up in the belief that it was the first national duty of every Englishman to 
hate Russia with a blind hatred.,14 Freeman's remarks came at a time when criticism 
of Russia was being used to undermine the Atrocity Campaign, so the strength with 
which he states his case is unsurprising. However, the fact remains that he clearly 
felt strongly that there was a negative attitude towards Russia inherent in much of 
British thinking, regardless of whether that was actually the case. 
Despite all these repeated perceived incompatibilities of policy and notions of 
inevitable conflict, we must keep in mind the fact that Crimea was the only 
significant occasion in the nineteenth Century where Britain and Russia were 
actually at war. Obviously, there is a seeming paradox between prolonged and 
often high tensions on the one hand, and ninety six years of the century spent 
formally at peace on the other. The explanations for this are multiple, and 
doubtless economic and political factors played their part. However, the most 
significant reason was, perhaps, logistical, summed up in Bismarck's wry 
observation that lit is not easy for an elephant to battle with a whale.,is 
In terms of real activity on behalf of Russia, Meininger highlights the contrast 
epitomised in a figure such as Ignatiev, the long-serving Russian ambassador to the 
Porte and a notorious Pan-Slav. Although his own views were strongly political, in 
crises such as the creation of the Bulgarian exarchate in the late 1860s and early 
1870s, Ignatiev allowed himself to be ruled by practicalities.16 This, however, is seen 
not simply as an example of Realpolitik, but as an awareness of the Russophobe 
attitudes of the rest of Europe and the consequent difficulty of Russian 
13 The notion of British and Russian foreign policy interests as being fundamentally incompatible has 
a long history of being contested as simply a matter of perception see e.g. w. T. Stead (Ed.), The MP 
for Russia: Reminiscences and correspondence of Mme. Olga Novikoff, (London, 1909), pviii., through 
to Prof. J. Ridley's comments on BBC2's 'Royal Upstairs Downstairs: Hughenden,' Broadcast 
9/11/2011. 
14 E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' The Contemporary Review, 
29 (February 1877), p.491. 
15 Gleason, Russophobia, p.289. 
16 Meininger, T.A., Ignatiev and the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872: a study in 
personal diplomacy, (Wisconsin, 1970), p.19S. 
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unilateralism on Slav matters.17 This notion of Russian activities or motives being 
perceived as somehow dark or duplicitous has recently received consideration in 
the work of Brown, who re-examines Said's Orientalism. Brown describes Said's 
classic work as having shown 'how an obtuse and prejudiced ideational construct of 
the Orient became hegemonic in Western thinking.,18 He then goes on to show how 
the corruption of analysis by artificially narrowed parameters of observation affects 
not only Western consideration of 'the East,' but also of Russia. 19 For western 
scholars, it is argued, the Russian volksgeist of 'sloth, drunkenness and laziness' is 
regarded as sufficiently universal that all considerations of Russia become viewed 
through this prism. 2o Although the nineteenth century seems to have attributed 
rather more sinister characteristics to Russia than laziness, the idea that a 
thoroughly flawed way of thinking can exist on the part of an entire historiography, 
makes it unsurprising that individuals or even a society might exhibit similar 
tendencies. 
If the historiography of British Russophobia is patchy and politicised, the history of 
Anglophobia in Russia, in English-language publications at least, is perhaps even 
more obscure. Figes asserts that it had a 'long tradition' in Russia and cites Russian 
drunkards in the 1850s who had run out of everyday insults yelling "Palmerston!" 
and "Napier!" at each other as if they were worse than the devil. 21 However, 
beyond this, there is little detail given. Anglo-British contact can be traced back as 
far as the reign of Ivan IV, but there is little in these early years to suggest great 
antipathy. Indeed, the Tsar seems to have had plans to marry England's Elizabeth I, 
albeit plans that were never entertained seriously by the English court and which 
only received such moderated answers as they did in order to ease the position of 
British merchants trading in the White Sea.22 Peter I, of course, famously visited 
Britain during his grand tour of Europe in 1698 and took many ideas and 
impressions from his visit back to Russia with him. However, a visit between the 
17 Meininger, Ignatiev and the Bulgarian Exarchate, p.62. 
18 J.D.J. Brown, 'A Stereotype, wrapped in a cliche, Inside a caricature: Russian Foreign Policy and 
Orientalism,' Politics, VoI30(3), 2010, p.149. 
19 Ibid., pp.152-156. 
20 Neuman cited in Ibid., p.153. 
21 Figes, Crimea, p.315. 
22 H. Troyat, Ivan the Terrible, trans. J. Pinkham, (London, 1984), pp.86, 137-141. 
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two countries is far from a guarantee of a good relationship and the case of 
Nicholas I shows the potential dangers of personal meetings between sovereigns in 
an era when the pragmatics of politics and diplomacy were generally conducted by 
lower-lever functionaries. Indeed, Figes asserts that Nicholas I felt he had reached 
an understanding with Queen Victoria over their future relations, during his visit to 
Great Britain in 1844. When events and policy did not play out along these lines, 
Nicholas perceived this as a personal slight and a great deal of the antipathy 
generated in later years stemmed from this sense of 'betrayal.,23 
Although the relationship between Britain and Russia was a long-established one, 
the Crimean conflict is a particularly significant moment between the two 
countries. Whilst Russia had always been something of an outsider to Europe, 
Crimea marked the first time that a country like Britain had openly sided with the 
Turks, a non-European, Muslim power, against Russia. 24 It is in this light that Figes 
has tried to portray the growth of Panslavism in Russia as a reaction to the Crimea. 
Although the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee had existed for several years 
before the war, the St Petersburg and Kiev branches were only launched in the 
1860s and were both a sign of (as well as a further contribution to) the growth of 
Slavonic sentiment amongst the urban well-to-do.25 
Foreign and Domestic Policy 
In both Britain and Russia, foreign policy was often driven by a consideration of 
domestic concerns.26 Indeed, Swartz attributes the breach between Disraeli and 
Derby during the eastern crisis to the fact that 'Derby, unlike Beaconsfield, did not 
conceive of the Russo-Turkish war primarily as a domestic political challenge.,27 At 
the simplest level, the link between Foreign and Domestic affairs may be something 
as simple as avoiding a war because the domestic economy cannot foot the bill. 
23 Figes, Crimea, p.69. 
24 One could of course argue that this was not strictly true, given the case of Sweden under Charles 
XII. However, this represents more of a direct and local power-struggle, and the British case is still a 
qualitatively different one. 
25 Figes, Crimea, pp.487-490. 
26 D. Geyer, Russian Imperialism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914, trans 
Bruce Little, (Leamington Spa, 1987). 
27 M. Swartz, Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone, (Oxford, 1985), 
p.62. 
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However, of far greater relevance for this study, is the question of how a 
government's Foreign Policy is perceived by its own electorate or, where an 
electorate was absent, the influential and politically aware and articulate classes. 
Britain in the nineteenth century often justified its international actions in 
reference to its eternal and ill-defined 'interests.' The extent to which a politician 
was perceived to be acting for or against those interests could have a significant 
impact upon their fortunes. Undoubtedly, the British politician in the nineteenth 
century best able to assume the mantle of patriotism was Palmerston. His death in 
1865 left something of a void in British politics and it was only in the later 1870s 
that Disraeli was able to claim the perception of the Conservatives as 'the patriotic 
party'. Interestingly, although Cunningham has asserted that Disraeli did, indeed, 
steal the 'language of Patriotism' from Palmerston, Parry believes that he tried and 
failed, being undermined by popular anti-Semitism at the time.28 How exactly he 
was able to do this forms a significant part of this chapter. Kovic notes that Disraeli 
and Palmerston alike both strove to 'resist' public opinion as a concept yet were 
prepared to 'use patriotism in a demagogic manner.,29 In one sense, Disraeli's 
positioning during the Eastern Crisis was made possible by Gladstone's decision to 
stand so firmly on the side not only of the Bulgarians who had suffered in the 
attacks, but also of the Russians. The extent to which the two causes were 
synonymous, is of course debatable. For the Russian Press and the literary classes, 
it was self-evident that the moral cause, and the one most in accord with Christian 
values, was the Russian one; an assumption which seems to remain underlying even 
when writers find themselves, or their abstracted notions of 'the people,' in 
opposition to the government.30 By contrast, the question of an ulterior motive for 
Russian activity was constant upon the pages of the British Press and, although 
Gladstone did not defend the Russians with the ferocity that he attacked the Turks, 
he nonetheless aligned himself with them to a sufficient extent for Disraeli to 
oppose them simultaneously. 
28 J. Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism National Identity & Europe, 1830-1886, 
(Cambridge, 2006), p.324. 
29 Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, p.45. 
30 F. Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz, (Evanstown, 2000), voLl, 
e.g. pp.524, 531; The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' 4/5/1876, p.1, CoI.B. 
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Disraeli's comment after Berlin that he had brought back 'peace with honour' 
identifies neatly the way in which he perceived both his own accomplishments and 
his objectives at Berlin. Nor was this a viewpoint which he held surreptitiously; on 
the death of Palmerston, Disraeli gave a speech in which he declared '[I] trust that 
the time will never come when the love of fame shall cease to be the sovereign 
passion of our public man.,31 Many historians have attested that the likelihood of a 
European war was all but gone by the time the diplomats assembled for the 
Congress of Berlin.32 However, Disraeli's principal concern was that the agreement, 
which would doubtless be reached, would be one that was most visibly in keeping 
with Britain's honour and, indeed, was one that would be well regarded at home. 
Gladstone would, of course, have questioned rather strongly his definition of 
'honour' and more significantly, perhaps, some historians have questioned the 
extent to which Disareli aided or ultimately hampered the cause of the British 
negotiating team at Berlin. Seton-Watson describes the fears of the rest of the 
British negotiating team at Disraeli's insistence on leading the negotiations on 
Batum as they were convinced he had 'never seen a map of Asia Minor.,33 Sumner 
has described how Disraeli was the only delegate present who did not speak fluent 
French, but insisted on conversing in this language anyway, rather than be seen to 
be ignorant. This led to his agreement that the clause regarding this major Russia n 
Black Sea port be changed from 'exclusivement commericel' to 'essentiallement 
commerciel' as Disraeli was assured that the two were essentially the same th ing.34 
Nor was this an isolated incidence of Disraeli's Foreign Policy leaving itself open to 
the classic 'style over substance' accusations. Eldridge cites the Suez Canal share 
purchase of 1875, often hailed as a major success of Disraeli's during this period, as 
a largely pointless gesture, noting that the British government only acquired a 44% 
stake in the canal, the voting rights of which had already been mortgaged. 
Furthermore, given that passage of the canal was guaranteed by international 
31 Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, p.68 
32 W.N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A DiplomatiC History o/the Near Eastern 
Settlement 1878-1880, 2nd Ed. (London, 1963). 
33 R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern question: a Study in Diplomacy and Party 
Politics, (London, 1962), p.4S4. 
34 B.H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, (Oxford, 1937), p.S44. 
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treaty, there was no tangible benefit to the share acquisition whatsoever. 35 It is also 
worth bearing in mind that one of the most credulous believers in the notion that 
Russian advances in the Balkans somehow threatened British links with India was 
Queen Victoria herself. During Disraeli's Premiership, she involved herself in policy 
far more than any other British monarch of the century. In the winter of 1877, she 
even visited Disraeli at Hughenden to urge him not to falter in pressing the cabinet 
to adopt a warlike posture towards Russia. Many have also attested to the Queen's 
personal role in the Imperial Titles Act of 1876 which styled her Empress of India. 
This was, perhaps, a response to the advice of Major C. David, who had observed 
earlier that year that only a 'discontented' India would be at all difficult to defend if 
by 'extraordinary strokes of strategy' an enemy got there at all. 361ndeed, Kovic has 
argued that Disraeli felt that the title was an 'ideological weapon' which would be 
highly significant and do much to improve Indian loyalty.37 
Russia and Britain in each others Press, 1875-1878 
Moving from the more general aspects of Russo-British relations in the nineteenth 
century, to the more specific coverage of our period, 1875-1878, it is possible to 
discern certain trends and patterns in the manner in which events were reported. 
One of the most significant of these, is the fact that in The Voice, Great Britain, or 
even individual members of the cabinet (most commonly Disraeli but occasionally 
Derby or Salisbury) were singled out by leaders and editorials as being the figures 
responsible for the precise state of affairs in Europe at that point in time. This was 
generally done in the manner of blame, rather than praise. Examples of this can be 
seen in the spring of 1876, when various last-ditch diplomatic efforts were being 
made to forestall the outbreak of war between Serbia and Turkey. The Voice 
opened with a front-page condemnation of Great Britain, stating that the British 
government was opposing 'the whole of Europe,' and that it was nonsense to send 
the British fleet to the Sea of Marmara purely on the suspicion that current 
diplomatic activity 'would not achieve its goals.,38 A week or so later, they 
3S c.c. Eldridge, Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism, (Cardiff, 1996), p.46 
36 Major C. David, (Indian Army), Is a Russian Invasion of India Feasible? (London, 1877), p.29. 
37 Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, pp. 85, 103. 
38 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (19) 31/5/1876, p.l, CoLE. 
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portrayed the whole of Europe as stuck in limbo waiting for a British decision, 
something they portrayed as the only practical solution to the 'uncertain political 
atmosphere of Europe.,39 Throughout the period of the crisis, there was rarely, it 
seems, any attempt made on the part of the Russian press to distinguish in any way 
between the British government, press, or people. Indeed, the entirety of Britain 
could quite easily have been seen by the Russian reading public as a completely 
homogenous mass, with the sole exceptions of William Gladstone and John 
B . h 40 rig t. 
This trend was taken still further with articles or communications addressed directly 
to British politicians. An obvious example of this is the 'Letter to Disraeli' which 
appeared in The Voice in August 1876.41 Despite appearing on the front page of a 
Russian newspaper, printed in St Petersburg, and unlikely to come immediately to 
Disraeli's attention, the piece was nonetheless laid out as an ordinary letter, 
addressed to 'the Minister of Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and Empress of India,' 
and signed off from A. Gradovskii, 'professor of St. Petersburg University, and 
perhaps also, unknown to yoU.,42 However, this structure was somewhat 
undermined by the opening line 'you understand, of course, that this letter to you is 
not, in reality, a letter.' After a short discussion of literary technique and the 
reasons for his self-contradiction, Gradovskii moves on to the reason for writing his 
letter, namely the British refusal to endorse the Berlin Memorandum. This, he 
argues, was a significant moment, as Disraeli 'brought light to that place, where 
previously darkness had reigned.' This rather over-the-top phraseology is used to 
convey the clarity with which Disraeli's actions (Gradovskii seems either unwilling or 
unable to distinguish between the personal activities of Disraeli and the acts of the 
British government) have shown 'exactly what Russia can expect from Europe' 
when there is a conflict between the cause of persecuted Christians and perceived 
'national interests.,43 When the crisis began, Gradovskii concedes, the British and 
the Germans were the first to show enthusiasm for the rebel cause, and certainly 
39 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' (29/5) 10/6/1876, p.l, CoLB. 
40 The Voice, 'Foreign News,' (8) 20/1/1878, p.4, CoLE. 
41 The Voice, 'Letter to Disraeli,' (3) 15/8/1876, p.l, CoLA. 
42 The Voice, 'letter to Disraeli', p.l, CoLE. 
43 Ibid. 
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more actively than the Russians. However, this quickly turned cold, with many 
German publications already denouncing the rebels and the British govern ment 
ensuring a terrible fate for the South Slavs, by virtue of their policy of non-
interference.44 The superficial assertion of the article is simple: that Russia is the 
true friend of the South Slavs, and that Britain, personified by Disraeli, has acted 
immorally by failing to support the Slavs and by allowing their 'interests' to dictate 
policy. 
However, there are still some questions about the article which need to be 
addressed: Given the immediate admission that the letter is not really a letter, it 
seems highly unlikely that Gradovskii's genuine intention was to alert Disraeli 
regarding his feelings and to affect a change in British governmental policy. In that 
case, the assumption must be that Gradovskii's true target audience was the actual 
readers of The Voice, a section of the educated, newspaper-reading classes of St. 
Petersburg. In this context, it becomes highly significant that Disraeli, and more 
generally Great Britain, is the 'other' against which he chooses to define himself 
and, by implication, Russia. Russia's actions (or at this point, more pertinently, 
inactions) are justified by reference to the behaviour of Great Britain. Passive 
inactivity is shown as being superior to the measured inactivity of Great Britain, as it 
offers hope for some kind of ultimate activity to emerge. 
As a brief aside, it is worthwhile considering to what extent, if any, the choice of 
Disraeli is significant. Why not an open letter to 'the British people,' 'the British 
government,' or even Queen Victoria? There are a number of possible answers to 
this: one is that Disraeli, by virtue of his previous politics was seen as a recognisably 
anti-Russian figure within the British establishment, and was thus an ideal choice 
for a negative personification of Britain. It is also possible however, that Disraeli 
was singled out due to his ancestry. Disraeli was, of course, the most prominent 
Jew in the Eastern Crisis, and it is worth considering for a moment whether this was 
a significant factor in the decision being taken to single him out for particular 
vilification? Until recently, there has been a decided paucity in the amount of 
attention given to Disraeli's Jewishness, particularly in relation to his Foreign and 
44 Ibid. 
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Imperial policy.45 However, it seems that there may well be a case for arguing both 
that Disraeli's targeting during the Eastern Crisis was, in some measure, anti-
Semitic, and a case for re-considering the belief that has been perpetuated ever 
since the 1870s that Disraeli's apparent Russophobia may in some way have been 
fuelled by his Jewishness. The most obvious instance of a Russian fixating upon 
Disraeli's Jewishness can be found in 1878, when Olga Novikov compared the Prime 
Minister to a notorious Biblical infanticide, claiming that even Disraeli recognised 
that there was room enough in Asia for Russia and Britain, so why did the anti-
Russian campaigners try to lout Herod Herod?J46 
It is difficult to discern the sentiments of the Russian Press on this matter. Unlike 
The Times, The Voice did not publish a regular selection of readers' letters and few 
opportunities were given for these individuals to express their views. The editorial 
stance of The Voice overall does not seem to suggest any particular invective 
against the Jews; they were often mentioned anecdotally, but rarely as a target of 
anger. Likewise, Dostoevskii, whose writer's Diary has been heavily criticised duri ng 
this period for the strong anti-Semitic sentiments it expressed, was, in fact, 
ethnically speaking, a model of courtesy when it came to Disraeli. 47 In June 1876, 
asserting that Russia would act honourably, but that England would not, he referred 
simply to IEngland's prime minister,' hardly an abusive form of address by anyone's 
standards.48 In the September of the same year, Dostoevskii returned to Disraeli 
and spent several pages denouncing him as a piccola bestia and generally as a 
dissimulating cad. However, once again, he is relatively moderate in his language. 
He notes, perhaps needlessly, that Disraeli is Ian Israelite by birth,' but otherwise 
45 Endelman and Kushner's recent volume has considered a broad sweep of aspects of Disraeli's life 
which were impacted by his Jewishness, and Wohl has shown the degree to which he often found 
himself subjected to anti-Semitic prejudices. Endelman and Kushner also note that Blake ignored 
Disraeli's Jewishness entirely and disparaged Shannon for his dismissal of anti-Semitism in the 
atrocities movement as 'prominent but superficial.' T.M. Endelman & T. Kushner (Eds.), Disraeli's 
Jewishness, (London, 2002); A.S. Wohl, IIIDizzi ben Dizzi": Disraeli as Alien,' Journal of British Studies, 
(July, 1995), pp.375-411; for an example of the sort of anti-Semitic material appearing about Disraeli 
at this time, see 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi; or, The Orphan of Baghdad,' in M. Partridge & R. Gaunt (Eds), Lives 
of Victorian Political Figures 1: Volume 2 Benjamin Disraeli (Part 1), (London, 2006), pp.361-372. 
46 O. Novikov, Is Russia Wrong? 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.112. 
47 G.S. Morson, 'Introductory Study: Dostoevsky's Great Experiment,' in Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, 
p.37. 
48 Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, p.524. 
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refers to him simply as 'Viscount Beaconsfield/ 'Mr. Beaconsfield,' or just plain 
'Beaconsfield' after the title which Disraeli adopted, on elevation to the House of 
Lords in August 1876.49 Once again, these are moderate words, given that 
Dostoevskii was in the habit of referring to Jews simply as 'Yids.,50 Given Morson's 
assertion that the 'fanatic anti-Semitism' which characterised the 1877 Writer's 
Diary was uncharacteristic of Dostoevskii, and influenced by millenarian 
excitement, Disraeli seems to have been remarkably decently treated in the writer's 
d· 'b 51 latn es. 
However, whilst Disraeli may have escaped the worst excesses of racial slur from 
the Russian press, the same could not be said in Britain. Wohl cites Stead, who 
claimed in his Northern Echo, that Disraeli's foreign Policy amounted to a 
declaration of 'death to the Christians!,52 This came in addition to a large number of 
cartoons, in magazines such as Fun, and Punch, which played strongly upon 
Disraeli's ethnicity, caricaturing him as Shylock or even the Devil. More measured, 
and perhaps more considered, attacks could be found within the assertions in the 
Fortnightly Review to Disraeli's 'Jewish Blood' as being the key to his Foreign 
Policy.53 
It appears that, at least in elements of the St Petersburg Press, Russian morality was 
being framed in terms of reference to British action. Interestingly, this does not 
seem to have been the case to the same extent in the literary 'thick' journals, which 
focused their energies instead upon the Crisis more directly. By contrast, the British 
Press of this period did little to suggest that British morality was defined in 
reference to Russian activity. However, this is certainly not to say that there were 
no elements within British society who articulated the view that any action which 
opposed Russia was inherently a positive one. As noted above, one of the most 
49 Ibid., p.608. 
50 This is the habitual translation of the Russian word 'Zhid,' which some have argued should not be 
equated exactly with the (supposedly) more offensive English word 'Yid.' However, the very fact that 
Dostoevskii feels the need to justify his use of the word shows that even in Russia in 1877, the word 
was not free of connotation or controversy; Dostoevskii, Writer's Diary, vol.2, p.902. 
51 G.S. Morson, 'Introductory Study: Dostoevsky's Great Experiment,' in Dostoevsky, Writer's Diary, 
p.37. 
52 Wohl, 'Ben Juju,' p.1l7. 
53 Wohl, 'Ben Juju,' p.106. 
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vocal critics of Russia in British Society, particularly when the Russian gaze fell upon 
Turkey, had long been David Urquhart. Urquhart's death in 1877 precluded his 
particular brand of vocal action in the latter stages of the crisis, but the Foreign 
Affairs committees which he had set up in the decades before still served as rallying 
points for those supporting a belligerently pro-Turkish foreign policy.54 The Times 
carried only a short obituary for Urquhart, but in doing so, they not only 
acknowledged how many people he had won to his cause, namely 'constant war in 
the region of opinion against the designs of Russia,' but perhaps more significantly 
how, 'his ideas seem to have transformed themselves into some powerful organs of 
English opinion, so that in listening to the Pall Mall Gazette and the Morning Post, 
we often seem to be hearing the very utterances of Mr Urquhart.,55 Although the 
Times article is typically moderate, it is still possible to detect here a note of 
concern that the mainstream press is representing such extremist views. Urquhart's 
name would continue to be used by those discussing the crisis for the following 
year or so. About a month after the obituary, Vernon Harcourt labelled the 'Russo-
phobist journals' of the 'alarmist press' as the 'legitimate heirs of the late Mr David 
Urquhart's mantle,' and derided the nonsensical and patronising attitude adopted 
by a supposedly 'intelligent Press ... to an educated people.,56 Given that Harcourt 
was a former cabinet colleague of Gladstone and had been a vocal atrocities 
campaigner the previous year, the fact that he talks disapprovingly of Urquhart is 
hardly surprising.57 However, the fact that such a figure continues to be invoked 
after his death offers some testament to the notoriety he had achieved. 
Despite Harcourt's assertion, there were others writing at this time who also 
appeared to be laying claim to Urquhart's mantle; few more energetically so than 
Augustus Daly. An otherwise little-known figure, Daly published two titles in 1877, 
both containing virulent attacks against Russia. The first, The duty of Civilised 
Europe on the Settlement of the Eastern Question: or the Warning Cry to Russia 
54 M. Taylor, 'Urquhart, David (1805-1877),' ODNB. [accessed 10 Nov 2011]. 
55 The Times, 'The Late Mr David Urquhart,' 28/5/1877, p.ll, Col.c. 
56 The Times, 'British Interests' (Letters to the Editor), 16/6/1877, p.12, CoI.B. 
57 P. Stansky, 'Harcourt, Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon (1827-1904),' Oxford Notional 
Dictionary of Biography, (Oxford, 2004), [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33693. accessed 
10 Nov 2011]. 
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contrasted the 'far-seeing and unswerving' Disraeli with the 'uncharitable' 
'embarrassment' Gladstone as the latter allowed himself to be taken in whilst the 
former saw through the disguise that Russia was the true 'aggressor.,S8 The second 
work, Greater Lessons in Massacre: a reply to the right honourable W.E. Gladstone 
M.P. was a more personal piece in nature which opened with a strong defence of its 
own lack of vindictiveness and a concern for brevity, conceding that it had been 
'unwillingly compelled' to 'strong' language by the need to offer a reasoned counter 
to those who had 'spoken so forcibly in favour of the Russian cause, and so harshly, 
and unjustly, against that of Turkey.,s9 The two publications shared some traits, 
blaming Russia for a diverse list of crimes of varying plausibility, including 
oppression in Poland, the lack of reforms in Turkey, starting the Bosnian revolt, and 
knouting prisoners to death.60 However, it was the second publication which was 
clearly the more enraged of the two, being littered with half-page sentences, 
assertions that Gorchakov's father was almost certainly the devil, and bold 
pronouncements that in all international disputes the 'criminals are the RUSSIANS' 
who, wherever they encountered other races, 'BUTCHERED THEM IN COLD 
BLOOD.,61 Indeed, he even went so far as to compile a list of the greatest villains of 
history: Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, Carracalla, Ivan the Terrible, and Ignatius 
Loyola. A fearsome group no doubt, but none were as bad as Alexander II !62 At this 
time, it was also possible to find in London documents such as the (conveniently) 
anonymous Russian Intrigues: Secret despatches of General Ignatiev and Consular 
Agents of the Great Panslavic Societies. 63 This collection offered, its preface 
explained, proof of Russia's guilt in the great conspiracy which had been so long 
suspected, by means of a series of documents purchased by a Turkish ambassador 
in Vienna from a corrupt Russian official. The conclusion of this piece was that the 
58 A.A. Daly, The duty of civilised Europe on the settlement of the eastern question or the Warning Cry 
to Russia, (London, 1877), pp.1-2. 
59 A.A. Daly, Greater Lessons in Massacre: a reply to the right honourable w.E. Gladstone M.P. 
(London, 1877). 
60 Daly, Warning Cry to Russia, pp.13, 18; Greater Lessons in Massacre, pp.l0, 40-42. 
61 Daly, Greater Lessons in Massacre, pp.3, 19,21, 27,31. 
62 Ibid., p.35. 
63 Russian Intrigues: Secret despatches of Generallgnotiev and Consular Agents of the Great 
Panslavic Societies, (London, 1877). 
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very word 'Russophobist' was now meaningless as the guilt had been pro 64 It . ven. IS, 
of course, difficult to assess what impact these publications may have had at the 
time - they certainly did not warrant review in The Times - but, nonetheless, they 
provide an insight into some of the more extreme opinions which were at least 
finding their way into print at this time. 
An earlier chapter has already mentioned the actions of Olga Novikov, the Russian 
ex-patriot resident in London whom Disraeli once dubbed 'the MP for Russia.' 
Having seen some of the materials that were being directed against the Russian 
point of view at this time, this is an appropriate point to consider in more detail her 
pamphlet Is Russia Wrong?65 Written in defence of Russian aims at the height of 
this crisis and its attendant anti-Russian atmosphere, it provides an insight into the 
charges being levelled against Russia from the perspective of a Russian who was in 
far closer contact with Britain than most of her compatriots. The pamphlet is a 
collection of letters all of which go some way towards providing an answer, (in the 
negative) to her book's eponymous title. At its worst, the pamphlet hawks the lazy 
stereotypes that were the bane of the Crisis on all sides, such as the question 'why 
do the Russians hate the Turks? - because they know them.,66 By and large, 
however, the pamphlet offers reasoned defences of particular actions, and seeks to 
undermine the foundation of ignorance upon which she argues Russophobia was 
built - an example of this can be seen when she highlights Tennyson's attempt to 
condemn Russia for use of the knout, fifteen years after it had been illegalised. 67 
Ultimately, though, however measured the majority of her arguments were, it is 
difficult to discern what impact the pamphlet actually had. It quickly ran to a second 
edition, but even this news was only communicated to the world via a tiny 
announcement in the 'classified' section of The Times and, once that had failed to 
generate interest, a follow-up a week or so later.68 Whilst the pamphlet was 
doubtless read keenly by Gladstone and other like-minded individuals, but this must 
64 Ibid., pp.iv-vi, 69. 
65 Mentioned above, pp.131, 140. 
66 O. Novikov, Is Russia Wrong? 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.69. 
67 Ibid, pp.81-82. 
68 The Times, 'Classified Advertising,' 17/1/1878, p.1S, CoLE; 22/1/1878, p.1S, CoLD. 
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largely be seen as a case of preaching to the converted.69 Dealing with the question 
of poor behaviour on the part of some of the Slavs demanding liberation, she 
adopted the familiar approach that this was due to the Turkish mis-rule they had 
suffered and that, in the words of Lord Russell, 'it would indeed be a hopeless case 
for mankind if despotism were thus allowed to take advantage of its own wrong.,70 
However, there is nothing, either here or elsewhere, to suggest that she reached or 
convinced anyone who had not been similarly swayed already by Russell's original 
71 pronouncement. 
It is important to keep in mind the degree to which perspectives have changed 
between the time at which these events in the Balkans were happening and the 
present day. Modern accounts of the Treaty of San Stefano invariably paint it as a 
picture of excess, as contrasted with the more moderate arrangement created by 
the Congress of Berlin.72 Novikov's work however, offers a fascinating insight into 
the brief period between the two treaties, when the San Stefano treaty did not 
have the Berlin settlement to be compared with. In Friends or Foes/ the sequel to /s 
Russia Wrong? Novikov cited San Stefano as the ultimate vindication of Russia's 
long-held claims of disinterest regarding territory in the Balkans, feeling that the 
treaty showed 'a magnanimity which is almost criminal' in having left European 
Turkey in existence. 73 Indeed, the original letter to The Northern Echo had 
expressed a confidence that the European conference which was in gestation was 
bound to expand upon and improve the 'humble half-measure,' which was followed 
in the printed compilation by an angry footnote remarking that the situation had 
only been made worse. 74 The attitudes expressed to the treaty at this time were, of 
course, varied, and it would be unsurprising to discover that 'the Pan-Slav 
69 Gladstone did not make any direct reference in his Diary to the pamphlet, but did repeatedly note 
meetings and correspondence with Novikov during this period. 
70 Novikov, is Russia wrong? p.119. 
71 See also above, pp.80-82. 
72 Glenny, The Balkans, p.133. 
73 O. Novikov, Friends or Foes, A sequel to 'Is Russia Wrong?', (London, 1878), p.8. 
74 Ibid., pp.8-9. 
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temptress' was expressing a thoro hi d 'ff ug y I erent perspective from the British 
mainstream.75 
Figure 2: 'Bulgaria according to the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.,76 
Beyond the general attitudes expressed towards Russia in the British Press, and the 
reactions to the people who expressed them most strongly, it is interesting to 
consider how the British Press at this time dealt with the military noises emanating 
75 R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78, (Oxford, 1979), p.238. 
76 htt p//en w iklpedia org! wik l/ FileBulga r ia San S t e f f ~ i i O O t.e' I II I' >-S T3 :." , [accessed 9/ 2/ 20 111 
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from Russia. The opinion of The Times is perhaps best summed up in an article of 
August 1876, entitled (Russian Opinion on the War.' This article reprinted a fairly 
large section of text from The Voice in which the demand for autonomy for the 
Christian provinces of Turkey was made and, perhaps more pertinently, the fact 
was noted that a failure to realise this would inevitably lead to Russian military 
intervention against Turkey.77 However, whilst the article was discussed, and 
deemed to be both a significant and an (authentic announcement of [Russian] views 
and opinions' the ultimate conclusion was that (this sensational article is, after all, 
no more than a fortissimo accompaniment to a much more moderate diplomatic 
campaign.,78 In other words, although the Russian Press might have gone beyond 
the government in terms of what they were prepared to state, demand and 
threaten publically, the contemporary view, at least in The Times, was that they 
were still simply providing an 'accompaniment,' to the official line, not pursuing 
their own course of action, or advancing a programme beyond that intended by the 
Russian state. Furthermore, the characterisation of the Russian diplomatic 
campaign as (moderate' suggests that whilst The Times may well not have shared 
the political conclusions or aspirations of Russian Foreign Policy at this time, they 
were a long way from condemning Russian diplomacy out of hand, or from 
dismissing it as a mere smoke-screeen. 
We know for certain that Britain had been considering, from as early as the autumn 
of 1876, whether military action would be necessary to prevent a Russian 
domination of the Turkish principalities, although it is unclear to what extent the 
logistical implications of this were ever followed through. 79 Likewise, the Russia 
government would not have been idle in considering the implications of alarming 
Britain. Indeed Jelavich and Jelavich note that in May 1877, before the Russo-, 
Turkish War even broke out Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador to London, had 
returned to St Petersburg in order to impress upon his superiors the dangers 
77 The Times, 'Russian Opinion on the War,' 2/8/1876, p.4, CoI.F. 
78 Ibid. 
79 TNA, War Office Records, The Steps which Russia would take should she determine to occupy the 
Principalities in the Spring, (Section D, Intelligence Branch, 1876), WO 33/28. 
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inherent in British suspicion of Russian intentions.8o At a time when the Russian 
Press was talking vaguely about the preparedness of {all layers of society' to make 
sacrifices for the War, and had barely begun to speculate on what the war would 
bring, Russian diplomats were already well aware, not only of plans closely 
resembling the Treat of San Stefano, but also the sort of consolations Britain was 
likely to require, in order to accept them. 81 However, such activities were 
insufficient to quell the fears of all elements within British sOciety, and thus there 
remained a significant portion who were prepared to voice loudly their opposition 
to Russia and its Balkan policies. 
Jingoism 
Perhaps the most significant group of Russophobes in Britain, at this time, were the 
{Jingoes,' taking their name from the lyrics of a popular music-hall song by G.H. 
MacDermott, cited at the start of this chapter. 
The juxtaposition of 'true' and {Constantinople' as a rhyme suggests that the song's 
popularity was not derived from its musical merits and thus it seems that the 
boisterous renditions which it enjoyed stemmed largely from sympathy with the 
sentiment it expressed. However, whilst this song is often cited in accounts of the 
time, Eldridge downplays its significance, citing an {anti-Jingo' song which often 
shared the same bill and was sung with equal gustO. 82 However, the song remains 
thoroughly obscure and any attempt to track it down is far more likely to turn up 
MacDermott's original. Furthermore, {the Great MacDermott' as he was 
increasingly known after this period is regarded as having 'become a household 
name' on the back of this significant commercial success and would later produce a 
further war song, and a pair of eulogies to Disraeli, both of which strengthened the 
Liberal accusations that he was in the pay of the Conservative Party. No such claims 
80 B. Jelavich C. Jelavich (Eds.), Russia in the East 1876-1880: The Russo Turkish War and the Kuldja 
Crisis as seen through the letters of A.G. Jomini to n.K. Giers, (Leiden, 1959) pp.36-37 
81 The Voice, 'Home news,' (30/5) 11/6/1877, p.2, CoI.B; Jelavich and Jelavich, Russia in the East, 
p.37. 
82 Eldridge, Disroeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism, p.69. 
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can be made about the anonymous author of Eldridge's alleged riposte. 83 Although 
the song is clearly the source of the term, the first use of it to refer to the 'rowdy 
supporters of a strong foreign policy' who made up the movement, was in a letter 
by G.J. Holyoake to The Daily News in March 1878.84 The term has since spread far 
beyond the Music Hall to refer to any zealous advocate of a militaristic foreign 
policy, but here we shall be concerned simply with the original group to whom the 
name was given. 
The most significant body of research produced on the subject of Jingoism, in its 
original sense, is that of Hugh Cunningham, whose work is unique in focusing upon 
the Jingoes themselves, rather than those they came into conflict with. Aside from 
the core studies of the atrocity campaign noted above, Laity's work on the British 
Peace movement is perhaps the best example of this, viewing the Jingoes through 
the eyes of those whom they attacked.8s It is indicative of the level of attention 
which the birth of Jingoism has received, that Cunningham's work consists primarily 
of a journal article and that the fuller consideration of the topic can only be found 
in his unpublished DPhil thesis. 86 Cunningham cites Holyoake, who described the 
Jingoes as being broadly derided by members of respectable society as those 
'habitues of the turf, the tap-room, and the low music halls, whose inspiration is 
beer, whose politics are swagger, and whose policy is to insult foreign nations.,87 
Although the term 'Jingo' is perhaps anachron istic before March 1878, public 
protest against Russia, against the Atrocities campaign, and against any calls for a 
peaceful solution to Europe's problems more generally, had been observable long 
before this. Laity notes that, even as far back as November 1876, there had been 
instances of hecklers at Peace Society meetings shouting their 'rowdy cheers for 
Beaconsfield.,88 Nor is it truly possible to pinpoint the moment at which this early 
enthusiasm crystallised into the Jingo movement: as might be expected of a 
83 D. Russell, 'MacDermott, Gilbert Hasting, (1845?-1901),' Oxford National Dictionary of Biography, 
(Oxford, 2004), [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34697. accessed 10 Nov 2011]. 
84 H. Cunningham, 'Jingoism in 1877-78,' Victorian Studies, Vol. 14, no.4, (Jun 1971), p.429. 
85 See above, pp.28-30. 
86 H.S. Cunningham, British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question, (University of Sussex, 
Unpublished Dphil thesis, 1969). 
87 Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.430. 
88 P. Laity, The British Peace Movement 1870-1914, (Oxford, 2001), p.70. 
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movement named for a song, by a letter to a newspaper, Jingoism itself never 
actually existed as a formal entity. However, this is not to say that there were no 
official organisations which could be associated with the Jingo movement. Laity 
identifies Maltman Barry as one of the key figures of Jingoism and notes that 
, 
through him, the Manhood Suffrage League, of which he was secretary at the time, 
became heavily involved in the agitation, although this proved a sufficiently 
unpopular course of action that it ultimately led to the untimely collapse of the 
League.89 Furthermore, the very fact of Barry's leadership of, at least elements of, 
the movement has led some to dismiss its significance. 9o Formerly a Marxist, and 
indeed a personal friend of Marx, the 1870s saw Barry's hatred of the Liberals drive 
him ever-closer to the Tories before the Eastern Crisis saw him reach a pinnacle of 
Russophobia and led to the foundation of the {National Society for the Resistance of 
Russian Aggression and the Protection of British Interests in the East.'91 
Cunningham notes that the National Society was formed in August 1877 but that, 
despite the best efforts of the {notorious' Barry, it attracted no meaningful degree 
of public attention until December, when the fall of Plevna (combined with the 
news that Parliament was to be recalled) bestirred the public imagination.92 
Independent of Barry, Laity also highlights links between Jingoism and the Turkish 
Defence Association as well as, more improbably, the Polish society of the White 
Eagle.93 
The Jingo movement seems throughout the period 1877-78 to have been 
characterised by violence and disorder, beginning with little more than anarchic 
attempts to disrupt meetings of the atrocity campaign by sheer volume of noise. In 
February and March of 1878, they turned their attentions more violently and 
deliberately towards Gladstone, three times attacking his house. Auguste Schluter, 
maid to Gladstone's daughters, described them on February second as a {dreadful 
89 Laity, The British Peace Movement, p.71. 
90 Cunningham, British Public Opinion p.114. . 
91 R. McWilliam, 'Barrie, Michael Maltman (1842-1909),' Oxford National Dictionary of B l O g r a ~ h Y , , , 
(Oxford, 2004), [ h t t p : / / w w w . o x f o r d d n b . c o m / v i e w / a r t i c i e / 4 2 3 3 1 . a c c e s s e d 4 N o v 2 0 1 . 1 ] . B o ~ n n .Barry 
the adoption of the alternate form 'Barrie' occurred sometime in the 1880s and thus Barry will be 
used in this work. 
92 Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.431. 
93 Laity, The British Peace Movement, pp.17; see below, pp.202-204. 
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crowd of people ... groaning and lifting their fists towards our windows.,94 
Gladstone himself noted in his diary on February twenty-fourth that the house had 
been attacked and that the windows had been broken amid 'much hooting.,95 The 
windows were smashed again in early March, an action Laity has suggested may 
even have been urged upon the mob by Tory headquarters.96 By contrast, 
Cunningham implies that this may simply have been a general outburst of anti-
Gladstonian feeling, claiming that Charles Stuart Parnell and his sister were 
amongst the crowd of window-breakers.97 The Workmen's Peace Association 
dismissed the Jingoes as not being 'artisans and mechanics' like themselves, but 
'swells and roughs.,98 Interestingly, Gladstone himself seems to have been 
reasonably untroubled by the March attacks, noting in his diary that the crowd had 
been 'held off by police.,99 
Of course, in a study of Press portrayals, the most important question to consider is 
the extent to which, and indeed the manner in which, these Jingoes were reported 
upon by the British Press at the time. The answer to this appears to be 'surprisingly 
little.' The Times did show a certain, limited, awareness of the phenomenon, 
recounting during their lengthy report on the vote of credit in February 1878 how 
The Liberal MP, William Lawson had asserted that 'Her Majesty's Government 
seemed to have been animated by the spirit of the song ... ,lOO That same April, they 
also recounted a speech by the Earl of Rosebery, which referenced 'the "By-Jingo" 
cries of the London music-halls and the metropolitan agitation,' and in Maya cry of 
'The Jingoes' was recounted as having been uttered by an anonymous heckler 
during a speech on the Eastern Question by Jacob Bright. lol However, the phrase 
did not appear directly from the pens of any of their reporters. This is not to say 
that the activities of the pro-war protestors went entirely unmentioned or 
unnoticed, merely that the term with which they have become synonymous in the 
94 M. Duncan (Ed), A Lady's Maid in Downing Street 1877-1896, (London, 1922), p.21. 
95 Gladstone Diaries, v.ix, p.293. 
96 Duncan, A Lady's Maid in downing Street, p.21, Laity, The British Peace Movement, p.72. 
97 Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.442. 
98 Laity, The British Peace Movement, pp. 
99 Gladstone Diaries, v.ix, p.297. 
100 The Times, 'House of Commons, Thursday January 31,' 1/1/1878, p.6, CoLE. , 
101 The Times, 'The Eastern Question,' 25/4/1878, p.5, CoLE; The Eastern Question, 1/5/1878, p.12, 
CoLA. 
200 
historiography was one which appears to have had little currency for 
contemporaries. 
In the dying hours of 1877, The Times carried a report on an attempt by the 
National Society for the Resistance of Russian Aggression and the Protection of 
British Interests in the East to stage an anti-Russian demonstration in Trafalgar 
Square.102 The meeting has been described since as a 'fiasco' and the report was 
quite unequivocal in its attitude towards the Society, describing the result of their 
attempts as 'a display of unseemly ruffianism and a decided demonstration of 
feeling against any interference on the part of England in support of the Turk.'lo3 
This, it will be remembered, is the newspaper which had supposedly 'turned Turk' 
earlier in the Crisis, and should supposedly have been encouraging exactly the sort 
of thing which this demonstration was campaigning for. 104 The Times went on to 
describe how the Society, led by Lord Stratheden and Campbell, had placarded 
London with 'pretensions' that the movement had sprung organically from the 
working classes, an affront which had prompted public meetings in Finsbury, 
Southwark and West London, to organise a counter-protest, far more effective than 
the original. This counter-protest was summoned by a handbill which demanded 
'Will you allow the Tories and Turcophiles to sacrifice on the altar of their ambition 
another 100,000 of your fellow-workers' lives and another 200 millions of your hard 
earnings, in order to maintain in Europe the abominable tyranny of the 
unspeakable Turk?,los The reporting of this event was highly significant, as although 
the demands and speeches of the anti-Russian society were reported by The Times, 
it was in an article which lambasted them as ruffians, questioned their integrity, 
and also stated the objections of their opponents. In sharp contrast, the very next 
column reported a meeting of the Workmen's Peace Association, characterised by 
little more boisterousness than 'warm cheers' and which stated their aim in a 
102 The Times, 'Trafalgar Square Demonstrations,' 31/12/1877, p.6, CoI.E. 
103 Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.431, Times, Trafalgar Square Demonstrations. 
104 See above, p102. 
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fashion entirely likely to evoke, if not sympathy with, at the very least respect for, 
this organisation and its goals.106 
Cunningham sees the end of 1877 as coinciding neatly with the end of this first 
phase of the agitation, and the movement towards a broader based campaign, 
inspired by the 'more potent' forces of 'anti-Gladstonism and Conservative 
nationalism.,107 The 'turning point' in his mind came in Sheffield at the very end of 
January 1878 when, he says, a public meeting refused to let the Liberals (who had 
organised the meeting) speak and instead passed an amendment in favour of the 
government. The Times coverage of the meeting offers far less indication that 
anything significant had transpired and, despite noting that the 'proceedings 
throughout were of a disorderly character,' they printed the Liberal motion that 
was proposed: one in favour of peace, and then simply noted that an amendment 
was successfully carried, favouring peace 'if it can be done consistently with the 
honour and the interests of the British Empire.,108 This was a visible defeat for the 
Peace Movement, but was not regarded as significant, judging from its placement 
in the second half of an article near the bottom of page ten. Cunningham does, 
however, regard them as the spark that kindled a series of further meetings which 
provided the core of the Jingo campaign. 10g 
Returning to the formal organisations who participated in the Jingo meetings, the 
Polish Society for the White Eagle received scant coverage on the pages of The 
Times. In October 1877, sandwiched between a report on the weather the Prince of 
Wales was experiencing in Scotland and a list of the following day's preachers at St. 
Paul's The Times noted 'we are asked to state that the Anglo-Polish society of the , 
"white eagle" is now collecting funds to equip a complete ambulance train to be 
attached to the Turkish army.,110 Aside from noting that this medical enterprise was 
to be staffed entirely by Polish individuals, and providing an address for those 
wishing to send contributions, this was the full extent of the article and permits 
106 Ibid., p.6, CaLF. 
107 Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.432. 
108 The Times, 'England and the War,' 30/1/1878, p.l0, CoLe. 
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little in the way of further comment. A few months later the head f th . 
, 0 e society, 
Major Wierzbicki, published an announcement in The Times which shed a little 
more light on the nature of the organisation, consisting as it did of an 
acknowledgement from the Porte of a message of goodwill and 'of the sympathy of 
the society for the Ottoman Empire in its struggle with the common enemy.,lll 
Once again, this article is simultaneously unremarkable and yet quite significant, 
the first for showing that a group of Polish exiles regarded Russia as 'the enemy,' 
the latter for the fact that, despite this latest article being an expression of 
animosity and belligerence towards another Power with whom Britain was still at 
peace, The Times still chose to carry it, albeit for only a few column inches near the 
bottom of page ten. 
The third and final time that The Times reported upon the activities of the SOciety of 
the 'White Eagle,' during the crisis, came on the occasion of a public meeting in 
February 1878. This time, there was an element of conflict once more to the 
proceedings, as the 'Anti-Russian' meeting clashed with the 'peace' meeting, both 
being held simultaneously in Hyde Park. 1l2 The article, moderately lengthy, 
described in some detail the course of the various meetings: broadly speaking an 
anti-Russian meeting, the beginnings of a Peace meeting, the arrival there of the 
first meeting, a general melee, and then a march through the streets of London by 
the anti-Russian faction, ultimately arriving at Downing Street, where they 
presented the resolutions of their meeting, via a number of intermediaries, to Lord 
Beaconsfield. Again, the tone of the article is broadly plain and descriptive, 
although a few hints may be glimpsed as to the possible sympathies of the author. 
Great attention is given to the various individuals who made up the crowds and the 
anti-Russians are seen to be split between 'very respectable people, including some 
well-dressed young men in organised bodies,' and 'roughs.' By contrast, the peace 
movement is depicted as containing 'many working men's leaders.' Although the 
greater social respectability of at least the first part of the anti-Russian group is 
made clear, and would doubtless have been more a note of commendation to a 
111 The Times, 'Poland and Turkey,' 12/10/1877, p.lO, Col.c. 
112 The Times, 'The Hyde Park Meeting,' 25/2/1878, p.10, CoI.A. 
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nineteenth century audience than to a modern-day one, the contrast between the 
'working-men's leaders,' on the one hand, and the 'roughs,' on the other, must be 
considered, even amongst Victorian educated society, to have given clear 
implications as to which group of people was best qualified to speak on behalf of 
'the people' of Great Britain, as both attempted to do. Aside from the nameless 
masses, there were individual spokespersons for both sides, namely Lt. Armit, 
Colonel Coope, Major Durrant and 'Mr Bartlett' on the anti-Russian side and 'The 
Hon. Auberon Herbert, Mr Bradlaugh, and the Rev. Mr Staunton of St. Albans.' 
Obviously it was a matter of personal opinion which of these groups of figures is 
considered to be the more impressive: the Peace movement would doubtless have 
looked dubiously upon the opinions of three commissioned officers regarding the 
avoidance of war, much as the anti-Russian party would have questioned the place 
of a Vicar to speak on matters of Foreign Policy. None of the officers appear to have 
impacted upon the historical consciousness beyond this meeting, although Sir Ellis 
Bartlett would be rewarded by Disraeli with the 'pocket borough' of Eye a few years 
later for his vociferous anti-Russian activity at this time. l13 Indeed, Cunningham 
notes how Bartlett wrote to Montagu Corry, Disraeli's private secretary, detailing 
the assistance that he had provided at this time. 114 The Peace movement had 
probably the higher-profile team of speakers, although something of a contrast in 
terms of their respectability; in Herbert a former Nottingham MP, drawn out of 
retirement by this particular issue, and in Bradlaugh a Radical Freethinker who had 
only avoided prison the previous year on a technicality, following his collaboration 
with Annie Beasant to republish an 'obscene' pamphlet on birth-control. 115 
However, despite the contrasting ways in which the two movements are portrayed, 
the most overwhelming sentiment which the Times article conveys, is general 
indifference. This may seem somewhat bizarre as an observation in reference to a 
113 J.P. Anderson, 'Bartlett, Sir Ellis Ashmead (1849-1902),' rev. H.C.G. Matthew, Oxford Dictionary of 
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gathering attended by over sixty thousand people. However, early on, the author 
notes the presence of a large number of 'the general public who had come to look 
on for amusement.,116 Later, this idea is reinforced with the more detailed 
comment: 
(the melee now became almost general, for all classes of persons had got 
mixed up together, and in the struggles of those who wanted to pass out of 
harm's wayan extraordinary scene was presented. There must have been 
60,000 or 70,000 people, but only a very small number was inclined to take 
an active part in the proceedings.' 
This presents a very odd picture of indifference in the face of mass presence at a 
meeting. Although some of the worst violence associated with the Jingoes was yet 
to come, such as the Gladstone windows incident described above, we have already 
seen how at the end of 1877, the Jingo movement had become synonymous with 
'roughs' and, in this light, it seems remarkable that so many would have turned up, 
simply out of idle curiosity at an opposed pair of meetings with such great potential 
to explode into violence. 
The lack of enthusiasm being demonstrated by the writer is clear, but the motives 
of the crowd are not. On the most basic level, it seems clear that there must have 
been a certain degree of popular interest in proceedings, as demonstrated by the 
fact that there were 60,000 or more people present. Even if most of these were 
not, as The Times stated, 'inclined to take an active part,' it is likely that they would 
have had a preference for one side or the other, felt a greater affinity with either 
the 'peace' meeting or the 'anti-Russian' one. 117 Whilst it is not possible to 
delineate the more passive supporters of the two groups from one another, the 
very fact that so many people turned out despite an atmosphere of Press dismissal 
only adds to the evidence that people attended out of genuine interest, rather than 
simply being sucked in by any hype. 
116 The Times, 'The Hyde-Park Meeting.' 
117 Ibid. 
205 
The opinion of The Times however, remains elusive. It might be possible to 
speculate that the paper did in fact have a stronger opinion on the matter than it 
ever made explicit, but that it feared the commercial implications of taking such a 
definitive stance, and opted instead to simply downplay the significance of the 
events, in an attempt to make the problem go away. However, there is nothing to 
explicitly support this notion. Furthermore, given Cunningham's observations on 
the way the movement quickly degenerated into {fiasco' and farce, it is unsurprising 
that The Times would feel the need to offer sustained comment. llS As he concludes 
{it may be of course that Beaconsfield had many silent supporters. But silence was 
equally likely to have indicated indifference.,119 
Anglophobia in Russia before the Congress 
Given the number of people who were clearly involved in some capacity or other in 
the campaign against Russia in Britain at this time, it seems pertinent to consider 
the attitude of the Russian Press and people towards Britain in the opening months 
of 1878. Understandably, there were many articles regarding the generally 
confused international situation, the war, and what was to follow. However, there 
does not seem to have been any particular preponderance of strongly anti-British 
sentiment amongst this. In January 1878, The Voice noted the relief emanating 
from Vienna that a cease-fire had been signed, and towards the end of the month, 
it expressed a fear that rumour, confusion and a lack of clear objectives would lead 
to further conflict.120 However, at this point, mentions of Britain were fairly 
infrequent, and even-tempered. In February, The Voice noted that the Turks were 
stalling over the peace treaty in the hope that the British would weigh in, but 
Gradovskii's article of the same day, {Peace with Turkey' directed its anger more at 
the Russian leaders who were prepared to {leave empty-handed' than the British 
for thwarting Russian plans. 121 
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Gradually however, the mood against Britain in the pages of Th V' b 
"e olce egan to 
harden. In mid-February, an editorial noted that 'English ministers never give up 
hope of taking over the Bosphorus,' and a few days later the same column asserted 
that if the Porte truly wanted peace they needed to allow the Russians to occupy 
the Dardanelles as a guard against British incursions.122 
The interesting thing about these editorials is that they do not seem to have been 
paralleled by any significant public expression of feeling against Britain. When 
editorials in The Voice talked about Russian suspicion of British actions or motives , 
they did not do so with reference to public expressions of sentiment. Nor did the 
'Home News' sections report protests against Britain on the streets of Moscow or St 
Petersburg in a fashion comparable to the 'anti-Russia' meetings in Hyde Park. All in 
all, then, it seems that Russian hostility towards Britain at this time was expressed 
very differently from British hostility towards Russia. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that there was no hostility towards Britain. The darkening tone of 
reports in The Voice has already been seen and the positioning of the British 
government as the benchmark for unsporting action is well-established. Indeed it 
might well be that the reason Russia lacked public vocalisations of disapproval 
against Britain was that there was no public movement advocating a strongly pro-
British policy, against whom such protests could be directed. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has seen that the tensions between Britain and Russia which lingered 
throughout the nineteenth century were particularly heightened during the Eastern 
Crisis of 1875-1878. Furthermore, it has been shown how, in Russia, at least within 
sections of the Press, the entirety of Foreign Policy was able to be defined in terms 
of contrast to British actions. However, it has also been shown that the strongly 
anti-Russian agents in Britain were able to dominate the noise making, but rarely 
became the majority element in terms of mass activity, and certainly in terms of 
respectable, articulate opinion. The question of the extent to which the strength or 
weakness of the Jingo movement was responsible for the amount of military 
122 The Voice, 'St Petersburg,' 2(14)/2/1878, p.l, CoLD; 'St Petersburg,' 4(16)/2/1878, p.1, CoI.B. 
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posturing practised by Britain or the ultimate decision to remain at peace is unclear. 
Derby's resignation from the Cabinet early in 1878 demonstrates the level of 
discord within the senior echelons of British politics, but it also deprives us of the 
useful source of a diarist privy to the inner goings-on, 
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Conclusion 
The years 1875-78 were of great significance in a number of ways: Firstly, British 
Foreign Policy and its relationship to popular politics entered a new era. 1 Although 
this was not the first point in time that Conservative and Liberal foreign policy had 
been seen to be different, nor the first time that Gladstone and Disraeli had been 
cast in such diametrically opposed roles, it saw the crystalisation of party foreign 
policy into the broad positions which they would occupy for a significant period 
after, and which would shape the course of subsequent British politics. 2 Secondly 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania became independent states, facts which are often 
treated with only superficial levels of details in their own national histories, with 
attention tending to concentrate instead upon first attempts to eke out a measure 
of autonomy, or upon later events. 3 Thirdly, Russian popular feeling was enshrined 
in literature in a powerful way.4 As has already been seen, the debate between 
Tolstoi and Dostoevskii was not confined to the literary world of the 1870s, but has 
permeated popular perceptions ever since.s 
However, despite all of this, this study has shown that many of the most sweeping 
conclusions drawn by historians, novelists and casual observers about the period 
simply do not stand up to scrutiny. Although particular interest groups were very 
active at this time and were able, on occasion, to mobilise significant amounts of 
the populace in activities related to their cause, the notion of genuine popular 
support remains difficult to substantiate. 
It does seem that, in both Britain and Russia at this time, there were considerable 
numbers of people taking an active interest in events in the Balkans and that they 
were able to raise sums of money, organise collections of aid, and distribute 
petitions. This is evident in the extensive lists of donations published in the Press, as 
1 H.S. Cunningham, British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question, (Unpublished DPhil thesis, 
University of Sussex, 1969), p.340. 
2 See above, pp.183-186. . 
3 . th gress of Berlin in his entire For example, Judah makes only two very brief references to e con . 
history of Serbia; T. Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of YugoslavlO, (Yale, 2000), pp. 
56, 67; see above Figure 2, p.195 .. 
4 See above, pp.142-147. 
5 See above, p.122. 
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well as the sizeable volume of letters and petitions held 'In th F . Off' e orelgn Ice 
collections.
6 
However, their impact upon the Press seems to be decidedly limited. In 
Russia, the majority of their achievement seems to have been to secure space for 
donations and collections to be printed and reported. 7 In Britain, the picture is 
more mixed, but despite the appearance of occasional letters touching upon 
Eastern matters, and of reports on the agitation, at no point does an overwhelming 
impression of Press enthusiasm appear. 
Of course, the sample of the Press considered here is a small one, and is not to be 
considered a definitive guide - other studies make it clear that there were some 
organs of the Press which were prepared to make a considerable amount of noise 
on behalf of whichever aspect of the cause they had aligned themselves to. 8 
Russian World (Russkii Mir) remained a loud voice for the Pan-Slav cause 
throughout this period, continuing to call for greater levels of intervention to aid 
the Balkan Slavs against the Turks (or British, Austrians, or whichever other people 
were deemed to be a threat at that time). Likewise, Stead's Northern Echo proved 
to be an ardent supporter of the 'atrocities campaign' both long before it rose to 
national prominence, and significantly after it had faded from the central spotlight. 
However, to have focused upon these would have been to show too much 
attention to simply partisan activities. The publications considered here, as 
representatives of more moderate and mainstream aspects of the Press, show that 
the overall picture was, as expected, rather more mixed. 
This overall ambivalent picture of the Press as a mouthpiece for certain 
metropolitan elites calls into question the broader notion of how, if at all, the Press 
was used as a medium of interface between the upper echelons of civil society and 
the political rulers of the states considered. It is, of course, possible on various 
occasions to find examples of governments using popular support to justify a 
preferred policy, citing it as an excuse, or trying to create reports to begin with. 
However, there is far less to indicate that either the British or the Russian 
6 See above, pp.113-116, 130-133. 
7 See above, p.134. 
8 R. T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, (London, 1963), pp. 67, 71. 
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government, in this period, was at any point forced into an activity that it did not 
want to participate in by popular or by Press pressures. Examples have been seen of 
governments adjusting their rhetoric or even altering their timing in order to find 
the path of least resistance to perceived opinions, such as the softening of language 
by the British government about the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria in the wake of the 
reaction against Disraeli's infamous 'coffee-house babble' remarks. 9 But the fact 
that Britain neither went to war against Turkey in the winter of 1876-77 nor for 
Turkey in the spring of 1878 show that the government operated according to its 
own rules and values, not those of the Hyde Park protestors. 
At the same time, it is also clear that the Hyde Park protestors were not themselves 
subject to the whims of the government. Gladstone's Bulgarian Horrors pamphlet 
was able to reach an incredibly wide audience and become synonymous with a 
public movement that operated on a truly mass scale. 10 However, the contrasting 
fate of his article The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem has been shown to be a 
case in point of how his earlier pamphlet derived its success from following, rather 
than leading public sentiment. ll Prominent figures like Gladstone were able to 
achieve much publicity and popularity when they articulated existing sentiments, 
but could not generate large-scale movements ex nihilo. 
Evidently, whilst public activity could not simply be whipped up by the pens of men 
such as Gladstone, neither did it emerge spontaneously from nowhere. The 
reporting of events in a manner which was perceived as sufficiently reliable to be 
trustworthy, yet laced with enough indignation and scandal to demand a moral 
response was crucial to this. Whilst the loudest demands for action and 
declarations of how to interpret the evidence inevitably came from the more 
partisan elements of the Press, more moderate sections such as The Times, still 
played a Significant role in the formation of opinion, by supporting the factual 
claims of the other publications, yet presenting them in an apparently more matter-
of-fact fashion. 
9 See above, pp.l0l-l02. 
10 See above, pp.l07 and after. 
11 See above, p.164. 
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One theme which has recurred time and again throughout this study is that of the 
hostility between Russia and Great Britain. Although there seems to be little to 
suggest that Russian and British Foreign Policy aims were in any meaningful way 
incompatible during this period, it certainly does appear that there was a growing 
perception amongst diverse elements of the population that this was the case. For 
this reason, it is possible to see increased periods of Press interest and indeed of 
reported public activity within that same Press at whichever point a particular 
Balkan issue, or even a population group began to be viewed differently through 
the prism of perceived hostile activity on the part of the rival Power. This has 
already been seen in the case of Greece: for the British Press, Greece was of 
greatest interest when it could serve as a counter-weight (or a bulwark) to Russian 
ambitions, a role traditionally fulfilled by Turkey. For Russia, by contrast, Greece 
was to be praised when aiding and abetting the general good of dismembering 
Turkey, but to be condemned when it followed British advice. 12 Likewise, the 
various Slav populations of the Balkans could also trace trends in the amount of 
interest shown in them which owed more to the relative movements of Lord Derby 
and Chancellor Gorchakov than to anything happening within the Balkans itself. 
The fact that Britain and Russia did not, ultimately, go to war during the Eastern 
Crisis of 1875 - 1878 is of course due to a multiplicity of factors, Sumner and 
Stojanovic amongst others have shown this, with detailed examination of official 
papers and documents, as well as with the diaries of the politicians occupying the 
highest offices. 13 This study however, has taken a fresh look at the more public 
aspect of the points in time when war seemed the most likely, and shown that 
there was not at any point in time a clearly articu lated mass desire for armed 
conflict. Individual columnists in Russia expressed a desire for Russia to be 
rewarded for her efforts, and crowds gather in Hyde Park ostensibly to protest 
against Russia grabbing too large a portion of the Balkan settlement, but these 
expressions of demands failed to prove a necessity of war. In some instances, they 
did not demand it, and in others, such as sections of the Jingo movement, when 
12 See above, pp.166-171, 176-177. G 
13 S.H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, (Oxford, 1937), M.D. Stojanovic, The reat 
Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, [1939], (Cambridge, 1968 Edn). 
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they did, it was in such a fashion as to fail to impress the neces·t f fl· Sl Y 0 con let upon 
the masses, let alone upon the government. Despite all of this, it has also been 
shown clearly here that had a war come between Russia and Britain (from the 
deeds of Tsars and Ministers), there would have been ample pre-existing sentiment 
in the Press which was hostile to the new enemy, sentiment which the Press 
certainly believed reflected the popular mood. 
Further Study 
As a study of the Press, this work has, inevitably been constrained by the relatively 
narrow number of publications that have formed the basis of the sample. However, 
whilst the addition of new metropolitan titles might help to flesh-out in some 
places the journalistic picture, it seems that the future for research in this area 
might more profitably lie in a different direction. As has already been noted, this 
work is unique in combining primary source research into both the British and the 
Russian side of the crisis. This has allowed a direct comparison between the moods 
being expressed in the educated press of the two countries for the first time. 
This study has also drawn upon existing research carried out in a number of specific 
areas, such as MacKenzie's study of the Serbian Press. 14 However, many areas 
remain ill-illuminated. The Balkan Christians whose fate aroused so much interest, 
and to an even greater extent their Turkish neighbours, overlords and opponents 
remain in the realm of English-language historiography on the Eastern Crisis, merely 
objects. No comparable consideration of the Constantinople Press exists, and if it 
did, the addition of this new dimension would add significantly to our 
understanding of the position of the Press as an intermediary between society and 
government. Furthermore, as has been noted, these studies have been primarily if 
not exclusively metropolitan in their focus, and can offer little information on the 
position of events outside of London, Moscow, or St. Petersburg. 
With the growth in recent years of more regional studies, and particularly of the 
current within the historiography of Russia for considering the attitudes of minority 
14 D. MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878, (New York, 1967). 
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populations, there is doubtless an opportunity here. 15 Whilst the Ottoman Empire 
is, of course, instantly recognised as an Islamic Power, it is often neglected that 
Russia and Great Britain also governed two of the world's largest Muslim 
populations. Although the British Imperial Muslim population particularly was 
separated from the metropolitan population by many thousands of miles, India 
particularly formed so central a part in any British Imperialist's thinking that no 
right-minded politician would have wanted to risk a pronouncement which he 
generally believed could have aggravated the Indian situation to the detriment of 
British rule. Whilst this remains a moderately unexplored area, despite significant 
recent positive steps,16 the significance of Russia's Muslim population has been an 
area of considerable interest for scholars in recent years. 17 Whilst thus far, the 
focus has primarily been upon Russian attempts to colonise the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, it would not require a great leap for the views of these figures to be 
considered with regard to the Eastern Crisis. 18 Perhaps the most significant addition 
to the views advanced in this thesis would be affected by an inclusion of the 
perspective of Turkish Muslims on the crisis. Whilst there have been attempts 
within this work to relate the study to some of the existing historiography on the 
Ottoman Empire there has, it appears, thus far been no English language study of 
the Eastern Crisis during the 1870s, nor of the Eastern Question during the 
Nineteenth Century, which has been written primarily, or even substantially, from a 
15 The regional studies of Russia are numerous, for example, see S. Badcock, Politics and the People 
in Revolutionary Russia: A Provincial History, (Cambridge, 2007); A.B. Retish, 'Creating Peasant 
Citizens: Rituals of Power, Rituals of Citizenship in Vi atka Province, 1917,' Revolutionary Russia, 16, 
1, (2003), pp.47-67; The study of minority populations within Russia has formed a major strand. of 
the work of the journal Ab Imperio since its launch in 2000, dedicated to 'studies of New Imperial 
History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space.' [http://abimperio.net!cgi-
bin!aishow.pl?state=contents&idlang=l] Last accessed 22/2/12. . 
16 E.g. K. Robbins & J. Fisher, Religion and Diplomacy: Religion and British foreign ~ O " c y y 1815.to 
1941, (Dodrecht, 2010); J. Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, NatIonal IdentIty ~ n d d
Europe, (Cambridge, 2006); s. Collini, R. Whatmore & B. Young History, Religion and Culture: Bntlsh 
Intellectual History, 1750-1950, (Cambridge, 2000). . . 
17 E.g. N. Breyfogle, 'Enduring Imperium: Russia/Soviet Union/Eurasia as multlethnlc, 
multiconfessional space,' Ab Imperio, 1 (2008), pp.79-107; R.D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam 
and empire in Russia and Central Asia, (Cambridge, Mass, 2006). , . 
18 'Russia Unbound: historical Framework and the Challenge of Globalism, Ab Impeno, 1 (2010), 
p.68. 
214 
Turkish and/or Muslim perspective.19 Such a work would provide considerable 
amounts of fresh perspective for the historiography of this topic. 
Whilst this work has already brought an unprecedented degree of breadth to a 
consideration of the Eastern Crisis, there is also further scope for incorporating 
other factors into the study of this topic. An issue given only brief consideration in 
this thesis, as well as in the recent work of Kovic, is the question of Jewishness and 
anti-semitism in relation to the Eastern Crisis. 20 Whilst Disraeli's Jewishness is, of 
course, a subject which has received a significant amount of scholarly attention, the 
existing work seems to exist in its own academic ghetto, and has thus far had little 
to no impact upon general histories of the Eastern Crisis. 21 
In all then, it seems that despite significant steps forward in recent years, there 
remains a continuing Christian/Slav-centric perspective to most studies of the 
Eastern Question, where Jewish or Muslim perspectives could provide fresh and 
more meaningful categories of exploration. 
f ernmentality at the local 
19 See above, e.g. pp.37-38; M.S. Saracoglu, 'some aspects ~ ~ Ottoman gov d 1870s ' Ab Imperio 2 
level: the judicio-administrative sphere of the Vidin county In the 1860s an, ' , 
(2008), pp.224-253. 
20 M. Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, (Oxford, 2011.)' 002) 
21 See e.g. T.M. Endelman & T. Kushner (Eds.), Disraeli's Jewishness, (London, 2 . 
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